42. B.H.Hodgson,"Route of Nepalese Mission to Pekin with remarks on the watershed and plateau of Tibet" in Miscellaneous Essays Relating to Indian Subjects, II^>.167 et seq. Also in J.A.3.B.,Vol.XXV,183^,pp.473-^7
43* 3«C., 14 October 1829, No.23, Oldfield, I, 411-2. F.M,, V0I.36O, Report on Nepal, by 0. Cavenagh, I85I, pp.54-9*
118
For Nepal connexion with China was not merely a useful deter rent to British hegemony "but a means of embarrassing them as well* No wonder,then,that the Anglo-Chinese war (1839-42) should be seized upon by the Nepalese government, then dominated by the bitterly anti-British
44
Pandes, as their opportunity. Emissaries were sent to Lhasa and Peking offering assistance to the Chinese and seeking their support against the British who were represented as a common enemy of China, Tibet, Nepal,
45
Bhutan and Sikkim. The King of Nepal, Rajendra Vikram, Hodgson reported, professed "extreme eagerness to throw off his allegiance to the British and to resume the old career of his ancestors'* by strengthening relations with the Emperor. Throughout the China war, which coincided with the
46
first Afghan war and other troubles, Hodgson was concerned that the Nepalese situation would turn even worse if China gave military aid or
47 even moral encouragement to the Pandes.
The situation became further complicated when the Dogras in- 48
vaded western Tibet in May 1841. The Bogras under Raja Gulab Singh and Dhian Singh had brought Ladakh, which paid tribute to Lhasa, under their
49
sway in 1834-5* Both the ruler of Ladakh and the Dogras, the latter possi bly fearing Chinese intervention, asked for Nepalese assistance, Rajendra 44* See Chapter I, p*33*
45* Missions were also sent to Bhutan and Sikkim asking them to rise te pise against the British and pledging Nepal*s assistance for the re covery of Darjiling and the Assam Duars from the British.
46. See Chapter I, pp.33-4*
47* S.C., 26 December 1839* No.139» 14 December 1842, No.83; 10 August 1842, No.126. Parker, "Nepaul and China”, p.80.
48. M.W.Fisher, Leo Rose, and R.A.Huttenback, Himalayan Battleground, pp. 49-59*K.M.Panikkar, The Founding of the Kashmir State ,pp.74-89* Tsa- kabpa, op.cit.,pp.176-80. Khuswant Singh, A History of' the Bikhs,II, pp.21-4.Pre-Mutiny Records of the Kumaun District, Political Letters Received, Series III, Vol.I, No(ll7; Political Letters Issued, Volfv,
No.50. 1 n
119
Vikram was willing to help the ruler of Ladakh and asked the Amban for authority to do so, As-prtce he wanted the Tibetan territory adjoining the Kerung and Kuti passes. But the Chinese did not want any embroilment with the British on the Indian frontier when at home they were being defeated by the British. 'Therefore, to the Nepalese entreaties for assis
tance against the British the Emperor gave a "stern refusal" together with a strong warning to Rajendra Vikram against excessive restlessness;
50 the latter was rebuked for his "silly requests" for Tibetan territory, Rajendra Vikram was told, so Hodgson reported to Government, that the Chinese government "has little or no purpose to interfere with ladakh politics1,1' and so the Nepalese would do well to confine themselves to "the established circle of connection cherishing peace and good faith within
51
that circle and to be less heedful of novelties beyond it", A Nepalese- Ladakhi alliance, so the Chinese will have thought, could lead to the intervention of the Lahore government where the Dogra rajas had commah-
52
ding influence; and it might even bring in the British who had treaty relations with the Lahore government.
Rajendra Vikram then sounded Hodgson if the Nepalese 53
government could help the Dogras against the 'Tibetans; the King perhaps expected that the British would welcome suck a means of harming the Chi nese. Hodgson had no doubt that the real intention of the King and the 50. Parker, "Nepaul and China", p.80.
51. 3»C«, 31 May 1841, No.154, Resident to Govt., 20 May 1841. 52. Panikkar, op.cit., pp.19-41*
53* R&ja Dhian Singh asked for Nepalese assistance in the Dogra difficul ties with the ruler of Ladakh. This is mentioned in a secret report from Major Ra^iubir Singh and Jamadar Mannu Singh, Nepalese agents at the Lahore darbar, to the King of Nepal. 'The report, dated August 1838, is in the Foreign Office, Kathmandu. For its English translation with Notes see my article "A Note on Anglo-Nepalese Relations in 1838", Bengal past and Present, Vol.LKXKVI, January-June 19o7, PP*1“9«
120
Pandes was somehow to involve the British with t&e Chinese, and there fore he discouraged the King*s intentions. "We had no desire", he told Rajendra Vikram, "to do injury to China in any quarter and should will ingly desist from our compulsory operations in China proper as soon as
54 justice had been rendered to us."
