Importantly, another recent development in the scholarly study of EU external relations, which provides an additional, albeit distinct, avenue for a more structure-oriented way of conceiving of the EU‟s influence, is the integration and application of new governance perspectives. Still a nascent literature, this strand of EU studies proves to have substantial potential in opening up the analysis of EU power beyond accession conditionality (see e.g. Bauer et al., 2007; Lavenex, 2004; Lavenex, 2008; Lavenex & Schimmelfennig, 2009; Schimmelfennig & Wagner, 2004). In reaction to traditional accounts of EU foreign policy (e.g. Hill, 1993; Smith, 2003), the term „external governance‟ has emerged as an alternative tool for capturing the EU‟s influence, and in particular, to analyse how the EU despite the absence of accession conditionality manages to extend parts of its acquis communautaire towards its neighbourhood (Lavenex, 2004: 681; Schimmelfennig & Wagner, 2004). According to Magen, this emergent strand can be situated within what she considers the latest „developmental phase‟ in European integration scholarship, which is primarily concerned with the impact of the EU - be it as a supranational system, actor, process, model or symbol - on the legislation, institutions and policies of third countries and international organisations beyond Europe (2007: 362). As Magen holds, this body of literature29 converges on the discussion of “whether and how EU institutions, rules, policy-making processes and broader international „actorness‟ […] constitute independent variables that impact the legal, regulatory, an administrative structures and conduct of entities well beyond the EU's borders” (2007: 365). As such, these studies seek to provide evidence of the EU‟s „transformative engagement‟ beyond enlargement, also referred to as „EU governance export‟ or „external
29 Apart from the afore-mentioned external governance strand, this body of literature includes such studies as De
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Europeanisation‟ (Magen, 2007: 366). Conceptualised by Youngs (2005), „EU transformative engagement‟ involves the establishment and gradual development of formal comprehensive
relations30, which encapsulate regularised cooperation, dialogue and monitoring (supported by
financial assistance, technical aid and conditionality) on a wide range of subjects, and which are essentially aimed at encouraging far-reaching economic, political and social change in third countries partner states.
Returning to the explanatory potential of EU external governance approaches as a structural perspective on EU power, a key proponent of this emergent strand, Lavenex (2008) investigates EU impact on the neighbouring countries in terms of establishing sectoral governance networks as a basis for regulatory approximation and organisational inclusion of ENP countries. As highlighted in the previous chapter, Lavenex (2008) challenges the predominant view of limited EU impact in non-candidate neighbouring countries beyond the so-called golden carrot of membership, contending that the academic debate on EU external relations and the ENP has drawn too much on the experience of Eastern enlargement, and, hence, is heavily fixated on the conditional transfer of the acquis. Using an external governance perspective, she therefore conceives of the ENP in a more structural way, distinguishing between “hierarchical policy transfer through conditionality”, i.e. the main mode of external governance in EU enlargement politics (see Schimmelfennig & Sedelmeier, 2004) and “horizontal network governance”, which Lavenex identifies as a more structural mode of exerting EU influence (2008: 941). As she specifies, the former mode is “hierarchical in the sense that it works through a vertical process of command - where the EU transfers predetermined, non-negotiable rules - and control - where the EU ensures compliance through regular monitoring mechanisms” (Lavenex, 2008: 941). Conversely, the network mode of governance allows for the extension of norms and rules in a process-oriented, horizontal, voluntaristic and inclusionary manner (Lavenex, 2008: 943). Crucially, this mode may contribute to a de-politicisation of cooperation, as the actors involved are experts and technocrats, who are not guided by their country‟s national interests. Moreover, it also allows for functionally specific forms of organisation, such as agencies (e.g. the European Environmental Agency), coordinating bodies (e.g. Europol), or less formalised policy networks (e.g. the DABLAS Initiative)31 (Lavenex, 2008: 943). In addition, being voluntary
30 For instance, through the Partnership and Cooperation Agreements with the Newly Independent States of the
former Soviet Union, the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership, the ENP, the Stabilisation and Association process in the Balkans and the Cotonou convention.
31
The DABLAS initiative was launched by the European Commission in 2001 to provide regional environmental cooperation for the wider Black Sea Region. DABLAS aims to coordinate the actions of the Black Sea and Danube Commissions, the Black Sea and Danube countries, bilateral donors as well as international financial institutions.
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and process-oriented in nature, network constellations constitute a fertile ground for mechanisms of impact based on socialisation, social learning and communication (Schimmelfennig & Sedelmeier, 2005; Bauer et al., 2007). Network governance may well omit the formal, traditional levels of decision-making and policy-making and may forsake the traditional incentive-based tools for rule adoption; however, as pointed out by Slaughter, “behind the facade of technical adjustments for improved coordination [...] and uniformity of standards lie subtle adjustments” of domestic laws (Slaughter, 2004: 59). As suggested by Lavenex, the subtle creation of joint regulatory structures through network governance thus constitutes a hitherto neglected structural dimension of EU influence over the ENP countries (2008: 952).
