Descripción de reguladores de la relación C:N

1987 Barnala govt dismissed and Punjab

placed under President’s Rule

May 1988 Operation Black Thunder led by police

chief KPS Gill against militants taking refuge in the Golden Temple

1989 Demand for Khalistan raised by a group

of militants in Punjab

December 1989 New non-Congress government at the

Centre led by Prime Minister VP Singh

1990 Lok Sabha elections in Punjab, Talks

between Centre and extremists

November 1991 Army reinducted in Punjab

98

February 1992 Punjab Legislative Assembly elections,

boycotted by all Akali factions

1993 KPS Gill announces end of terrorism in

Punjab

Causes

In May 1987, the home minister discussed the situation in Punjab and elevated it to an

“unprecedented” level, “the past two months has been an unprecedented period in the history of Punjab so far as the killings by terrorists is concerned.”¹¹³ Further, “what made matters worse was the deep involvement of some of the state ministers and their relations with the terrorists and the unwanted attempted interference with the functioning of the police by them some of the leaders of the ruling party.”

The conflict was at this stage considered to be entirely secessionist and extremist in nature. For home minister Buta Singh, “it is not a law and order situation. We are trying to fight against those forces which are out to destroy the country, which are out to fragment the country.”¹¹⁴ The 1987-88 annual home ministry report mentioned how 1987 “witnessed escalation in violent and secessionist activities and emergence of a fundamentalist movement” which led to the imposition of President’s Rule in May 1987.

The conflict was framed as Pakistan-sponsored:

Operation Black Thunder gave a severe jolt to the nucleus of terrorist activities in Pakistan…While the role of Pakistan in aiding and abetting terrorism in Punjab is the most prominent one, it is part of a widespread international conspiracy to destabilise India, for example, pro-Khalistan elements

113 Buta Singh, Lok Sabha, May 12, 1987, Budget Session, Government of India.

114 Lok Sabha, November 9, 1987, Winter Session, Government of India.

99

demonstrated in front of Indian missions abroad to register their protest against Operation Black Thunder…¹¹⁵

By 1989, the perception of the causes suggests a shift from a secessionist one to one now driven by pure criminal activity. On May 8 1989, even as the government sought to extend President’s Rule in Punjab, the home minister said that the situation had changed and that:

The governor has reported that while it is true that the number of killings is still large, it has to be noted that most of the killings are today not for achieving any separatist or fundamentalist ideology but for mainly anti-social and criminal reasons such as robbery, kidnapping, land grabbing, looting, extortion etc. In other words, a number of dangerous criminals armed with sophisticated weapons and arms are continuing their efforts to take advantage of the situation…Khalistani posters or slogans are not generally seen or heard these days…¹¹⁶

The home minister said that earlier the reform movement of the Sikhs had taken on an extremist hue and pitted religious communities against each other but the situation had improved such that the issue now was “the continuing battle between groups of terrorists and law enforcing agency. It has to be met with very a heavy hand and with full determination.”¹¹⁷

By July 1989, the government was also vehemently against any reorganisation of federal arrangements as per the Anandpur Sahib Resolution (ASR). Further, the discourse at this time was dominated by references to external powers aiding the conflict. Speaking in the Parliament, Minister of State in the Home Affairs ministry P Chidambaram said,

It is these two powerful factors-one internal, political, giving legitimacy to extremists and their movement, and the other external, perhaps international

115 MoS in the Ministry of Home Affairs, Santosh Mohan Dev, Lok Sabha, August 2, 1988, Monsoon Session, Government of India.

116 Lok Sabha, May 9, 1989, Budget Session, Government of India.

117 Lok Sabha, May 9, 1989, Budget Session, Government of India.

100

which gives arms, money and support to the terrorists which has made for this combustible mixture in Punjab…the situation is a very difficult situation….¹¹⁸ He also said that the Sarkaria Commission had given its report on the ASR and observed that the ASR demand to restrict the Union’s powers to defence, foreign affairs, currency and general communications only meant that “under such arrangements the country cannot survive as one integrated nation.” Further, he said,

If this Resolution is accepted it will mean that the survival of India as an integrated country is in peril. Therefore we reject the Anandpur Sahib Resolution. It is the support to the ASR that has given legitimacy to extremists.

