DERECHO SOBRE LAS TIERRAS Y LOS RECURSOS NATURALES (CONSULTA PREVIA

What has changed? Why should the U.S. maritime services take maritime security seriously as a body for strategic development and investment in its own right? As

Kilcullen illustrates, the increasingly hybridized nature of urban coastal threats will only compound preexisting stressors like climate change and poverty in the coming decades. Demographic and human geographic changes are placing new and significant stress on

Framing Littoral Maritime Security Through the Lens of the Broken Windows Theory the maritime domain, and projections indicate that these factors will continue to

drastically reshape international security. The resulting pressures those forces will inevitably bring to bear on navies like that of the U.S. are unlike the traditional conflicts Mahanian strategies are optimized to combat. As a consequence, what has also begun to change is the U.S. Navy’s longstanding attitude towards these issues. While not

groundbreaking in practical terms, A Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Seapower and documents like it are nevertheless invitations for “further experimentation.”202 The 2014

Quadrennial Defense Review’s references to non-state actors and their impact amid an interconnected world suggest that the Pentagon has begun to recognize the veracity of alternative security visions that only a decade ago it would have been unlikely to mention.203 We are consequently presented with a compelling picture of the substantive changes taking hold across littorals and naval theorizing. It is the need to address these changes that makes this dissertation relevant. The issues raised above—including austerity, sustainability, urbanization, poverty, globalization, global warming, and third world development—will become increasingly significant throughout the ‘Asian century.’ And while the Asia-Pacific may dominate navies’ attention and resources, finding an effective strategy of maritime security to meet the needs of the growing masses will be indispensable for national security and international affairs.

In the Introduction, we divided the research question into two sub-questions: why should we consider the need for a new perspective in naval strategy, and what is the Broken Windows theory? In this chapter we turned to the first question; why does it matter? To answer, we looked at demographic and human geographic trends, gaining a better understanding of the global threat forecast over the coming decades. We also looked at how the Pentagon is thinking about the future, how that perspective has the potential to obscure important developments in the littorals, and how the U.S. Navy is slowly addressing some of these most pressing issues. As a consequence, we were able to underscore how Broken Windows’ contextual and communal approach to crime

prevention could prove fruitful as a strong foundation for a new naval littoral strategy. Combined, these factors answer the second of our sub-questions, the ‘so what’ of this research.

In a domain where “the international architecture of the twentieth century is buckling under the weight of new threats,”204 _{the risk of disorder and poor governance is} among the rising themes in American national security publications. From the National Security Strategy,205 to the Pentagon’s Quadrennial Defense Review,206 to A Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Seapower,207 ensuring law and order in the face of threats that recognize no boundaries is among the leading problems of the early twenty-first century. We live in a time when pandemics, global warming, and worldwide networks of crime and terrorism make events in the farthest corner of the planet relevant to every citizen of every country. Developing a sustainable strategy of maritime security capable of

addressing the instability of such unconventional threats requires new ways of thinking about what navies do, and where they do it.

1 _{Pentagon, Quadrennial Defense Review 2014 (Washington, DC: Pentagon, 2014), III.} 2 _{Pentagon, Quadrennial Defense Review 2014, III.}

3 _{Pentagon, Quadrennial Defense Review 2014, 12.} 4 _{Pentagon, Quadrennial Defense Review 2014, VII.}

5 _{Geoffrey Till, Seapower: A Guide for the Twenty-Fist Century 3}rd _{Ed (New York: Routledge, 2013), 25.} 6 _{Kilcullen, Out of the Mountains, 239.}

7 _{Kilcullen, Out of the Mountains, 25.} 8 _{Kilcullen, Out of the Mountains, 25.}

9 _{United Nations, World Population Prospects, The 2012 Revision: Highlights and Advance Tables (New} York: United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs, 2013), xvi,

http://esa.un.org/wpp/Documentation/pdf/WPP2012_HIGHLIGHTS.pdf. 10 _{Kilcullen, Out of the Mountains, 29.}

11 _{Statistics like these, which demonstrate the ongoing rise of the city’s prominence, have sparked a related} discussion on whether cities could surpass the state as the smallest sovereign actors in the international community. For an analysis of how that impacts strategic planning see, John Sullivan and Adam Elkus, “Command of the Cities: Towards a Theory of Urban Strategy,” Small Wars Journal, September 26, 2011, http://smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art/command-of-the-cities-towards-a-theory-of-urban-strategy.

