DEL COMITÉEJECUTIVO

Respect for the moral law must be the starting point for any other sense in which

we might have respect for a person. We respect others only insofar as 1) the moral law

requires us to, or 2) others provide an example of moral uprightness in general and

341 _{Collins Lectures 27:665. Note that Kant here talks as if positive honor is owed to those who}

have committed good acts that exceed what is required of them. It seems clear, though, that what Kant really has in mind are wide duties. He also says that it is indeed impossible to do more than is incumbent on us since “everything is required” but we can compare out fulfillment of our wide obligations in comparison with other human beings and can receive positive honor when our achievements in the moral realm are compared to those of others.


commitment to the narrow duties that are required by the moral law in particular. In other

words, the two senses of respect that are directed towards other people ultimately have

their source in respect for the moral law. Respect for the moral law, then, grounds respect for other people (in both senses). That is, respect for the moral law is the most basic kind

of moral respect. Without respect for the moral law, respect for other people is actually not

rationally anchored in anything. In all likelihood, without respect for the moral law, so-

called “respect” for other people is mere sentimental outpouring that has nothing to do

with serious morality.

An interesting question to consider in light of Kant’s contention that most, if not

all, people are actually evil (that is, they privilege self-love over morality) is whether or

not respect for the moral law is possible in imperfectly moral people (that is, people who

while affectively responsive to the moral law fail to live up to its dictates when faced with

enough resistance from inclinations). In my view, respect for the moral law is an affective

state brought about by the striking down of self-love when it conflicts with the

requirements of the moral law. It follows, then, that cases of authentic respect for the

moral law, according to Kant, will be infrequent, vanishingly so. Respect for the moral

law will occur in cases where 1) the person experiences a moral crisis in which nature

leads him or her in one direction and freedom in another and 2) the person possesses a

good will and thus strikes down self-love in favor of morality.

Respect for persons, therefore, comes after possession of a good will. While the duties of respect are unconditionally required of us, only those who have achieved a good

While each sense of respect is distinct from the other, there are similarities

between all three senses of respect’s impact on our affective state. Each sense of respect

dramatizes, internally (in our own minds), the moral crisis that is an inevitable part of our

experience of moral life. In all three senses, there is a dynamic (and sometimes

antagonistic) interplay between what the moral law imposes on us and what inclination

may pull us toward. In the case of respect for the moral law, we must, at times, restrict the

efficaciousness of inclination in our decision making in order to do our duty. In the case of

our duties of respect, we may be tempted to act on inclinations that would assert

superiority over others. Finally, in the case of merit-based respect, our own conscience

may be pained by the respect we irresistibly give to moral exemplars. As a result, we may

have an inclination to seek out ways in which we can diminish the degree to which we

must afford them respect (though of course this could easily lapse into a serious violation

of our duties of respect). Each sense of respect, cultivates in us authentic humility.342 _{In his} discussion of the vice of servility in the Metaphysics of Morals, Kant writes, “True

humility follows unavoidably from our sincere and exact comparison of ourselves with the

moral law (its holiness and strictness).”343 Each sense of respect reminds us, in one way or

another, of our propensity toward evil. They engender, like much of Kant’s moral theory

as a whole, honest self-reflection about our own problematic and complex relation to the

moral law.

342 _{Kant offers a definition of humility in Metaphysics of Morals when he writes, “The}

consciousness and feeling of the insignificance of one’s moral worth in comparison with the law is humility (humilitas moralis)” (6:435).


CHAPTER 4

The Sublime and Its Relation to Kant’s Moral Philosophy Introduction

This chapter examines some issues surrounding Kant’s account of the sublime

and its relation to his moral philosophy. In particular, it focuses on the relation between

the moral feeling of respect and the feeling that constitutes a dynamically sublime

experience. I begin with a discussion of Kant’s description of the sublime as given in The Critique of the Power of Judgment. I then consider the relationship between the sublime and morality. In particular, I discuss some similarities and differences between the moral

feeling of respect and the feeling of the sublime. In this section, I also consider the

indirect contribution to morality that the sublime makes. I discuss the role sublimity has

in Kant’s broader moral philosophy and consider the implications that sublimity has on

subjects who undergo a sublime experience. I argue that sublimity does not reveal

anything new to the subject, but it does dramatize the preexisting receptivity to moral

ideas that the subject must have in order to have a sublime experience in the first place.