United States Russia France United Kingdom China (PRC) Germany Italy Other Europeans All Others
Another critical element in military diplomacy in the region has been education and training of personnel. USSOUTHCOM, throughout its history, has placed great store on the use of education, in order to promote bilateral military relations. In the twenty-first century, Latin American politicians are in urgent need of education in military affairs to secure the process of democratisation. Historically, the US military‟s efforts in military education have concentrated on the teaching of personnel among the middle-and-high-level officer corps, as Military Official 6 states with reference to his military educational institution: „We are emphasizing NCO education, believing that a strong NCO corps is vital to our own military forces and that the countries of this hemisphere need that same level of competence in their military forces‟.29
The educating of middle-level ranks, namely non-commissioned officers (NCOs) has been undertaken through practical and professional courses. Such courses have been conducted both within the host Latin American country, via mobile training teams of US personnel or via the posting of NCOs to US educational institutions, in particular, the Western Hemisphere Institute for Security Co-operation (WHISC) where instruction is performed in Spanish. The Institute‟s stated vision is: „… preparing leaders to solve hemispheric security challenges and foster regional co-operation‟ (WHISC, 2005).
In order to fulfil this goal, the curriculum includes instruction in civil-military operations, democratic consolidation and a non-commissioned officer professional development course. The education of non-commissioned officers is regarded as a win-win activity within military circles. For Latin American countries it is seen as free professionalisation of their armed forces. For the US military, such courses are seen as a long- to medium-term investment(s) in the „buying‟ of influence within the military establishments of the Latin America as Military Official 1 posits: „… All that [military education] really gets you is access, it doesn‟t get you to change anybody‟s mind, it gets you through the door, where perhaps you couldn‟t get through the door before …‟.30
The education of higher level Latin American officer corps has generally emphasised instructor training and/or command and general staff officer courses. The provision of instruction to higher level officers is far less segregated from the US military‟s own officer corps than at the NCO level. In part, this is due to the greater language skills amongst Latin
29
Interviewed by author, 13 May 2005.
30
American top brass compared to their NCOs.31 Language requirements aside, Latin American high level officers are instructed throughout the US military educational establishment, from Fort Leavenworth to the Center for Hemispheric Defense Studies (CHDS). For Latin Americans, it allows for a deeper understanding both of the US military system and mindset, together with the professionalisation of their officer corps. For the US military, such training provides a similar insight into the mindset of their counterparts - as well as an investment in goodwill.32
In terms of Latin American non-military students within the US military educational system, the level of interest has been very disappointing to US defence officials. The training of Latin American citizens in civil-military relations is seen as key to the promotion and deepening of harmonious relations and the process of democratisation.
Differing political cultures in Latin America to civil-military relations are at least partially due to the historical memory of dictatorship and the associated repression of civil society. This has made Latin American politicians and technocrats somewhat wary towards issues concerning the military. Latin American civilians, with their differing notion of „national security‟ and preference for consensus has resulted in Latin American governments erring towards the utilisation of the good offices of the OAS for the provision of education in civil-military relations, rather than direct entry to US military educational establishments. Yet the openness of the US military establishment to Latin American countries has had some limited success in training Latin American military personnel if not the political elite. This attitude has only been altered, to a limited degree, in recent years. With specific regard to Mexico, the growing level of military transparency upon the political decline of the PRI, has led to the opening of new possible vistas in civil-military relations.33 The Mexican military has increasingly opened itself to civilian oversight via Congress, rather than the historical
31
„The decision was made long ago to provide Spanish-language instruction in six different schools in the system. Because many of our students are of relatively low rank , their need to learn English is not as important as their need to learn course material‟. Interview, Military Official 6, 13 May 2005.
„… The [Command and General Staff] course (CGSC) we offer here in Spanish, well these countries perhaps also send students to our CGSC in Fort Leavenworth but those students have to be able to speak English…‟. Interview, Military Official 6, 13 May 2005.
32
„…[The WHISC] was created … to not just teach specific courses but also to develop relationships … it humanizes the people from the other country, it also encourages understanding not only of the military thing but also the social and political issues…‟. Interview, Military Official 6, 13 May 2005.
33
Aide memoir note: „Key to understanding civil-military relations is the relationship between PRI and
SEDENA [Spanish initials of the Mexican military] and in the post-2000 era competition between PRI and PAN over influence of SEDENA. … Emphasis on legalistic/constitutional measures to promote democratization is misplaced – need to concentrate on culture of military and democratic culture within body politic‟. Interview, Academic Interviewee 9, 14 March 2005.