12 _{John Kirby, “The Littoral Combat Ship: Give It Time,” Information Dissemination (blog), June 10, 2013,} http://www.informationdissemination.net/2013/06/the-littoral-combat-ship-give-it-time.html.

13 _{John Sullivan and Adam Elkus, “Command of the Cities: Towards a Theory of Urban Strategy,” Small} Wars Journal, September 26, 2011, http://smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art/command-of-the-cities-towards-a- theory-of-urban-strategy.

14 _{Kilcullen, Out of the Mountains, 29.} 15 _{Kilcullen, Out of the Mountains, 29.} 16 _{Kilcullen, Out of the Mountains, 29.} 17 _{Kilcullen, Out of the Mountains, 29.}

18 _{Mike Davis, Planet of Slums (New York: Verso, 2007), 20.} 19 _{Kilcullen, Out of the Mountains, 29.}

20 _{Dr. Thomas Mahnken (former Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Policy Planning) in discussion} with the author, June 24, 2014. For a transcript, see Appendix C.

21 _{“Cities and Coastal Areas,” United Nations Environment Programme, accessed July 3, 2014,} http://www.unep.org/urban_environment/issues/coastal_zones.asp.

22 _{Kilcullen, Out of the Mountains, 32.} 23 _{Kilcullen, Out of the Mountains, 32.} 24 _{Kilcullen, Out of the Mountains, 30.} 25 _{Kilcullen, Out of the Mountains, 247.}

26 _{Pentagon, Quadrennial Defense Review 2014, 8.}

27 _{Richard Norton, “Feral Cities,” Naval War College Review 56, no. 4 (2003): 98.}

28 _{John Sullivan and Adam Elkus, “Postcard from Mumbai: Modern Urban Siege,” Small Wars Journal,} February 16, 2009, 8.

29 _{Richard Norton, “Feral Cities,” Naval War College Review 56, no. 4 (2003): 98.} 30 _{Ken Stier, “Feral Cities,” New York Times, Dec 12, 2004,}

http://www.nytimes.com/2004/12/12/magazine/12FERAL.html?_r=0; Matthew Frick, “Feral Cities—Pirate Havens,” Proceedings Magazine 134, No. 12 (2008), http://www.usni.org/magazines/proceedings/2008- 12/feral-cities-pirate-havens.

31 _{Kilcullen, Out of the Mountains, 40.} 32 _{Kilcullen, Out of the Mountains, 114.} 33 _{Kilcullen, Out of the Mountains, 89, 93.} 34 _{Kilcullen, Out of the Mountains, 141.}

35 _{See, for example, Max Weber (1919): Politics as}

Vocationhttp://fs2.american.edu/dfagel/www/Class%20Readings/Weber/PoliticsAsAVocation.pdf. 36 _{Kilcullen, Out of the Mountains, 45.}

37 _{Norton, “Feral Cities,” 98-99.}

38 _{John Kirby, “The Littoral Combat Ship: Give It Time,” Information Dissemination (blog), June 10, 2013,} http://www.informationdissemination.net/2013/06/the-littoral-combat-ship-give-it-time.html.

39 _{Sullivan and Elkus, “Postcard from Mumbai,” 8.} 40 _{Kilcullen, Out of the Mountains, 45.}

41 _{Kilcullen, Out of the Mountains, 34.}

Framing Littoral Maritime Security Through the Lens of the Broken Windows Theory

43 _{Kilcullen, Out of the Mountains, 99.}

44 _{John Sullivan and Adam Elkus, “Postcard from Mumbai: Modern Urban Siege,” Small Wars Journal,}

February 16, 2009.

45 _{Frank Hoffman, “Hybrid vs. Compound War,” Armed Forces Journal, October 1, 2009,}

http://www.armedforcesjournal.com/hybrid-vs-compound-war/.

46 _{Frank Hoffman, “Hybrid vs. Compound War,” Armed Forces Journal, October 1, 2009,}

http://www.armedforcesjournal.com/hybrid-vs-compound-war/.

47 _{Frank Hoffman, “Hybrid vs. Compound War,” Armed Forces Journal, October 1, 2009,}

http://www.armedforcesjournal.com/hybrid-vs-compound-war/.

48 _{White House, National Security Strategy (2010), 49.} 49 _{White House, National Security Strategy (2010), 49.}

50 _{Frank Hoffman, “Hybrid vs. Compound War,” Armed Forces Journal, October 1, 2009,}

http://www.armedforcesjournal.com/hybrid-vs-compound-war/.

