Derecho Penal en Ecuador

4.2.1. Early post-Soviet Central Asia: a non-priority for the EU

This subsection discusses the EU‟s policies towards the former Soviet bloc in the wake of the disintegration of the Soviet Union. It shows that while the policies were designed to build ties with the former Soviet bloc countries and help them on the path of transition, they distinguished rather heavily between the different post-Soviet states. As such, the Central Asian republics received only a fraction of the attention paid by the EU to the group of former socialist countries. Above all, the limited involvement of the EU in 1990s Central Asia mirrored its scarce interests in this peripheral and rather unknown region.

Following the demise of the Soviet Union in 1991, the EU conducted a conceptual redivision of the former Soviet bloc. In practice, this implied that the EU formulated two distinct policy agendas for two very different groups of countries, closely reflecting the EU‟s foreign policy priorities at the time. On the one hand, the Union extended the already existing assistance programmes „Poland and Hungary Assistance for Restructuring their Economies‟ (PHARE) to those countries in Central and Eastern Europe likely to join the EU in the medium-to-long term, notably Slovakia, Czech Republic, Romania, Bulgaria, Slovenia, Estonia, Lithuania and Latvia. These states were not only geographically closer to the EU, but they were also more dependent on the Union in comparison with the other countries of the former Soviet bloc. Moreover, and partly as a result of this, they were also more inclined to comply with the conditions imposed by the EU. On the other hand, the Union created a new assistance programme for the remaining group of former Soviet states, i.e. „Technical

- 98 -

Assistance for the Common Wealth of Independent States‟ (TACIS).88

Both PHARE and TACIS provided technical and financial assistance to support these countries‟ transition towards market economies and democracies. However, the PHARE beneficiaries received more than double the amount spent on the TACIS programme.89 This clearly indicates that Central and Eastern Europe was much more important for the EU‟s 1990s foreign policy than the other countries of the former Soviet bloc (Hughes, 2007: 76-96). In addition, the EU also made a clear categorisation within the group of TACIS beneficiaries, with Russia and the Ukraine being prioritised over the others and receiving around 50% of the total TACIS budget.

As a next step in its conceptual redivision of the former Soviet bloc, the EU institutionalised the policy-oriented disconnection of Central and Eastern Europe from Russia and the other former soviet bloc countries. It did so by concluding „Europe Agreements‟ with the Central and Eastern European candidate member states and Partnership and Cooperation Agreements (PCAs) with the TACIS beneficiaries countries, including the Central Asian countries. While the Europe Agreements were aimed at integrating the partner countries into the EU, the PCAs served mainly just to strengthen the EU‟s bilateral ties with the TACIS countries and to develop broad cooperation. Replacing the 1989 Trade and Cooperation Agreement with the Soviet Union, PCAs were concluded with Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan in

1995, and with Uzbekistan in 1996.90 A PCA was signed with Turkmenistan in 1998, but the

agreement is not yet enforced as the ratification process remains frozen (see more below). The conclusion of a PCA with Tajikistan was delayed until 2004 due to the civil war and

subsequent perceptions of instability (see more below).91 The overall goal of the PCAs was to

provide a broad framework of economic and political cooperation with the former Soviet states, supporting them in their transition towards open market economies and political democracies. Yet, although the PCAs with the Central Asian countries provide for the establishment of political dialogue92, covering human rights, constitutional reform and regional issues, they are primarily economically and technically oriented, with their political and institutional framework being less elaborate than that of other PCAs, particularly those with Russia and Ukraine (Matveeva, 2006: 85; Petrov, 2002). Still, the PCAs with the Central

88

The TACIS beneficiaries included Russia, the Ukraine, Belarus, Moldova, Georgia, Armenia, Azerbaijan and the five Central Asian states.

89 _{In the period 1990-1999, the EU spent ca. EUR 10,200 m. on PHARE and EUR 4,200 m. on TACIS (Hughes,}

2007).

90 _{These three PCAs entered into force in July 1999 for an initial period of ten years, automatically renewable on}

an annual basis thereafter.

91 _{The PCA with Tajikistan entered into force in January 2010. Previously, an Interim Agreement on Trade and}

Trade-related Matters between the EU and Tajikistan had been in force since May 2005.

