Identificación de las alternativas de producción de abono

Referred to as the ‘Maoist’, ‘Naxalite’, or ‘left wing extremist’ conflict, the naxal challenge has in recent times moved from being an entirely state-centric to a national issue, as the Centre has shown increasing interest in addressing the problem. The naxal conflict is different from the conflicts in Punjab and Kashmir, as the issue is not limited to a particular state but is spread out geographically, and is also not confined to border regions. Further, the key actors in the conflict are not religious minorities, but belong to the lowest castes and tribes of rural India. Despite these differences, the naxal conflict is a useful case to analyse changes in the state’s discourses as well as to draw comparisons from the discourses on the Punjab and Kashmir conflicts. Moreover, do these differences make legitimisation of force harder for the State? How do conflict representations and policy options legitimise the preferred security strategy?

While much of the current literature on the naxal conflict focuses on the groups and ideologies, causes of the conflict and state government responses, this chapter shall analyse the Centre’s response to the issue over a ten year period from 2000 to 2010.

The relatively short time period is analysed as a phase in itself. A careful analysis of the discourses of New Delhi on the issue is carried out and divided under sections on causes, identity and policy representations.

In particular, this chapter will answer more definitely:

How is the naxal conflict understood by the Indian government? Has this changed over time?

What are the policy options weighted by the Indian government in dealing with the conflict? Does this change over time?

How was India’s security strategy against the Naxalites legitimised?

Background of the conflict

Since colonial times, peasant rebellions had been a common feature in India, including in Bengal, as the Indian peasantry sought to rebel against colonial exploitation. With India’s independence in 1947, the colonial legacy of inequitable land distribution

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policies continued and with it, the tillers continued to face exploitation at the hands of the landowners (Gupta 2007). In 1967, a peasant uprising against land owners and land policies erupted into violence in a village called Naxalbari in West Bengal. It is from this district that the term ‘Naxalism’ originated to refer to similar armed peasant movements across the country. Even prior to this, Andhra Pradesh witnessed a Communist party-led peasant uprising in 1944, and a similar uprising took place in the state in 1968. Organisational and ideological support for the uprising in Naxalbari came from the militant wing of the Communist Party of India Marxist (CPM) which later split from the parent party to form the Communist Party of India-Marxist Leninist, also called CPI (ML) (Mehra 2000). Charu Mazumdar and Kanu Sanyal, stalwarts of the communist movement in Bengal during the 1960s, were greatly inspired by the Chinese communist movement and its pattern of leading revolution from the villages. When the CPM decided to join parliamentary politics, the CPI (ML) took charge of the movement. As the peasants resorted to violence against the landowners in Naxalbari, the police was sent in and clashes between the rebels and the police led to a brutal suppression of the former.

By mid-1972, the movement was almost entirely crushed. The movement in Andhra Pradesh was likewise crushed by the time the Indira Gandhi imposed Emergency came to an end in 1977. During the Emergency, a number of leaders of the Naxalite movement were jailed under the Maintenance of Internal Security Act. In 1972, Charu Mazumdar died in police custody. The Naxalite movement, despite its origins in rural Bengal, was led by educated, urban youth from middle and upper middle class families, and could not unite the myriad movements in other parts of the country. Once the leadership was crushed, the movement was largely over.

Since the Emergency, Naxalite parties such as the CPI (ML), Maoist Communist Centre (MCC) and People’s War Group (PWG) have made efforts to mobilise through front organisations, which dealt with workers and peasant’s rights in mainstream politics, and armed wings which had a long term agenda of organising armed revolution to achieve radical changes (Basu 2011). Since the 1980s and 1990s, there has been a proliferation of Naxalite groups across states like Bihar, Andhra Pradesh, Orissa, Maharashtra, Kerala and Madhya Pradesh. The pace and pattern of development projects in these states also served to alienate people from their traditional livelihood, and in many cases, caused displacement of people to make way for the

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construction of dams, mineral refineries and factories. The goal of the CPI (M) is to capture state power through armed struggle and an overhaul of the existing political system (Ramana 2006).