51 _{Kilcullen, Out of the Mountains, 102.} 52 _{Kilcullen, Out of the Mountains, 126.} 53 _{Kilcullen, Out of the Mountains, 287.} 54 _{Kilcullen, Out of the Mountains, 287.} 55 _{Kilcullen, Out of the Mountains, 287.}

56 _{Dr. Mahnken likewise identifies the role Italian and Australian police play in augmenting American law}

enforcement capabilities abroad. Mahnken offers that the lack of an American federal police force hinders the United States’ ability to train and advise law enforcement overseas and creates a capabilities gap often filled by the Italians or Australians. See, Dr. Thomas Mahnken in discussion with the author, June 24, 2014.

57 _{Sullivan and Elkus, “Postcard from Mumbai,” 12.} 58 _{Kilcullen, Out of the Mountains, 287.}

59 _{Kilcullen, Out of the Mountains, 23.} 60 _{Kilcullen, Out of the Mountains, 24.}

61 _{Posen, Barry. “Command of the Commons: The Military Foundation of U.S. Hegemony.” International}

Security 28, No. 1, (2003): 5-46.

62 _{Kilcullen, Out of the Mountains, 24.} 63 _{Kilcullen, Out of the Mountains, 24.} 64 _{Kilcullen, Out of the Mountains, 24.} 65 _{Kilcullen, Out of the Mountains, 24.}

66 _{The Marine Corps seems to be the most comfortable of the U.S. Armed Services, noting their “‘small}

wars’ legacy.” See, United States Marine Corps, Marine Corps Operations, MCDP 1-0 (Washington, DC: HQ Marine Corps, 2011), 1-17.

67 _{Nagl, Learning to Eat Soup with a Knife, 5.} 68 _{Kilcullen, Out of the Mountains, 23.}

69 _{Shy "The American Military Experience," 213.} 70 _{Kilcullen, Out of the Mountains, 23.}

71 _{Kilcullen, Out of the Mountains, 24.} 72 _{Kilcullen, Out of the Mountains, 127.} 73 _{Kilcullen, Out of the Mountains, 241.} 74 _{Kilcullen, Out of the Mountains, 85.} 75 _{Kilcullen, Out of the Mountains, 85.} 76 _{Kilcullen, Out of the Mountains, 261.}

77 _{Sullivan and Elkus, “Postcard from Mumbai,” 6.}

78 _{Eyal Weizman, “The Art of War,” Frieze 99, (May, 2006),}

http://www.frieze.com/issue/article/the_art_of_war/.

79 _{Sullivan and Elkus, “Postcard from Mumbai,” 7-8.} 80 _{Kilcullen, Out of the Mountains, 19-20.}

81 _{Kilcullen, Out of the Mountains, 288.} 82 _{Kilcullen, Out of the Mountains, 76, 110-112.} 83 _{Kilcullen, Out of the Mountains, 111.} 84 _{Kilcullen, Out of the Mountains, 112.}

85 _{Kilcullen, Out of the Mountains, 112.}

86 _{For a critical view on the new military urbanism, see Stephen Graham’s Cities Under Siege: The New} Military Urbanism, (London and New York: Verso 2011) (paperback ed.), chapter 3, “The New Military Urbanism” 60-88.

87 _{Pentagon, Quadrennial Defense Review 2014, 62.} 88 _{Kilcullen, Out of the Mountains, 27.}

89 _{Kilcullen, Out of the Mountains, 27.}

90 _{John Shy, "The American Military Experience: History and Learning," Journal of Interdisciplinary} History, 1, no. 2 (1971): 223.

91 _{Shy, "The American Military Experience: History and Learning," 224.} 92 _{Shy, "The American Military Experience: History and Learning," 224.} 93 _{Shy, "The American Military Experience: History and Learning," 224.} 94 _{Shy, "The American Military Experience: History and Learning," 223.} 95 _{Shy, "The American Military Experience: History and Learning," 223.} 96 _{Shy, "The American Military Experience: History and Learning," 224.} 97 _{Shy, "The American Military Experience: History and Learning," 225.}

98 _{John Nagl, Learning to Eat Soup with a Knife: Counterinsurgency Lessons from Malaya and Vietnam} (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 2002), 201.

99 _{Nagl, Learning to Eat Soup with a Knife, 223.}

100 _{Alfred Thayer Mahan, The Influence of Sea Power Upon History: 1660-1783 (New York: Dover} Publications, Inc., 1987), 287.

