PARTICIPACIÓN DE LOS PUEBLOS EN LAS ACTIVIDADES EXTRACTIVAS (CONSULTA

The word piracy often evokes images of Johnny Depp (or Errol Flynn) swashbuckling in Tortuga, or Captain Phillips held hostage for days. In West Africa, however, piracy takes a much different form. The International Crisis Group identifies three types of maritime criminality there: “the spread of political gangster-ism from the Niger Delta to the Bakassi peninsula; seaborne raids; and increasingly sophisticated acts

of piracy.”308 The latter two can also be described as opportunistic and organized piracy.

According to Tepp, opportunistic piracy is “not as much a way of life as a crime of

opportunity,”309 lending the issue particularly well towards an evaluation through a

Broken Windows perspective. If crime is opportunistic, that means it is rooted

fundamentally in the perceptions of those who perpetrate the acts. And, as we detailed in Chapter Two, if perceptions can be altered, so can actions. Moreover, Kamal-Deen

categorizes most Gulf of Guinea piracy leading up to 2005 as opportunistic,310 when

robberies were mostly “subsidiary activities.”311 He notes that this label is not a

commentary on capabilities, but rather about the centrality of piracy for an

organization.312 Such robberies, stealing easily portable cargo and equipment, can net

between ten and fifteen thousand dollars in one attack, grossing as much as $1.3 million

annually.313 _{Coordinated attacks, such as those choreographed against oil tankers, can net}

nearly triple that figure.314 In such attacks as many as thirty men in up to five speedboats

converge on a target at speeds of sixty knots.*315 This is a surgical strike requiring

operational intelligence, unlike the prowling technique often employed in Somalia.316

Groups including MEND, the Niger Delta People’s Volunteer Force, and the Niger Delta

Vigilante have been identified with this type of attack.317 Oil theft also includes the

involvement of organizations from as far as Eastern Europe or Asia.318 This connection to

transnational crime can be seen in the hijacking of the Duzgit Venture, during which

pirates were “in cahoots with other actors about four thousand kilometers away from the

point of hijack.”319 In an attempt to meet, “they sailed the commandeered ship across the

coastal waters of five states.”320 _{Yet, as we detailed in Chapter Three, even organized}

* _{Speedboats, which can often outrun naval craft, were already in use by littoral insurgents and were easily}

repurposed for piracy. See, Ali Kamal-Dee, “The Anatomy of the Gulf of Guinea Piracy,” Naval War College Review 68, No. 1 (Winter 2015): 104.

Framing Littoral Maritime Security Through the Lens of the Broken Windows Theory

crime fits into the Broken Windows’ theoretical lens. At the most granular level,

transnational crime does not exist in a vacuum—real crime happens in real communities. Organized operations trace their origins to the 1970s, as the oil industry took hold, bringing with it an upsurge in shipping for construction materials (the “cement

armada”).321 Then, piracy was centered on Lagos.322 As the petroleum industry migrated southeast, stirring feelings of disenfranchisement, piracy followed suit.323 And note, once again, that something so seemingly intangible as sentiments of discontent, when framed through Broken Windows, takes on greater significance in the context of broader maritime insecurity. This antecedent to contemporary piracy exhibited a number of characteristics that have proven durable. Robbery, for one, was no longer the only apparent motive. Sabotage (and, to a lesser extent, kidnap and ransom)324 became prominent, and it had become evident that piracy was increasingly part of a complex set of criminal, political, and tribal concerns.325 Violence also becomes a motif at this stage.326 Nigerian pirates are accused of being more violent than their Somali

counterparts,327,328,329 usually for tactical reasons. The former aim to facilitate an efficient robbery while the latter employ kidnap for ransom and thus need live victims.330 The use of violence to ensure complicity may also be a result of a lack of safe havens from which Nigerian pirates can conduct ransom negotiations.*331 This violence is also important because successful boardings are more common in the Gulf of Guinea than elsewhere in Africa,332 which is also noteworthy for the high rate of successful attacks.333 The use of automatic rifles and rocket-propelled grenades is not uncommon in such attacks.334

As Broken Windows would predict, these attacks have an impact on local

communities. In particular, piracy has impacted West African fishing more than any other local sector, according to Tepp.335 Between 2003 and 2008, Nigeria documented nearly 300 pirate attacks on fishing boats.336 Fishing vessels are also targeted for hijackings. Pirates use stolen trawlers’ expanded ranges to operate as mother ships with which to stage attacks on oil tankers farther to sea,337 as well as for use as a ruse to approach oil tankers.338 Recall, above, we discussed the importance of local fishing to the livelihood of regional communities. Moreover, recall the vignette in Chapter Three on fisherman Oneal Burke, from the Jamaican hamlet of Forum. Burke’s community, and those like them, are bellwethers of security. By engaging with such populations, as community policing recommends, authorities are afforded the opportunity to identify the problems most often first detected by communities themselves. It should be no surprise, therefore, that

counter-piracy operations frequently see benefits in the fight against IUU fishing as well.339 This is an explicit endorsement of the multidimensional nature of security in the littorals.

That piracy and terrorism may become linked, therefore, is also not inconceivable, particularly given our understanding of the multidimensionality of crime. Pirates

maintain capabilities that many terrorists would envy. Though such a relationship remains a matter of speculation,340 an attack on a pipeline in February 2012 sparked concerns that Boko Haram might begin to target petroleum infrastructure, including maritime targets.341 _{Similar concerns, with some more supporting evidence, in Chapter} Three suggest such crime-terror partnerships are possible. Fluid criminal dynamics and

* _{While this violence is widely cited, Steffen disputes its treatment as dogma and dives into such claims in}

greater detail. See, Dirk Steffen, “Challenging the Myths of Pirate Violence,” Marine Link, September 2, 2014, http://www.marinelink.com/news/challenging-violence376188.aspx.

the potential for TCOs to co-opt existing infrastructure make the terror-piracy nexus

worth monitoring.342, 343 _{Aside from acts of piracy committed in the maritime space,}

terrorists may also adapt the infrastructure of piracy for use entering and exiting Africa in

obscurity, like the Caribbean could be used as a staging ground for acts elsewhere.344 As

we explored in Chapter Three, the capabilities inherent in human smuggling, narcotics trafficking or, as seen here, piracy, overlap. As we also saw in Chapter Three, as well as in our conversation with Captain Morris (see appendix), these linkages are not simply theoretical. While every link may not be of equal strength or validity, the

multidimensionality of maritime crime is a fundamental component of framing littoral security. As we saw above, pirates in the Gulf of Guinea threaten good order at sea

alongside poachers, narcotics traffickers, and other criminals and insurgents.345 Piracy is,

therefore, not an isolated phenomenon. It is one node in a dynamic web of interrelated issues.