It has given respect to the Khalistan demand…This is the problem of Punjab and unless you come to grips with this problem, unless you understand the game played by the factions of the Akali Dal, unless you understand the legitimacy and respect which the Akali Dal is giving to extremism, terrorists and militants-I am not saying you are extremists but you are giving legitimacy and respect to the terrorists and extremists in Punjab-you cannot deal with this.

For a brief period between December 1989 and 1991, the National Front government at the Centre tried to make amends for previous Congress government failures in Punjab but lack of a cohesive policy and all round confusion prevailed. Prime Minister VP Singh visited the Golden Temple and spoke of the need of a “healing touch” for the people of Punjab. The new government however continued to espouse external factors as the main source of the causes of the conflict. Home Minister Mufti Mohammed Syed said, “Every time there has been a rise in terrorist activity, the source of guidance and motivation appears to have come from outside our borders.”¹¹⁹

The government also sought to draw Pakistan into the discourse on causes and home minister Mufti Mohammed Sayeed said, “it is obvious that they (Pakistan) are making every effort to communalise the situation in Punjab and Kashmir…”¹²⁰

118 Lok Sabha, July 18, 1989, Monsoon Session, Government of India.

119 Lok Sabha, March 22, 1990, Budget Session, Government of India.

120 Lok Sabha, May 2, 1990, Budget Session, Government of India.

101

By November 1991, a new Congress government was at the Centre under the Prime Ministership of Narasimha Rao. In the same year, the Army was reinducted in Punjab and a new impetus given to the Centre’s counter-terrorism strategy. KPS Gill was transferred back to Punjab to lead the police force. The selection of KPS Gill as police chief was also symbolic, for as a Sikh officer known for his hard-line views on using force against militants, the government hoped to achieve some measure of legitimacy in Punjab.

In August 1992, a minister in the home ministry gave a report saying that violent incidents had decreased and said, “with the killings of some of the top terrorists and faced with depletion of their ranks, the Pakistan backed terrorist outfits have become panicky…the security forces have taken note of the challenge and have initiated various operational steps so as to combat terrorists threat and ensure protection to the families of the policemen.”¹²¹ The report of 1990-91 put Punjab and Kashmir together and mentioned “terrorist and subversive activities continued unabated” with aid and abetment from across the border.

The state assembly elections in February 1992 installed a new Congress government under the Chief Ministership of Beant Singh, the onus of counter terrorism fell to the state government. The causes of the conflict were no longer thought to be any real political grievance, but reduced entirely to criminality, terrorism and fundamentalism till such time that each of the extremist outfits were not driven underground or obsolete.

Identity

The identification of “terrorists” and “secessionists” during this phase went hand in hand with their representation as foreign-aided extremist’s intent on dividing the country. Home minister Buta Singh said, “Today the Sikhs are being converted into fundamentalists and terrorists…Sikhs are being converted into neo-Sikhism. Hence it is essential to understand the Sikh psyche in Punjab today.”¹²² He also said that most of these people were not Indians but nationals of western countries. Further, “whatever resolutions they have passed till date, they have supported the division of the country.

121 MM Jacob, Lok Sabha, August 18, 1992, Monsoon Session, Government of India.

122 Lok Sabha, November 9, 1987, Winter Session, Government of India.

102

They do not want to hold talks with the Central government short of Khalistan..”¹²³ He also said that these extremists, including the Panthic Committee¹²⁴, was behind killings and anti-national activities and had not abjured violence. “Who brought this Panthic Committee inside the Golden Temple? Was it not Mr Tohra? Was he not responsible for handing over the whole complex?” There was a clear reference to Akali leaders as being hand in glove with the extremists.