In the autumn of 1841 the Dogras conquered Gartok and the neighbouring Tibetan territories. Hodgson was now apprehending the appearance of a Chinese army on the scene?counting on whose support the Pandes would goad the Nepalese troops to invade ti^ British terri tory. Further, since the Dogra rajas were subjects of tjie state of Lahore which was in alliance with the British, the Chinese might sus- pect the British having incited the Dogras to attack 'Tibet, and if so they "are very likely to resent it by letting loose Nepal upon us", so Hodgson warned the Government. And then, he added,
with Chinese, Sikhs and Gurkhas we shall ere long find ourselves of necessity involved in a labyrinth of trans-Himalayan politics the clue to which may be difficult to find and unprofitable to use when found. 55
Besides, the Dogra military activities in Ladakh and western Tibet had seriously affected trade in shawl wool, borax, salt and opium in
<u~
56
which both the British and Chinese governments had^interest* This led the British government to make a strong representation to Maharaja sher- Singh, the ruler of the state of Lahore, that the Dogra activities must 54* S.C.,3 January 1842 ^Resident to Govt., 20 December 1841*
55* 3.C., 11 October 1841, No.89, Resident to Govt., 11 October 1841* 56. Ibid., 13 December 1841, No.42. Cunningham, op.cit., pp.244*248.
121
stop. Towards the end of 1841 a Sino-Tibetan army arrived and routed the Dogra troops* killing their general, Zorawar Singh. With the end of
57 the war, Nepalese restlessness abated.
Neither the Anglo-Chinese war nor the Dogra-Tibetan war- could be exploited by Nepal because the Chinese refused to pla^ into the hands of the Nepalese; the Chinese would not encourage Nepalese militarism in any way nor give them any excuse for realising their territorial ambi tions in Tibet. Nepal*s offer of assistance against the British might have appeared to China rather a ruse to serve her own interests than a token of sincere allegiance to her suzerain. Hodgson*s reports suggest that the Nepalese King even tried to blackmail the Chinese. His letter to the Amban contained a threat that if the Chinese did not help Nepal against the British, the King "shall be necessitated" to seek British
58
assistance against China "which he has only to ask for in order to get". The Amban cooly replied that the Emperor "never sends troops to protect
59
the lands of foreign barbarians". Once again the Nepalese had seen how difficult it was to embroil the Chinese withi the British and to reap political harvest therefrom.
57. On Nepal's role in the Dogra cappaign in western Tibet see my article, "Nepal and the Sikh-Tibetan War, 1841-2", Bengal Past and Present , Vol.LKXXII, January-June 1963, pp.12-25*
58. S»C., 14 September 1842, No.83, Translation of a Nepalese secret repp- rt enclosed in Residents letter to Govt., 2 September 1842.
59- Leo Rose, "Sino-Indian Rivalry and the Himalayan border states", Orbis, Summer 1961, p.202. Rose has drawn on Chinese sources. Hodgson also had earlier reported that "no importance is attached by the Chinese to their relations with Nepal, and they are maintained by Nepal chief ly or solely to be played off against us [British], if need be" .Letter
122
III
From the middle of the 19th century the pattern of Nepal's rela tions with China and Britain started changing as a result of two facts 5 the establishment of the Rana regime with its settled policy of friend liness and cooperation with the British government; and the decline of the Chinese power. The Nepalese government were no longer eager to ex ploit the British troubles; rather they sought to make a profitable use of their alliance with the British, China's weakness was exposed in her successive discomfitures, both military and diplomatic, at the hands of Britain, France, Russia and Japan; revolts and insurrections in the out lying provinces and dependencies indicated the Chinese imperial govern ment's loosening grip over these regions.
The decline of China's power stimulated Nepal's military ambitions in Tibet and the hope of British support made Chinese retribution a less dangerous prospect in Nepalese eyes than it was before. Since the war in 1788-92 Nepal's relations with Tibet had been uneasy as indicated by the periodical disputes over border tracts and trade matters. The Amban medi-
60