101 _{Mahan, The Influence of Sea Power, 288.}

102 _{Geoffrey Till, Seapower: A Guide for the Twenty-Fist Century 3}rd _{Ed (New York: Routledge, 2013), 48.} 103 _{Till, Seapower, 48.} 104 _{Till, Seapower, 48.} 105 _{Till, Seapower, 57.} 106 _{Till, Seapower, 58.} 107 _{Till, Seapower, 58.} 108 _{Till, Seapower, 61.} 109 _{Till, Seapower, 62.} 110 _{Till, Seapower, 84-85.} 111 _{Till, Seapower, 85.}

112 _{Hugh Whit, “Navy on the Wrong Course Building Large Warships,” The Age (Australia), October 29,} 2013, http://www.theage.com.au/comment/navy-on-the-wrong-course-building-large-warships-20131028- 2wbu0.html. 113 _{Till, Seapower, 36.} 114 _{Till, Seapower, 35.} 115 _{Till, Seapower, 36.} 116 _{Till, Seapower, 36.}

117 _{Robert Rubel, “Navies and Economic Prosperity – The New Logic of Sea Power,” Corbett Paper, no.} 11 (2012): 8.

118 _{Till, Seapower, 36.}

119 _{David Kilcullen, Out of the Mountains: The Coming Age of the Urban Guerrilla (London: C. Hurst &} Company, 2013), 16-17.

120 _{Kilcullen, Out of the Mountains, 16-17.} 121 _{Kilcullen, Out of the Mountains, 16-17.} 122 _{Kilcullen, Out of the Mountains, 114.}

123 _{Pentagon, National Defense Strategy (Washington, DC: Pentagon, June, 2008), 2-3.} 124 _{Pentagon, National Defense Strategy, 3, 8.}

125 _{Pentagon, National Defense Strategy, 4.} 126 _{Pentagon, National Defense Strategy, 9.} 127 _{Pentagon, National Defense Strategy, 10.}

128 _{Joint Chiefs of Staff, The National Military Strategy of the United States of America 2011: Redefining} America’s Military Leadership (Washington, DC: Pentagon, February, 2011), 2.

Framing Littoral Maritime Security Through the Lens of the Broken Windows Theory 130 _{Joint Chiefs of Staff, National Military Strategy, 4.}

131 _{Joint Chiefs of Staff, National Military Strategy, 6.} 132 _{Joint Chiefs of Staff, National Military Strategy, 11, 15.} 133 _{Joint Chiefs of Staff, National Military Strategy, 15.}

134 _{As an aside, and as we note in Chapter Two, the process by which states securitize various}

unconventional issues (or populations) is an area of robust critical debate, including in the maritime domain (as highlighted by Bueger). See, for example, Christian Bueger, “What is Maritime Security,” Marine Policy 53, (2015); Christian Bueger and Jan Stockbruegger, “Security Communities, Alliances and Macro- securitization: The Practices of Counter-piracy Governance,” in Maritime Piracy and the Construction of Global Governance, ed. Michael Struett, Mark Nance, and John Carlson (London: Routledge, 2013), 99– 124. While important, however, investigating this body of work in greater detail lies outside of the scope of this research.

135 _{White House, National Strategy for Maritime Security (Washington, DC: White House, September,} 2005), 7-8.

136 _{Pentagon, Naval Doctrinal Publication 1: Naval Warfare (Washington, DC: Pentagon, March, 2010),} 29-30.

137 _{Pentagon, Naval Operations Concept 2010: Implementing the Maritime Strategy (Washington, DC:} Pentagon, 2010), 35-44.

138 _{Pentagon, Naval Operations Concept, 1.} 139 _{Pentagon, Naval Operations Concept, 37.} 140 _{Till, Seapower, 51.}

141 _{Basil Germond, “The Geopolitical Dimension of Maritime Security,” Marine Policy 54, (2015): 137.} 142 _{Basil Germond, “The Geopolitical Dimension of Maritime Security,” Marine Policy 54, (2015): 137.} 143 _{Basil Germond, “The Geopolitical Dimension of Maritime Security,” Marine Policy 54, (2015): 137.} 144 _{J. Ashley Roach, “Initiatives to Enhance Maritime Security at Sea,” Marine Policy 28, (2004): 43.} 145 _{Roach, “Initiatives to Enhance Maritime Security at Sea,” 45.}

146 _{Roach, “Initiatives to Enhance Maritime Security at Sea,” 46.} 147 _{Nagl, Learning to Eat Soup with a Knife, 49.}

148 _{Nagl, Learning to Eat Soup With a Knife, 205.} 149 _{Till, Seapower, 348.}

150 _{Kilcullen, Out of the Mountains, 279.}

151 _{Pentagon, Quadrennial Defense Review 2014, 59.} 152 _{Kilcullen, Out of the Mountains, 261.}

153 _{Department of the Navy, …From the Sea (Washington, DC: Navy News Service, October 6, 1992),} http://www.navy.mil/navydata/policy/fromsea/fromsea.txt.