In the aftermath of Operation Black Thunder in May 1988, the government stated in Parliament that

The disclosures of the material recovered from the Golden Temple complex after Operation Black Thunder show the close connection between Pakistan and the terrorist groups…after Operation Black Thunder a number of Sikh terrorist leaders based in Pakistan took stock of the situation. The Panthic Committee and the Babbar Khalsa sent out instructions to their members in India to step up violence…¹²⁵

In May 1988, the home minister said that the Governor of Punjab had submitted his report to the President and in it he had mentioned that

Increase in the killings of civilians by terrorist activities are mainly due to a new factor being added to the Punjab problem by the illegal intrusion of trained terrorists and smugglers with sophisticated arms and ammunition into Punjab from Pakistan with the avowed object of disintegrating and destabilising the State…the Governor is of the view that Pakistan is behind the encounters which have taken place near our border areas. He has further mentioned that a number of centres have been set up by Pakistan in their territory for the purpose of training infiltrators into India.

He also said that he had recommended extension of President’s Rule in light of the

“firmness required” and to maintain the morale of the security forces. There was also a

123 Lok Sabha, November 9, 1987, Winter Session, Government of India.

124 Panthic Committee refers to an underground group of insurgents formed in 1986 which claimed to represent the extremists and issued statements from the Golden Temple. (Crenshaw 2010), p. 395.

125 MoS in the Ministry of Home Affairs, Lok Sabha, Santosh Mohan Dev, August 2, 1988, Monsoon Session, Government of India.

103

reference made to the links of Sikh extremists with the Mujahideen groups in Afghanistan. The minister of state in the Home Ministry, P Chidambaram said,

We are aware that there have been some contracts between the extremists who are operating in Punjab, not the terrorists themselves but their mentors abroad, and the Afghan Mujahideen. Government has information that in 1985 some Sikh extremists came into contact with Afghan Mujahideen in the United Kingdom…obviously there is some contact between the two groups in the matter of purchase of arms.¹²⁶

On the other hand, there was a parallel discourse of the need to address ordinary Sikhs including the youth, for which there was a call for development and employment oriented policies. In a discussion on the budget for Punjab in September 1990, the government defended its policies in the state and said,

What is needed is not merely irrigation projects, what is needed is not merely the employment problem, they are necessary to remove the discontent of Punjab, but the whole psyche of Sikhs is also to be looked after….let us try to see that the disturbed psyche of friends, brothers and sisters is healed.¹²⁷

He also said that various financial programmes had been started in Punjab with regards to development works. He said, “I fully agree with members that we have to tackle this problem in a federal spirit”. When asked about avenues for employment for youth and lack of industries. He said, “if youth remain unemployed and they do not get opportunities, terrorists utilise them…they play as stooges in the hands of the corrupt.

They play in the hands of the Pakistanis...”

On October 5, 1990, PM VP Singh once again reiterated that though they were in favour of elections, the atmosphere was not conducive. He said that the threat from across the border continued to be present, “Pakistan is also busy in its activities across the border and there is no abatement.” Also, “the present government and supporting parties had created an atmosphere that every Sikh is not looked at with suspicion…We

126 Lok Sabha, April 6, 1989, Budget Session, Government of India.

127 Minister of Finance, Madhu Dandavate, Lok Sabha, September 5, 1990, Monsoon Session, Government of India.

104

do not suspect Sikh brethren, we trust them. They have sacrificed themselves for this country. They have contributed in the making and upliftment of this country.” By 1992-93, the discourses on identity of the actors had succeeded in demarcating extremists from ordinary Sikhs. The boycott by the Akalis of the state legislative elections in 1992 resulting from the dictates issued by extremist groups was termed unfortunate.

Policy

With the identification of causes and identities being dominated by references to the extremist nature of the conflict, the policy during this phase was largely one of counter-terrorism led by police and paramilitary action. Any references to human rights violations were acknowledged but considered peripheral to the task at hand. In the Parliament, Home minister Buta Singh defended the actions of the Police chief Ribeiro, known for his bullet for bullet policy, as follows, “the whole country knows at what personal risks the Director General of Police in Punjab has been discharging his duties…wild allegations including that of fostering communalism were falsely made against him…”¹²⁸ He also said that the situation had deteriorated to such an extent that made it impossible for the state government to control despite the best intentions of Chief Minister Barnala. Therefore he said, the state assembly was placed under suspended animation and President’s Rule imposed in May 1987. Buta Singh said that elections had been held in the hope that a democratic government would be able to solve the situation but,