92 _{As we will see in more detail in chapter 6, the PCAs provide for three political dialogue structures, the}

- 99 -

Asian republics provide the legal basis for cooperation across a wide range of sectors, including trade, economic cooperation, legislative approximation to EU norms and standards, and improvement of the business and investment climate.

In sum, the EU‟s conceptual redivision of the former Soviet bloc in the 1990s meant that the former Soviet states - except for the three Baltic states - were placed in the category of „outsiders‟. These states were to constitute the EU‟s eastern periphery, with whom contractual relations would not go beyond the level of „partnership‟. Situated at the most outward point of this eastern periphery, the Central Asian republics triggered only little interest from Brussels throughout the 1990s, even less so since the EU considered Central Asia as the most backward region in the former Soviet Union, and as the least inclined to adopt European norms and values (Kassenova, 2007). Indeed, while the Kazakh, Kyrgyz and Uzbek leaderships were enthusiastic about forging stronger relations with the EU when signing the EU-initiated PCAs, their enthusiasm was only marginally reciprocated, especially as the EU‟s political engagement with the region remained low-key.

4.2.2. Generous but invisible

The EU may well have provided relatively small amounts of assistance to Central Asia in comparison with its aid to other parts of the former Soviet bloc; nevertheless, the Union has grown out to be the largest donor in Central Asia (Djalili & Kellner, 2008). At the same time, however, the EU‟s engagement with the region remained low in terms of visibility. Moreover, assessments of the impact of the EU‟s assistance programmes were mixed. Other donors in Central Asia, including the U.S. and the UN, were also criticised for the limited impact of their aid programmes, but they did not suffer from the same lack of visibility as the EU did.

The European Commission opened its first delegation office in Central Asia in 1994, in Almaty, the then capital of Kazakhstan. The delegation was charged with implementing part of the EU‟s technical and financial assistance in Kazakhstan, Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan.93 Later on, the Commission opened a regionalised office in Bishkek and in Dushanbe, supervised by a chargé d‟affaires and subject to the head delegation in

Kazakhstan.94 At the time, the Commission was already represented in Dushanbe, through the

Central Asian office of the European Commission Humanitarian Office‟s (ECHO). This

93

In 2006, the Commission moved the head office of the Delegation to Astana, Kazakhstan‟s new capital, with the remaining desks in Almaty functioning as a regional office.

94 _{The office in Dushanbe opened in May 2004. Following the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty in December}

2009, the Commission delegation in Kazakhstan as well as the regionalised offices in Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan became fully accredited „EU Delegations‟, each headed by an EU ambassador.

- 100 -

regional office opened in 1993 in order to coordinate the EU‟s provision of humanitarian aid to Tajikstan and Kyrgyzstan. ECHO assistance was generally provided to the most vulnerable parts of the population, usually living in disaster-prone areas, and consisted, among other

things, of drugs, food and medical supplies.95 In Kyrgyzstan, humanitarian aid was provided,

for instance, in 1994 and 1995 to help people after floods and earthquakes. In Tajikistan, ECHO assistance was delivered throughout the civil war, which lasted from 1992 until 1997, unlike TACIS, which was halted after only a few months due to security risks owing to the start of the war in 1992. By 1995, the domestic situation was deemed safe enough for TACIS to resume. From 1996 onwards, the Central Asian states have also been beneficiaries of the ECHO programme „Disaster Preparedness ECHO‟ (DIPECHO), designed for natural disaster preparedness. After the Tajik civil war, the EU continued to deliver humanitarian aid to

Tajikistan, supplemented with technical assistance under TACIS and other aid programmes.96

As an instrument introduced shortly after the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, TACIS was designed to “promote the transition to a market economy and to reinforce democracy and the rule of law in the partner States” (Council, 1999). TACIS in 1990s Central Asia was mostly aimed at economic development, capacity building of government services and poverty reduction (European Commission, 2002). From 1994 onwards, TACIS was also used to fund Tempus projects in Central Asia, aimed at supporting the modernisation of higher education through cooperation with universities from EU Member States. Apart from TACIS and ECHO, a range of other EC instruments were introduced in the 1990s to assist the Central Asian countries. Local NGOs and media, for instance, have been sponsored through the European Initiative (now Instrument) for Democracy and Human Rights (EIDHR), although the number of projects remained scarce until the mid-2000s. In turn, food security aid has been provided through the „Food Security Programme‟. Moreover, the EU has been delivering macro-financial assistance. This has included one-off targeted assistance for the impact of the 1998 Russian economic crisis. In addition, the five Central Asian countries were granted preferential access to the EU‟s market under its „Generalised System of Preferences‟ (GSP).