154 _{Department of the Navy, Forward…From the Sea (Washington, DC: Pentagon, March, 1997),} http://www.dtic.mil/jv2010/navy/b014.pdf.

155 _{The word “littoral” is used nineteen times in the first and ten in the second of these papers.} 156 _{Department of the Navy, …From the Sea.}

157 _{The resurgence of interest in the littorals is presaged in Admiral Vern Clark’s 2002 Proceedings article} “Sea Power 21.” In the article, the significance of assured littoral access is a visible element of a yet wider strategy. A 2005 CRS article by O’Rourke, “Naval Transformation: Background and Issues for Congress,” similarly notes the Navy’s growing interest in a shift from blue waters to green.

158 _{United States Marine Corps, Marine Corps Operations, MCDP 1-0 (Washington, DC: HQ Marine} Corps, 2011), 1-15, 2-20.

159 _{United States Marine Corps, Marine Corps Operations, MCDP 1-0 (Washington, DC: HQ Marine} Corps, 2011), 1-15.

160 _{Till, Seapower, 274.}

161 _{Tallis, Joshua. “The New US Maritime Strategy.” Center for International Maritime Security (CIMSEC)} NextWar blog, March 13, 2015.

162 _{Till, Seapower, 84.}

163 _{Pentagon, A Cooperative Strategy for 21}st _{Century Seapower (Washington, DC: Pentagon, October} 2007).

164 _{The 2014 QDR echoes the same preventative ethos. See, Pentagon, Quadrennial Defense Review 2014,} 15.

165 _{Pentagon, A Cooperative Strategy for 21}st _{Century Seapower (Washington, DC: Pentagon, October} 2007).

166 _{Pentagon, A Cooperative Strategy for 21}st _{Century Seapower (Washington, DC: Pentagon, October} 2007).

167 _{Pentagon, A Cooperative Strategy for 21}st _{Century Seapower (Washington, DC: Pentagon, October} 2007).

168 _{Pentagon, A Cooperative Strategy for 21}st _{Century Seapower (Washington, DC: Pentagon, October} 2007).

169 _{David Sharp, “Hagel: Navy’s Zumwalt Destroyer Important for Asia-Pacific,” Associated Press,} November 21, 2013, http://www.navytimes.com/article/20131121/NEWS04/311210030/Hagel-Navy-s- Zumwalt-destroyer-important-Asia-Pacific.

170 _{David Sharp, “Hagel: Navy’s Zumwalt Destroyer Important for Asia-Pacific,” Associated Press,} November 21, 2013, http://www.navytimes.com/article/20131121/NEWS04/311210030/Hagel-Navy-s- Zumwalt-destroyer-important-Asia-Pacific.

171 _{Pentagon, A Cooperative Strategy for 21}st _{Century Seapower (Washington, DC: Pentagon, October} 2007).

172 _{Pentagon, Quadrennial Defense Review 2014, 8.}

173 _{John Kirby, “The Littoral Combat Ship: Give It Time,” Information Dissemination (blog), June 10,} 2013, http://www.informationdissemination.net/2013/06/the-littoral-combat-ship-give-it-time.html. 174 _{Pentagon, A Cooperative Strategy for 21}st _{Century Seapower (Washington, DC: Pentagon, October} 2007).

175 _{U.S. Library of Congress, Congressional Research Service, Navy Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) Program:} Background and Issues for Congress, by Ronald O’Rourke, CRS Report RL33741 (Washington, DC: Office of Congressional Information and Publishing, September 27, 2013), 23.

176 _{In a high-low mix, mission-tailored ships such as the LCS are frequently cheaper than their multi-} mission counterparts because they require fewer systems and are typically much smaller than multi-mission platforms. See, Arena, Blickstein, Younossi, and Grammich, Why Has the Cost of Navy Ships Risen?, 67- 68.