The analytical potential of Lavenex‟s (2008) governance-based model for examining the EU‟s rule and policy transfer beyond accession conditionality is further expanded in Lavenex and Schimmelfennig (2009; also see 2010). Interestingly, they highlight a third structural mode of external governance, i.e the market mode. As the final basic form of
external governance beyond hierarchy and networks, market governance captures the
dynamics of regulatory approximation through market competition, thus representing only a loosely and informally institutionalised kind of interaction. Regulatory adaptation occurs here either directly, notably as a result of the principle of mutual recognition as applied in the EU‟s internal market - whereby the most competitive products and services prevail - or indirectly, owing to the EU‟s „presence‟ (cf. Allen & Smith, 1990; Bretherton & Vogler, 2006) and the interdependence of third countries with the EU‟s internal market and its process of regional governance (Lavenex & Schimmelfennig, 2009: 799). As pointed out by Lavenex and Schimmelfennig, the market mode may affect states, induced to harmonise their domestic rules and policies to those of the EU, as well as societal actors, in particular business associations and firms, which have no choice but to follow the EU‟s regulations and standards if they want to participate in the EU market (2009: 799).
In sum, while the external governance literature within the field of EU studies is still in an exploratory phase, these new governance-based approaches, as a more structural alternative to the traditional perspectives of EU influence, may have considerable potential in terms of their analytical relevance for a more holistic understanding of EU power. In this regard, it is important to emphasise that on their own those governance perspectives will not be sufficient to fully capture EU power. The same goes for the above-mentioned conceptions of structural power, which only become meaningful when subsumed into an integrative framework, which also considers relational power. Or to reverse the central claim of this chapter, power lies not only in the systemic imperatives that determine agents‟ actions, but
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also in the relational interaction of agents (see e.g. Guzzini, 1993: 474). The thesis‟s assumption that the analysis of power, as a comprehensive account of power phenomena, should consider both the relational and the structural level on which power is exerted, as well as the interplay between both levels, finds support in the long-running debate in the social sciences concerning the duality between structure and agency, i.e. the so-called structure-
agency problem.32 Here Giddens (1995) and Hay (2002) both point to the need to overcome
this persistent juxtaposition in established theories of power. To cite Hay, “what is required is a mode of analysis [...] capable of reconciling structural and agential factors within a single explanation” (2002: 113). In a same vein, Giddens proposes that agent-focused theories and structuralist approaches can be seen to be complementary (1995: 49-50). Similarly, rather than studying the EU‟s external agency solely through their notion of structural foreign policy, Keukeleire and MacNaughtan develop a comprehensive conceptual framework based on a „structural foreign policy - conventional foreign policy‟ continuum, which encompasses both conventional and „neglected‟ - i.e. structural - dimensions of foreign policy (2008: 19 & 335).
The relationship between structure and agency is also considered - although more implicitly - in Young‟s (1991) discussion of structural leadership in institutional bargaining at the international level. In processes of institutional bargaining, Young views the link between structural power and bargaining leverage as stemming from the existence of asymmetries among the participants or stakeholders (1991: 289). As a distinct type of leadership, „structural leadership‟ then reflects an actor‟s ability to translate structural power into bargaining leverage so as to reach agreement (1991: 289).33 To conclude, an inspirational case in point of a structurally integrative analysis is Payne‟s (2000) study of U.S.-Caribbean relations. Payne responds here to the need to develop an integrative analysis by purposively combining parsimonious, agent-focused approaches with structuralist theories (2000: 81-2). In the context of Payne‟s enquiry into U.S.-Caribbean relations, this translates into working eclectically with propositions drawn, on the one hand, from comparative public policy analysis and, on the other, from critical IPE theories, in casu neo-Gramscianism. As Payne specifies, by embedding agent-oriented concepts inside structuralist propositions, he seeks to come to a better understanding - than offered by either classical realism or structuralism, or even more subtly pluralist approaches - of the possibilities for action open to both state and non-state actors in the structural situation of the U.S.-Caribbean relationship (2000: 73). In
32
For relevant discussions of the structure-agency dichotomy in IR, see Bieler & Morton (2001), Wendt (1987) and Wight (2006).
33 It should be noted that Young conceives here of structural power through a neorealist lens, notably as power
based on the possession of material resources. In this way, he defines structural leaders as experts in translating the possession of material resources into bargaining leverage (Young, 1991: 288).
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this way, Payne traces signs of a broad “shift in the dominant modalities of interstate linkages” in the sense that the essence of the contemporary U.S.-Caribbean relationship “has now been reconfigured as a series of interlocking transnational and transgovernmental policy communities (here drawing on Keohane & Nye, 1989) in which different actors within the U.S. state/society complex and within various Caribbean state/society complexes (here drawing on Cox, 1981; 1987) engage each other in different policy arenas where there are no automatic priorities” (Payne, 2000: 82). This leads him to conclude that, in re-engaging with the Caribbean since the end of the 1980s onwards, the U.S. has gradually emerged as a „regional hegemon‟ through a mixture of coercive and consensual forms of control, with the Caribbean being entangled within common patterns of trade, financial flows, migration and narcotics movements.