position of theoretical presidential oversight, resulting in a de facto carte blanche.34 Military Official 1 comments on the increasing transparency:
… Prior to the late 1990s, if you were a [Mexican] Congressman on the Defence Committee, you probably had to go to the Ministry, you have to go to SEDENA, you had to go to the font of power to see the Secretary of Defence. Today [General] Vega Garcia goes to Congress and testifies, today you would have a press conference, today they are very aware of some the [human] rights issues of their internal justice system … its more … my view … its more a question of the Mexican armed forces trying to react to the on-going changes in democracy rather than feeling a part of the democratic change ….35
This has created greater need within the political system, as elsewhere in Latin America, for the creation of a cadre of civilian professional experts in military affairs - a matter of concern not only in Mexico, but to all parties interested in the maintenance and progression of democratisation in Mexico as elsewhere in Latin America.36
To this backdrop, over the past fifteen years the region has created a loose and informal set of bilateral military relations both between Latin American militaries and with the hegemonic power of the US military, as well as extra-hemispheric bodies37. The inter- American security architecture acts as a facilitator and glue to these interlocking connections of bilateral relations. As Schulz states: „While the „system‟ (which consists of a collection of countries, instruments, organisations, and norms) is often poorly integrated, it is the system the hemisphere‟s leaders wanted‟ (1998: 160). This said, the push for reform of Western Hemispheric security architecture continues and has accelerated in recent times as the security threats within the region have evolved.
Future of the Regional Security Environment
The future of the hemispheric security architecture is still under debate. While the OAS remains the formal body of inter-American relations, it has largely become the forum of last resort and/or a forum for expression of hemispheric solidarity rather than a „parliament of Latin American nations‟. Informal inter-American bodies, such as the Conference of
34
Aide memoir note: „civil-military relations are on-going process with give and take‟. Interview, Academic Interviewee 2, 12 April 2004.
35
Interviewed by author, 12 February 2004.
36
Aide memoir note: „Mexican military – increase in civilians within educational system (both students and tutors). Cultural change – greater respect for civilians points of view/greater realization of modernization through use of civilians. Civilian oversight – in process of developing overtime/need for greater education of Congress members and public about SEDENA, as well as media‟. Interview, Academic Interviewee 2, 12 April 2004.
37
American Armies (CAA) and direct bilateral relations operate as the main channels of inter- military communication, facilitating good security relations, as Military Official 1 explains:
I think [the CAA] is helpful, I think its good, you can say the same thing about the Canadians for that matter, they have recently come in too, and that‟s an opportunity to open … to talk to other countries, to talk to us, to see each other a different way. It‟s a confidence and security measure, all of these opportunities to exchange ideas, philosophies, get leaders to talk to one another ….38
On 16 March 2006, the IADB was formally linked to the OAS as an OAS agency. This move represents a formal administrative matter and the IADB is unlikely to see any change in practical terms. Significantly, the IADB will not become a security council for the OAS, as favoured by the US military establishment. This preference for informal organisation is explained by Scheman: „If one lesson is to be learned about the functioning of international organisations from the history of the OAS, it is that informal procedures work. The moment the framework becomes too rigid or formal, the Organisation falters‟ (1988: 51).
This is a preference born not only of mistrust of the global hyper-power to the North but also of their fellow Latin American countries‟ militaries. With this in mind, the debate over the Rio Treaty and its relevance in a post-Cold War era has been coloured by the Latin American preference for informal regional security structures. Mexico continues to argue that the Rio Treaty is unsuited to a new era characterised by „grey areas‟ in the field of insecurity and globalisation. In the aftermath of 11 September 2001, others, such the ABC countries and the US, argue that the Rio Treaty can be adapted to the changed requirements of the hemisphere. There appears little chance of progress in this debate in the near future, with Mexico remaining outside of the Rio Treaty system consensus.
Furthermore, the current rise of leftist governments in the hemisphere opposed to US strategic interests (particularly Venezuela, Ecuador and Bolivia) has encouraged a strong element of anti-Americanism within Latin American politics generally. Indeed, it has led to the formulation of the Alternativa Bolivariana de las Americas (ALBA) around the central axis of Venezuela, Cuba and Bolivia. While the ALBA agreement is in essence a trade agreement it has coloured the strategic environment in the region creating a secondary counter-hegemonic power bloc which has increasingly worried US policymakers both through its independent approach to economic and trade policy but also through its political connections with radical leftist and indigenous movements in the member countries and flirtations with both the Iranian and Russian governments (Manwaring, 2007). As of early
38
2008, Hugo Chávez has begun to talk of the possibility of extending the reach of the ALBA to include a collective security arrangement.39
These concerns combined with the growing problem „grey area‟ threats (such as the growing problem of gangs and the narcotics cartels), means that the issue of insecurity in the Western Hemisphere is likely to remain high on the regional political agenda, though priorities may be ranked differently by sub-region (Pion-Berlin, 2005: 221).