The most recent report of the Home Ministry indicates that front organisations of these left wing extremist groups are active in 20 states of India, of which the CPI (M) is the most dominant and violent.²²⁵ The worst affected states are Chhattisgarh, Jharkhand, Orissa and Bihar. While Naxalism has largely been an issue specific to the state governments, in recent times, it has assumed national significance with the Centre taking a keener look at the problem.

Figure 1: Map of Naxal affected states (Source:

http://www.satp.org/satporgtp/countries/india/database/conflictmap.htm)

225 Annual Report 2013-2014, available at

http://mha.nic.in/sites/upload_files/mha/files/AR(E)1314.pdf. Accessed on September 30, 2014.

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Towards a discourse analysis of the management of the Naxal conflict

As the above background shows, there has been a long history of the Naxal conflict and it has spread from a small district in West Bengal to across 20 states in India. From being a state-specific issue it has now become a ‘national’ security problem and to that extent occupies a prominent place in the Centre’s discourses on security.

Below, some of the most significant events related to the naxal conflict between 2000 and 2010 are laid out. Discourses have been selected around these events and analyses is presented around the themes of causes, identity representations, and government policy discourses.

Key events

2000 Creation of two new states: Jharkhand and

Chhattisgarh with significant tribal populations

2001 Prevention of Terrorism Ordinance;

CPML People’s War and Maoist Communist Centre and their formations and front organisations notified as terrorist organisations under the provision of the Prevention of Terrorism Ordinance 2001.

2004 CPI(ML) and the MCC merged to form the

CPI (Maoist)

2005 Peace talks between Maoists and AP

government; in Chhattisgarh, Congress government instituted Salwa Judum-an armed resistance group of local tribals to fight against the Naxalites.

2006 PM Manmohan Singh calls it the biggest

internal security threat; Chhattisgarh state government appoints KPS Gill as security adviser; Naxal Management Division

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created within the Ministry of Home Affairs to deal with the issue from a security and development perspective.

2009 Formation of GoI’s first inter-state military

offensive against the Maoists-Clear, Hold and Develop. It took its cue from the US Army Counter Terrorism Handbook which had a chapter Clear, Hold and Build.

Home Secretary GK Pillai said in Oct 2009 that within 30 days administration would be restored in these areas; CPI (M) banned as a terrorist organisation

2010 76 security personnel killed in Dantewada

district in Chhattisgarh-one of the deadliest attacks by the naxals; in July, Maoist leader Azad was killed; in Chhattisgarh CM says links between Maoists and LeT, similar sentiments echoed by J&K CM

Causes

The creation of the states of Jharkhand and Chhattisgarh in 2000 was the result of administrative and socio-political convenience. While not directly related to the issue of Naxalism, the creation of these states did mean that demographically they had large tribal populations. At this stage, the onus of the naxal issue fell on individual state governments, though this was gradually giving way to an increased focus of the Centre on the issue. In 2001, even as worldwide events such as the terrorist attacks in New York and subsequent attention to terrorism increased, in India, there was an attempt to link the Indian Maoists with the Maoists in Nepal as a senior government minister

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claimed that there were “reports that Indian left extremist groups and Maoists of Nepal are in contact with each other.”²²⁶

The annual report of the home ministry for 2001-02 noted that that the “Efforts are being made by the left wing extremist outfits towards actualisation of the Compact Revolutionary Zone envisaged by the MCC, CPML-PW and CPN (Maoist) of Nepal for linking up the strongholds of the CPML-PW in Telengana and Dandakaranya and of the MCC in Bihar and Jharkhand with those of the CPN (Maoist) in Nepal.” That the government believed that the Maoists were uniting in India and Nepal also elevated the problem from a local issue to an international one.

There was a near unanimous view in the parliament that the roots of the naxal issue were to be found in economic causes. A senior member of the opposition Congress party said that unemployment affected terrorism. While talking of Kashmir, the north east and naxal affected states, he said that many educated youth were facing lack of employment opportunities, and “are quite easily misled by the people who want to mislead them. This economic problem generates terrorism.”²²⁷ This was echoed by other MPs such as Gutha Sukender Reddy from Andhra Pradesh who said that “one of the reasons why Naxalism has assumed such a serious proportion is the unemployment problem among the youth.”²²⁸ He also said that “Naxalites have no faith in democracy.