In these 21 months our hopes remain unfulfilled and the democratically elected government was not able to tackle the situation fully…the political people who were expected to tackle the complicated problems were busy in seeking positions and those who were not given any position deserted the party….the state government did not cooperate in implementing Article 249¹²⁹ and the people had to undergo enormous hardship for 21 months.¹³⁰

128 Lok Sabha, May 12, 1987, Budget Session, Government of India.

129 Article 249 of the Indian Constitution gives the Parliament power to legislate on matters in the State List in what is termed as the ‘national interest’.

130 Lok Sabha, May 12, 1987, Budget Session, Government of India.

105

He also said that Chandigarh had to be transferred only simultaneously with the transfer of territories to Haryana as it was a condition stipulated in the Accord.

In November 1987, in a discussion on extending President’s Rule in Punjab, home minister Buta Singh said that

The Governor of Punjab’s assessment is that when President’s Rule was promulgated in Punjab the state administration had to deal with two dangerous trends-fundamentalist terrorism in all its destructive and anti-national manifestation and ordinary terrorism that was both dangerous and anti-national in character...the Governor is of the view that if a popular government is installed now the present firmness will go and the people thrown into a state of nervousness and disarray. Moreover there is no party that can lead any government effectively in the present condition of the state with any firmness or determination. ”¹³¹

Hence, elections were at this stage delegitimised due to the fear that the structures of force required to deal with terrorism would collapse. Extraordinary measures and their amendments were made legitimate owing to the securitised framing of the situation in Punjab. That these policies were proving to be successful counter-terrorism measures was highlighted in official discourses:

The paramilitary forces have been deployed in greater strength and given legal powers to so as to enable them to deal with any terrorist effectively…over a dozen notorious terrorists have been killed in encounters or apprehended. Their leaders who had links not only inside the country but also outside have been eliminated. The Dal Khalsa and National Council of Khalistan have been banned; patrolling of police and paramilitary forces has been intensified…

Through President’s Rule we will endeavour to root out extremism and separatism from Punjab at the earliest possible.”¹³²

131 Lok Sabha, November 6, 1987, Winter Session, Government of India.

132 Home minister Buta Singh, Lok Sabha, November 9, 1987, Winter session, Government of India.

106

The 1987-88 report of the home ministry noted that “anti-terrorist” measures had been intensified and “a large number of suspected terrorists” been killed or apprehended. In November 1987, President’s Rule was extended for another six months.

If, on the one hand, these security-centric policies were being instituted and carried on from previous phases, now, there was also a parallel policy targeting societal cohesion which suggests that the government was moving towards a normalisation in Punjab by co-opting and directing civil society organisations. These token peace committees coexisted with armed village defence committees. The rationale behind these groups was to instil in the state “lok shakti”, or people’s power:

The Governor of Punjab has formed more than 2000 peace and development committees which are represented by all parties…their job is to solve the local problems of every village and to check the growing influence of terrorism through persuasion and mass contact. There are cases where villagers armed with lathis have killed terrorists armed with stenguns. Such confidence has been created… It is being considered that a village force should be organised so that they may be supplied arms to combat terrorism…these committees are proving quite successful and a lot of information is being received through them. We should channelize our efforts to mobilise ‘Lok Shakti’ i.e. the power of the people so that Punjab may come out of the mire of terrorism and may regain its high position of being a progressive state.”¹³³

With Operation Black Thunder in 1988, a number of extremists sheltering in the Golden Temple were flushed out in a joint police-army operation led by KPS Gill.

Unlike the infamous Operation Blue Star, this time the operation was conducted with minimal damage and targeted only the militants. In May 1989, the home minister justified the government’s policies of force and highlighted their success as proof of

Unlike the infamous Operation Blue Star, this time the operation was conducted with minimal damage and targeted only the militants. In May 1989, the home minister justified the government’s policies of force and highlighted their success as proof of