had represented to the Amban that the British attack on Nepal was a pre lude to their invasion pf Tibet; the Chinese were entreated to attack Bengal in order to create a diversion in Nepal*s favour. The Chinese
Emperor sent a general with troops to Lhasa to ascertain if the British 28
had really any design on 'Tibet and to oppose them if they had.
Although by then the war had been over, Moira was troubled with the thought that China might resent the British establishing treaty relations with Nepal ignoring her suzerain. A British Residency at Kath mandu. established by the treaty of Sagauli could also stimulate China*s jealousy and suspicioh, particularly as she herself had no such establi shment in Nepal. 'The Nepalese sought to exploit this anxiety. They infor med the Resident* Edward Gardner, that
China was deeply offended, considering Nepal as tributary to the Emperor as this government having entered into war and concluded peace with the English without his sanction and knowledge. 29
To meet the supposed Chinese wrath the Nepalese government sought the British protection, calculating that rather than risk a conflict with China, the British would withdraw the Residency and restore the Nepal
30
Terai they had annexed. The stratagem had very nearly worked. Moira,who was having trouble with the Marathas and the Pindaris, could have hardly defended the British position in Nepal if openly challenged by China. 28. Papers Relating to the Nepaul War, p. 556, Moira to Secret Committee,
11 May 1815*JJEUEraser, Journal of a tour through part of the Himala Mountains, pp.536-7* Rose, op.cit., pp.210-11. A*Lamb, Britain and Chinese Central Asia, p.41* Chittaranjan Nepali, Bhimsen Thapa, pp. 136-8, 145-6, 157* the Nepalese King*s letters to the Chinese Emperor and the Amban, ws.
29* S.C., 14 September 1816, No.41* Gardner to Govt., 28 August 1816. 30. Ibid., Nos.39* 41-2.
114
He was, therefore, prepared, should the Chinese insist, to withdraw the Residency and avert a misunderstanding with China for the sake of Brita-
31 in's China trade.
Fortunately, however, the Chinese authorities in Tibet were apparently satisfied with Moira*s explanation of the war and his assurance that the Company*s relations with Nepal would leave the Chi nese position there unaffected. What the British had done was "perfectly correct and proper", the Chinese general at Lhasa assured the Governor*-
32
General. The Chinese Emperor had confidentially asked the Amban to keep 33
the British away from Kathmandu, but the Amban made rather a mild requ est for the withdrawal of the Residency "out of kindness towards us phi-
34
nese] and in consideration of the ties of friendship" • Moira chose to ignore this, and the Chinese did not press it further. In May 1818 they declared that they were finally satisfied with the Company*s settlement
35
with Nepal. The Chinese also did not embarrass Amherst, as they did 36
Macartney earlier, by raising the Nepalese issue with him.
China's attitude during the war was clear evidence that she had little sympathy for Nepal and no desire whatsoever to be drawn into a conflict with the British for Nepal's sake. The Amban and the 31* S.C., 14 September 1816, No*43* Govt, to Gardner, 14 September 1816.
Lamb, op.cit.,p.45* Rose, op.cit., pp.212-3* 32. S.C., 9 November 1816, No.19*
33* E.H.Parker, "Nepaul and China", Imperial and Asiatic Quarterly Review, Vol.VII* 1B99* py*73* The sources used in this article are Chinese. 34* T.Smith, op.cit., p.88.
35* S.C., 11 January 1817* No.7* 15 May 1818, No.69*
115
Chinese general strongly distrusted the Nepalese. Not to speak of mili tary assistance, not even pecuniary help was given to Nepal because, as the Amban explained ii^iis letter to the Nepalese King, "it is not custo mary to give treasures of China to other countries". The general had also no faith in the Nepalese? he wrote to Moira to explain the genesis of the war so that he could expose "the falsehood of the Goorkha raja". It seemed to the general "quite inconsistent with the usual wisdom of the English" that they should invade Tibet when they had such a heavy stake in the China trade. The Nepalese government were threatened with punish-
37 ment if their allegation against the English proved false.