They believe in gaining power through the barrel of the gun…these extremists have made life miserable.” Further, he said, “where there is poverty, there is unrest. The government should implement effective economic policies and programmes and see that economically backward areas witness adequate economic development.”

In 2004, the merger of the CPI (ML) and MCC to form the CPI (Maoist) also stoked added concern amongst the political elite who were convinced that there was a more sinister plan to wreak havoc on India’s national security. There was also some concern about “compact revolutionary zones” set up by Naxalites to which MoS Jaiswal said that “available reports indicate that Naxalite outfits have been making attempts to carve

226 Minister of state in the Ministry of Home Affairs, Vidyasagar Rao made the statement in Parliament on December 18, 2001, Winter Session, Government of India.

227 Shivraj Patil, Lok Sabha, December 17, 2002, Winter Session, Government of India.

228 Lok Sabha, December 17, 2002, Winter Session, Government of India.

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out a compact revolutionary zone spreading from the Nepal border through Bihar and the Dandakaranya region to Andhra Pradesh.”²²⁹

This concern with the links of the Naxals with Nepalese groups was a consistent feature of the discourse, and suggests that it formed an important part of the discourse on causes of the conflict. It implies that the government never considered the issue to be purely internal. The internal issue was linked to economic dissatisfaction but links with foreign groups made the issue a greater threat.

At the second meeting of the standing committee of chief ministers on Naxalism in April 2006, PM Manmohan Singh said, “The problem of Naxalism is the single biggest internal security challenge ever faced by the country.”²³⁰ This statement represented how the conflict had now been elevated in terms of its threat perception. He also said that the Naxalites were trying to establish “liberation zones where they are dispensing or claiming to be dispensing basic state functions of administration, policing and justice. It is a cause for great concern that civil administration and police are periodically absent in some of these areas.” That the PM alluded to political shortcomings as a possible cause for the conflict suggests that some of the demands and grievances were considered legitimate, but the violence perpetrated by naxal groups was a major cause for concern and entirely delegitimized. There was a heightened sense of urgency as the PM said that there had been a “qualitative change” in the character of the movement: “They were earlier restricted to using local weapons, acted in small groups and indulged in isolated attacks. The naxal movement is now characterized by growing militarisation, superior army style organisation, better trained cadres, attacks on large targets through large scale frontal assaults, better coordination and possible external links.” Further,

Naxalism is directly related to underdevelopment…it is the tribal areas that are the main battleground of left wing extremism today. Exploitation, artificially depressed wages, iniquitous socio political circumstances, inadequate employment opportunities, lack of access to resources, under developed agriculture, geographical isolation, lack of land reforms – all contribute

229 Lok Sabha, 23 August, 2005, Monsoon Session, Government of India.

230 www.pib.nic.in Accessed on August 25, 2014.

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significantly to the growth of the Naxalite movement. All these factors have to be taken into consideration as we evolve solutions for facing the challenge of Naxalism.²³¹

A detailed discourse of the causes can be found in a Planning Commission report of 2008, when in March, an expert group published their report titled ‘Development challenges in extremist affected areas’.²³² The report recognised that “The directional shift in Government policies towards modernisation and mechanisation, export orientation, diversification to produce for the market, withdrawal of various subsidy regimes and exposure to global trade has been an important factor in hurting the poor in several ways” and that “it should not cause surprise that a large section of the people are angry and feel alienated from the polity.” It also referred to the causes as follows:

Apart from poverty and deprivation in general, the causes of the tribal movements are many: the most important among them are absence of self-governance, forest policy, excise policy, land related issues, multifaceted forms of exploitation, cultural humiliation and political marginalisation. Land alienation, forced evictions from land, and displacement also added to unrest.

Failure to implement protective regulations in Scheduled Areas, absence of credit mechanism leading to dependence on money lenders and consequent loss of land and often even violence by the State functionaries added to the problem.

