Descripción del problema:

The general point, then, that Socrates is trying to convey is that if Y is for the sake of X, then X is not good in itself (but dependent for its value on X). This seems to be hardly a controversial point, in particular when we take a widespread example of the for-the-sake-of relation: coming to be.

44 _{This point is made clear in the “ascent of love” passage in Symp. 209e5-212a7.} There is, however, no need to suppose that Socrates expects Protarchus to be versed in Diotima’s mysteries. It is an everyday phenomenon to evaluate somebody in terms of what he or she is a lover of. Think, for example, how art lovers tend to look down on “low-brow” art lovers, or dog lovers on cat lovers (and vice versa). A problem for my interpretation might be that K. Dover 1989:202 points out that the Spartans held that the lover transfers his value to the value of the beloved. I think this is not a problem for my view because even in Sparta, without beloved ones, the lovers are worth nothing as lovers. What it does undermine is the idea that the beloved ones are already kalokagathoi - but this might be a difference between Sparta and Athens.

Philebus 54a3-b5

Socrates: So let's take another pair. Protarchus: Of what kind?

Socrates: Take on the one hand the generation of all things, on the other their being.

Protarchus: I also accept this pair from you, being and generation.

Socrates: Excellent. Now, which of the two do you think exists for the other's sake? Shall we say that generation takes place for the sake of being, or does being exist for the sake of generation?

Protarchus: Whether what is called being is what it is for the sake of generation, is that what you want to know?

Socrates: Apparently.

Protarchus: By heavens, what a question to ask me! You might as well ask: "Tell me, Protarchus, whether shipbuilding goes on for the sake of ships or whether ships are for the sake of shipbuilding," or some such thing.

Socrates: That is precisely what I am talking about, Protarchus.

Socrates here introduces an important case of the for-the-sake-of relation. He introduces it as ‘another pair’ because ‘Y is for the sake of X’ and ‘Y comes to be X’ are not the same.45 _{For example, the}

lover’s activities are for the sake of the beloved, but clearly the lover does not become the beloved (nor, in fact, does shipbuilding become the ship). All Socrates needs for the argument is that all instances of Y’s coming to be (genesis) some being X (ousia) are instances of Y being for the sake of X - this we can see in premise 2 of my representation of the genesis argument.

45 _{According to many interpreters, e.g. Hackforth 1945:106, the whole argument is} about the difference between genesis and ousia, and hence examples (i) to (iii) are usually moulded into that scheme. I disagree with this way of understanding the argument, as becomes clear form the text.

The text, in my view, clearly supports this way of reading the argument, for Socrates takes pains to introduce the for-the-sake-of relation with three examples, then he turns to two more familiar entities, being and becoming, and asks how they fit into the scheme just introduced. Protarchus, once he understands what Socrates wants, cites shipbuilding as a particular example of Y being for the sake of X; and it is clear that shipbuilding is for the sake of the ship and not vice versa. 46 _{The crux is that the point about value carries}

over:

Philebus54c9-12

Socrates: But that for the sake of which what comes to be for the sake of something comes to be in each case, ought to be put into the class of the things good in themselves (en tê(i) tou agathou moira(i)), while that which comes to be for the sake of something else belongs in another class, my friend.

Protarchus: Undeniably.

Socrates here justifies premise 3 by arguing that Y, that for the sake of which something comes to be, is to be put into the class of things which are good in their own right (tou agathou moira), given that Y is

46 _{Socrates adds some further refinements which are not essential to the argument.} He argues at 54c1-4 that ‘all drugs (pharmaka), as well as all tools (organa), and quite generally all materials (hulê), are always provided for the sake of some process of generation (genesis). I (sc. Socrates) further hold that every process of generation in turn always takes place for the sake of some particular being, and that all generation taken together takes place for the sake of being as a whole.’ Thus, he makes clear, once more, that Y is for the sake of X is not the same as Y becoming X, for drugs and tools are obviously not processes of coming to be, but they are for the sake of something. He further points out that even a process of coming to be can be that for the sake of something else is (e.g. tools), but that this process is not the primary locus of value. Rather, the value is to be found in that for the sake of which the process of coming to be takes place.

not in its turn for the sake of yet something else.47 _{By contrast, that}

which comes to be for the sake of Y, X, is not in this class - this was the whole point of introducing the for-the-sake-of relation in the first place.

The point seems not very difficult to grasp: the value of ship- building is dependent upon the value of ships. If ships were completely useless, then shipbuilding, too, would be useless.48 _It

does not matter that ships may not have value in their own right, for a) it is Protarchus’ example and it is not clear whether Socrates merely accepts that this is the sort of thing he is speaking about, or whether he genuinely accepts the example as instance of his schema, and b) the argument is not designed to tell us what things are goods in themselves. The argument is supposed to show which things are not goods in themselves, namely those things which are for the sake of other things, and in particular things which come to be for the sake of something else: these things are not in the class of the things which are good in themselves.