Table 3.6: Perception of Threat by Government Officials, Ranked According to Sub- Region
MERSOCSUR ANDEAN NATIONS CENTRAL
AMERICA
CARIBBEAN
Drug trafficking Drug trafficking Drug trafficking Drug trafficking
Terrorism Terrorism Terrorism Terrorism
Arms trafficking Poverty and social
deprivation
Environmental and natural disaster
Poverty and social deprivation
Organised crime Guerrilla activity and
subversive groups
Organised crime Environment and
natural disasters Environment and
natural disasters
Arms trafficking Poverty and social
deprivation
Arms trafficking
Poverty and social deprivation
Organised crime Arms trafficking Organised crime
Guerrilla activity and subversive groups
Environment and natural disasters
Guerrilla activity and subversive groups
n/a
Source: Rojas Aravena, 2004: 13
The spectre of these growing grey areas in the security of Latin American countries is due to, as Eadie explains, to the Janus-faced nature of the state in the twenty-first century:
The multiple pressures which bear upon the modern state force it into a Janus-faced position. Leaving issues of war and peace aside, co-existent conditions of neo-liberal globalisation and domestic democracy dictate that the state must balance inward and outward-orientated roles. These roles may make conflicting demands and result in the adaption of „two faces‟ as the state seeks to meet its multiple responsibilities. The characteristics that are demanded of good neo-liberal players and reliable domestic providers may be contradictory, incompatible and at times impossible to reconcile (2007: 636)
39
Another factor in the changing security architecture of the region is the geo-political decision making made by the most powerful player, the US, which is increasingly moving away from multilateral organisations, preferring ad hoc informal coalitions. Within the Western Hemisphere, US policy has been coloured by the combination of the US political and military attentions concerned with the Iraqi conflict and the US defence establishment‟s encouragement of its notion of „effective sovereignty‟ as a solution to the growing „grey areas‟ of insecurity (National Security Strategy, 2002).40
In practice, US policy in the hemisphere has been a combination of diplomatic rhetoric in line with the Bush Doctrine with limited low-key military cooperation in the region, most particularly in terms of the funding of the Colombian military establishment as well as technical and financial support also being given to the Mexicans. In this political framework, Latin American governments have been left primarily to their own devices to resolve regional issues of insecurity. As Hayes states:
The insecurity that characterizes Latin America and the Caribbean countries at the outset of the twenty-first century must be addressed principally by Latin American governments, politicians, public and private institutions, and citizens. No outside actor, no matter how well intentioned, can effect the profound changes needed if the political will to effect change is not present (Hayes in Roett and Paz, 2003: 56).
Given the lack of a consensus amongst Latin American countries and the hyper-power‟s attentions being elsewhere, the security architecture in the Western Hemisphere is likely to remain in its current impasse.
Conclusion
It is clear to see from the above that the influence of the US on the hemispheric security architecture has brought deep and mixed results. The US played a key role in the promotion of inter-American solidarity through institutional means, from the nineteenth century development of an international conference to the latter day Organisation of American States (OAS). It could be argued that it is the US‟ hegemonic role in the region that has enabled the relatively high level of co-operation amongst states in Latin America compared to other regions. This is not to state that Latin America remains the prime concern of the US political class latterly, rather that the region, as a whole, is able to co-operate under the geo-political umbrella of its northern neighbour, as Fawcett states: „The refocus on security, including terrorism and weapons of mass destruction, did not bring Latin America to the fore. Rather,
40
No recording for security reasons. Aide memoir notes: „notion of effective sovereignty - National Security Policy Directive 32 – move away from counternarcotics to new threat of terrorism but not as single focus‟. Interview, Federal Government Official 9, 31 March 2004.
the region has been reminded of its subordinate place in the international system‟ (2005: 45). While the US political elite may concentrate their attention towards the Near East region and the growing influence of „Communist‟ China, the Western Hemisphere, due to the US‟ geographical positioning in the region, will always remain a region of special interest. The converse is also true for the US still plays a critical role within Latin American political and economic life, even in the likes of Hugo Chávez‟s Venezuela. The US government will continue to promote cooperation within the region as a whole and between militaries in the hemisphere to maintain its strategic interests. Indeed, it is in the Latin American socio- economic elite‟s interest to maintain good relations with the global hyper-power and major trading partner, thus creating a rationale for the continued good bilateral relations - enlightened self-interest.
The real or perceived subordination of regional organisations by the hegemonic power has led to the creation of informal relations and groupings for the promotion of hemispheric solidarity where US interests are perceived to be in conflict with Latin American governments‟ interests. It continues to be the case that the hemisphere‟s security architecture is a mixture of formal and informal structures centred on common interests in the fields of security and trade. Despite the commonalities, differences of opinion regularly occur, as Mares states: „Disagreements over threat identification and tactics are attributed by US analysts to an unwillingness by Latin America to take „responsibility‟ and share in the domestic cost of an activist foreign policy‟ (Mares in Smith and Schoultz, 1994: 272). Whilst, from the Latin American countries‟ perspective, disagreements centre on their concern to maintain at least rhetorical sovereignty in accordance with the Calvo doctrine; the distrust from Latin American civilians towards militarism combined with perceived arrogance and superiority complex amongst US officials towards their Latin American counterparts. This heady mix can, on occasion, result in a combustible diplomatic discourse within the region.
This chapter proffers an insight into the role of regional social institutions in the development of US-Mexican relations over time into the present day. Through the use of a historical institutionalist analysis of the evolution of institutions and their interests and identities, the central underlying themes of US foreign policy and Latin American responses to it have been delineated. Notable is the deft political manoeuvring of the Mexicans in playing the interests of their northern neighbour off the wider region to enable the development of their independent foreign policy towards the region.
The post-11 September 2001 environment followed this pattern of inter-relations within the hemisphere. Mexico‟s rejection of the continuation of the collective formal security