Such a lucid explanation of the causes of the conflict also put the onus of responsibility on the State; though the report also noted that the Naxalites were exploiting the situation for their own ends,

The Naxalites exploit the situation for their own political gain by giving the affected persons some semblance of relief or response. Thereby they tend to legitimise in the eyes of the masses their own legal or even illegal activities…

their hostile attitude towards the electoral process has meant that they have not had much effect on the political system and the functioning of the local bodies.

231 PM Manmohan Singh, April 13, 2006. www.pib.nic.in Accessed on August 25, 2014.

232 Full text available at http://planningcommission.gov.in/reports/publications/rep_dce.pdf Accessed on September 25, 2014.

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Instead they have concentrated on establishing their organisations as alternatives.

For the government, the litmus test of the legitimacy of rebel groups thus was their participation in the electoral process, and, in this case, the reaction of the Naxalites was proof of their undemocratic functioning and delegitimised their means.

The government also blamed the Naxalites for hindering the pace of development. In September 2008, PM Manmohan Singh said that

Naxalism and Left Wing Extremism continue to pose a challenge to development and the social and economic uplift of people in some of the most backward regions of our country. The States of Chhattisgarh, Jharkhand, Bihar and Orissa figure prominently in the list of areas that are affected. What is especially disturbing is the extent to which these extremists have improved techniques and the kind of improvisations that they have succeeded in making.

…²³³

The annual report of the MHA for 2007-08 mentioned that

Naxalites typically operate in the vacuum created by functional inadequacy of field level governance structures, espouse local demands, and take advantage of prevalent dissatisfaction and feelings of perceived neglect and injustice among the under privileged and remote segments of population. Simultaneously, systematic efforts are made by them to prevent execution and implementation of development projects, deliberately target critical infrastructure like railways, roads, power and telecommunications, and to try and create an environment, through violence and terror, where the governance structures at field levels are shown as being ineffective.

The above quote shows how the government differentiated between the genuine economic dissatisfaction of the local population and the Naxalites who they considered as exploiting these grievances for their own ends, which were to create an environment of ‘violence and terror’. These means were delegitimised, and their violence was seen

233 Lok Sabha, September 17, 2008, Monsoon Session, Government of India.

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as being a deliberate attempt to malign the government by thwarting development projects.

A glance at the discourses on the causes of the Naxalite conflict detailed above reflects some clear patterns. The causes were pinned to prevailing economic policies and patterns of development and not just to ‘law and order’ issues that could be left to the state governments. Poverty and unemployment were regarded as being the primary motivators for leading the poor to take up arms against the State. These were the reasons why the Naxalites were able to garner support amongst the population. The attempt to link the Naxalites with foreign support worked to give the issue added urgency but was not considered a primary cause for the conflict. The concern with

‘compact revolutionary zones’ in the aftermath of the merger of two separate sections of the Naxalites also and with their growing strength and capacity ever since ensured that the issue became one of the most prioritised national security issues. No longer was the Centre content to leave the conflict purely in the hands of individual state government but took a keener interest at the issue.

Identity

In terms of identifying who the Naxalites were, the government had already banned the front organisations and knew both the main organisations and where they operated. The Naxal groups were termed ‘terrorist organisations’ and their reach was seen to have been expanded to 9 states across India. The annual report of the home ministry for 2001-02 noted that “left wing extremist movement remained a cause for concern with countrywide Naxalite violence increasing during the current year…among the states affected by the menace, Bihar and Jharkhand witnessed an increase in Naxalite violence.” It also noted that the “MCC and the CPML-PW continued to spearhead the Naxalite movement and accounted for around 85.9% of countrywide Naxalite violence and resultant deaths despite their inclusion in the schedule 18 of POTA as terrorist organisations.” The report also lay out that 53 districts in 9 states were affected by left wing extremism, worst of them being Bihar, Jharkhand, Chhattisgarh, Andhra Pradesh and Orissa.

Interestingly, the government also identified the Naxalites as essentially ‘our own people’ and as those gone astray. The Centre drafted a surrender policy for “left wing

Interestingly, the government also identified the Naxalites as essentially ‘our own people’ and as those gone astray. The Centre drafted a surrender policy for “left wing