177 _{Dion Nissenbaum, “Navy Ship Plan Faces Pentagon Budget Cutters,” Wall Street Journal, November} 12, 2013, http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB10001424052702303460004579191950780107222. 178 _{Loren Thompson, “Navy Has Few Options If Littoral Combat Ship Falters,” Forbes, March 7, 2014,} http://www.forbes.com/sites/lorenthompson/2014/03/07/navy-has-few-options-if-littoral-combat-ship- falters/.

179 _{For more on the LCS’s potential capabilities, see Martin Murphy, Littoral Combat Ship: An} Examination of Possible Concepts of Operation (Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments, 2010) in addition to O’Rouke and Work.

180 _{Robert Work, Naval Transformation and the Littoral Combat Ship (Washington, DC: Center for} Strategic and Budgetary Assessments, February, 2004), 131.

181 _{U.S. Library of Congress, Congressional Research Service, Navy Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) Program:} Background and Issues for Congress, by Ronald O’Rourke, CRS Report RL33741 (Washington, DC: Office of Congressional Information and Publishing, September 27, 2013), 19-40.

182 _{U.S. Library of Congress, Congressional Research Service, Navy Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) Program:} Background and Issues for Congress, by Ronald O’Rourke, CRS Report RL33741 (Washington, DC: Office of Congressional Information and Publishing, September 27, 2013), 21.

183 _{Robert Work, Naval Transformation and the Littoral Combat Ship (Washington, DC: Center for} Strategic and Budgetary Assessments, February, 2004), 2.

184 _{U.S. Library of Congress, Congressional Research Service, Navy Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) Program:} Background and Issues for Congress, by Ronald O’Rourke, CRS Report RL33741 (Washington, DC: Office of Congressional Information and Publishing, September 27, 2013), 22.

185 _{Loren Thompson, “Navy Has Few Options If Littoral Combat Ship Falters,” Forbes, March 7, 2014,} http://www.forbes.com/sites/lorenthompson/2014/03/07/navy-has-few-options-if-littoral-combat-ship- falters/.

186 _{The same issue is raised in the 2014 QDR. See, Pentagon, Quadrennial Defense Review 2014, 30.} 187 _{John Kirby, “The Littoral Combat Ship: Give It Time,” Information Dissemination (blog), June 10,} 2013, http://www.informationdissemination.net/2013/06/the-littoral-combat-ship-give-it-time.html.

Framing Littoral Maritime Security Through the Lens of the Broken Windows Theory 188 _{Loren Thompson, “Navy Has Few Options If Littoral Combat Ship Falters,” Forbes, March 7, 2014,} http://www.forbes.com/sites/lorenthompson/2014/03/07/navy-has-few-options-if-littoral-combat-ship- falters/.

189 _{Loren Thompson, “Navy Has Few Options If Littoral Combat Ship Falters,” Forbes, March 7, 2014,} http://www.forbes.com/sites/lorenthompson/2014/03/07/navy-has-few-options-if-littoral-combat-ship- falters/.

190 _{Pentagon, Quadrennial Defense Review 2014, 30.} 191 _{Pentagon, Quadrennial Defense Review 2014, 30.}

192 _{Andrea Shalal, “U.S. Navy Seeks Data on Small Warship Options,” Reuters, April 30, 2014,} http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/04/30/navy-ships-idUSL2N0NM2JE20140430.

193 _{Christopher Cavas, “US Navy Task Force Seeks Industry Ideas,” Defense News, April 30, 2014,} http://www.defensenews.com/article/20140430/DEFREG02/304300042/US-Navy-Task-Force-Seeks- Industry-Ideas?odyssey=nav%7Chead.

194 _{Pentagon, Quadrennial Defense Review 2014, 30.} 195 _{Till, Seapower, 123.}

196 _{See for example the U.S. Navy’s response to Typhoon Haiyan in 2013. See, Jim Garamone, “Navy} Official Details Aid Moving to Philippines,” American Forces Press Service (Department of Defense), November 15, 2013, http://www.defense.gov/news/newsarticle.aspx?id=121134.

197 _{Loren Thompson, “Navy Has Few Options If Littoral Combat Ship Falters,” Forbes, March 7, 2014,} http://www.forbes.com/sites/lorenthompson/2014/03/07/navy-has-few-options-if-littoral-combat-ship- falters/.

198 _{Loren Thompson, “Navy Has Few Options If Littoral Combat Ship Falters,” Forbes, March 7, 2014,} http://www.forbes.com/sites/lorenthompson/2014/03/07/navy-has-few-options-if-littoral-combat-ship-

In document La Naturaleza Jurídica de la Consulta Previa y su Aplicación en el Perú (2011 2016) (página 42-45)