Next to these national assistance programmes, the EU established a number of regional and transboundary programmes, dealing with transport, energy, environmental issues and drugs trafficking. Two of these programmes even go beyond the region of Central Asia

95 _{International Crisis Group (2006) reports that between 1992 and 2004 Tajikistan was given around EUR 155}

million in humanitarian aid for public health, food security, and transport issues (aviation, security, road and rail, and infrastructure) and sanitation. Between 1992 and 1999, Kyrgyzstan was given EUR 20 million in assistance from ECHO.

96 _{However, due to a deadly incident involving a TACIS expert who had been kidnapped, the EU‟s technical}

assistance to Tajikistan was suspended from 1998 until 2000. The other assistance programmes, including ECHO, EIDHR and FSP, remained operational.

- 101 -

and encompass other countries of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), and in particular countries bordering the Black and Caspian Seas. The first region-wide programme was the „Transport Corridor Europe-Caucasus-Asia‟ (TRACECA), established at a conference in Brussels in 1993. The programme foresees the construction of a vast east-west corridor connecting the EU to the three South Caucasus and five Central Asian states via the Black and Caspian Seas. It provides both technical aid and infrastructure rehabilitation projects, adding up to a value of EUR 110 million in 1993-2002. In turn, the „Interstate Oil and Gas Transport to Europe‟ programme (INOGATE) was established in the mid-1990s as part of EU efforts to strengthen its energy security. The programme is based on an umbrella agreement concerning the integration of oil and gas transport systems, signed by no less than 21 countries. An EC regional programme that is exclusive to Central Asia is the „Central Asia Drugs Action Programme‟ (CADAP), originally a French initiative launched after a 1996 declaration by President Chirac. Following French promotion and assessment efforts, the programme was adopted by the Commission, which established CADAP in early 2001. Aimed at supporting the Central Asian states at fighting drugs trafficking across their borders, CADAP comprises “legal advice, training, strengthening law enforcement capacities, forensics and intelligence gathering together with preventative measures, such as anti-drug projects in prisons” (Matveeva, 2006: 88-89).

With EU assistance between 1991 and 2002 totalling around EUR 944 million, the EU grew out to be the largest donor in the region (European Commission, 2002: 12). However, this cumulative amount conceals the paradox that, despite being the most generous donor in the region, the Union was a rather invisible development actor in Central Asia, especially in comparison with other donors, including the U.S., the UN and Asian and Muslim development agencies. Moreover, assessments of the impact of the EU‟s assistance programmes were mixed. One of the problems was the breadth of the objectives and programmes, which negatively affected the time delivery, effectiveness and follow-up of the projects (European Commission, 2002). Another obstacle was that reform in the Central Asian states was slower than in most other CIS countries, amongst other things due to limited administrative and technical capacity. Crucially, this indicated that the Central Asian states faced problems that went beyond matters of „transition‟ for which TACIS was not adequately equipped. As a first step in accommodating for the special needs of the Central Asian countries, the Commission introduced its Food Security Programme to the region in 1996 to address problems of inadequate access to food in impoverished parts of Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan. The programme is based primarily on the provision of budget support to ministries and government agencies to implement reforms, in particular in the areas of agriculture, social

- 102 -

protection and state statistical agencies. However, many donors concur that there are serious limits to budget support when used for promoting reform in a poor country such as Tajikistan (International Crisis Group, 2006: 16). Following an extensive review of its assistance to the region, the Commission acknowledged and addressed many of the shortcomings of its assistance, both in relation to limited effectiveness and to limited visibility, as envisaged in its Regional Strategy Paper for Central Asia for the period 2002-2006 (European Commission, 2002). Amongst other things, the Commission responded to the need to concentrate its assistance on a much more limited number of priorities and programmes and to strengthen dialogue, both on regional cooperation and on TACIS priorities, including through the PCA dialogue mechanisms (ibid.).