China did not claim any monopoly of relations with Nepal; the Emperor, as E.H.Parker citing Chinese sources informs us, clearly disavowed any responsibility for the removal of the British Residency from Kathmandu and told the Nepalese King that since he and the British lived "in far distant countries" the "sovereign authority of the Emperor
38
of China does not extend" over Nepal. What China seems to have been concerned with was the continuance of Nepal's tributary relations with the Manchu Court. It is significant that while disclaimimg any obligation for the protection of Nepal from the British, the Amban reminded the
Nepalese government of their commitment to regularly send tributary miss- 39
ions to Peking. Obviously, from the Chinese point of viww Nepal's treaty 37* Foreign Office, Kathmandu, Letter of Chinese Amban to King of Nepal,
Chachin Varsa 12,Mahina 3 Ka Din 8.Nepali, op.cit., pp.301-2,312-4* Letters from Chinese authorities in Tibet to the King of Nepal, 1815- 6. 5.C., 13 July 1816, No.17; 27 July 1816, No.12. Rose, op.cit.,pp. 210, 211-4.
38. Parker, "China, Nepaul, Bhutan and Sikkim", op.cit., pp. 149-50* "China and Nepaul", op.cit., p*78. Nepali, op.cit., p.305*S.C., 22
June 1816, No.31* Pemberton thought that the Chinese did not exte nd their direct authority beyond Tibet for fear of contact with the British. Report on his mission to Bhutan, op.cit., p.8.
39* Parker, "China, Nepaul, Bhutan and Sikkim", op.cit., 149-58* See aClso Chapter VI, p. 240.
116 relations with the British had made little change to her status as a Chinese tributary.
The Anglo-Nepalese war had some other results as well* 'The Residency henceforth served as an observation post in the Himalayan region whence the British could take a better view of the Chinese in
Tibet. At Kumaun and Garhwal the British territory became directly coterminous with the Chinese territory in Tibet* The Raja of Sikkim who had helped the British in the war was assured of British protec
tion against a future Nepalese invasion without any apparent Chinese 40
opposition* The British appeared as a potential force in the Himalayan area where China had already established her influence.
II
The Nepalese policy after the war was to balance China
against British India as a measure of security against domination by the latter* Politically relations with China were now found more useful to the Nepalese government than ever before* Missions were sent to Peking with scrupulous care and regularity, bearing tributes of indigeneous
products and letters from the Nepalese kings paying homage to the Chi nese Emperors and invoking their blessings. The missions took normally about two years to cover the journey both ways. The distance between
41
Kathmandu and Peking through Lhasa, Tachienlu and Chengtu was about
40. The Treaty of Sagauli obliged Nepal to accept British arbitration in her disputes with Sikkim. The Treaty of Titalya(1817) committed the Raja of Sikkim to assistance to the British in any hill campaign. Aitchison, Treaties, (1909 edn,),II, pp.112,322-3.
41• Tachienlu on the Szechuan border was an important trade centre. Cheng tu was the capital of Szechuan.
117
2<?00 miles* Hie missions stayed , in Peking for forty five days and then returned to Kathmandu, bringing valuable presents from the Emperor along with a letter to the King of Nepal advising him to govern well and to
receive the Emperor's blessings* The members of the missions were provi ded with food, transport and accommodation by the Tibetan and Chinese authorities as &oon as they crossed the Nepalese frontier. The goods
carried by the missions on their outward and return journeys passed duty 42
free. On their return the missions were receiveda:/few) miles away from Kathmandu by the King of Nepal under whose personal supervision purifi cation ceremonies were held to restore the members of the missions to caste which they were supposed to have lost by going to foreign lands with strange customs and practices. Then, accompanied by the officers of the state and a large body of soldiers, the King escorted the miss ions into the capital where people stood in hundreds to welcome this impressive symbol of their country's relations with the most powerful oriental state. In the full darbar the Emperor's presents brought by the missions were displayed and his •'decree'* blessing his loyal and humble vassal read. And all this the British Resident noted together with the implied warning : keep off from Nepal on pain of Chinese repri
sal. The Nepalese government strongly beliebed, as Hodgson reported to the Government, that "we should hesitate at any time to push to extremi-
43