DESPACHO ADUANERO A LA EXPORTACION

A further means of exploring implications of preferential voting in New Zealand conditions comes through survey evidence. In the 1981 New Zealand survey respondents were asked to state a second preference after they had expressed their initial voting choice. The results of

For the purposes of this discussion a "safe" seat is one which requires a two-party swing of 10 per cent or more to change hands, a "fairly safe" seat requires a swing of between 5 and 10 per cent to change hands and a "marginal" seat requires a two-party swing of less than 5 per cent to change. On these matters see Alan McRobie and Nigel S. Roberts, Election '78 (Dunedin: John Mclndoe, 1978).

2

On electoral redistributions in Australia and New Zealand see, respectively, Hughes, "The Case of the Arrested Pendulum", pp. 305-310, and McRobie and Roberts, Election '78, pp. 25-32.

123

this exercise are displayed in Table 4.4 while Table 4.5 shows the equivalent preferences of respondents from the 1979 Australian survey. An exercise such as this must remain tentative at best. For one thing it was asking New Zealanders to do something that was quite foreign to them. That some did not comprehend what was being asked of them is demonstrated by the fact that about 2 per cent of respondents repeated their first choice when asked for their second preference (these respondents are omitted from the table). The tables unearth no remarkable dissimilarities. New Zealand voters appear to regard the major opposition party as a viable alternative to their chosen party (even though many of them never have and never will vote for it) as do

Table 4.4

Second Preferences of New Zealand Respondents, 1981

(in percentages)

First Preference

Second Preference

Labour National Social Credit

Labour - 54 55 National 47 - 43 Social Credit 49 44 - Other 4 2 1 100 100 100 (N) (595) (445) (159)

NOTE: The table contains only respondents who made a legitimate second preference after having initially nominated one of the three main parties.

Table 4.5

Second Preferences of Australian Respondents, 1979

(in percentages)

First Preference

Second Preference

Labor Liberal-National Democrat

Labor 48 43 Lib.-NP 40 55 Democrat 56 46 Other 4 6 2 (N) 100 100 100 (638) (252) (82)

NOTE: The table contains only respondents who made a specific second preference after having initially nominated one of the three main parties. Coalition supporters who chose the other

coalition partner as their second preference are excluded.

Australians. On the other hand many supporters of the major parties in both countries are glad of a minor party to support as second best. Alternatively, supporters of the minor parties flock back to the two major parties in each country as their second choice.”* it is doubtful that preferential voting would operate much differently in New Zealand from the way it does in Australia and it is also doubtful that preferential voting would alter New Zealand electoral behaviour significantly. A more likely, but still not large, effect might be on

In practice the Australian Labor Party perhaps derives slightly more benefit from the second preferences of Australian Democrat voters than the coalition parties. When the Democratic Labor Party was the principal minor party in Australia the second preferences of its voters heavily favoured the coalition. See Hughes, "The Case of the Arrested Pendulum", pp. 316-322.

125

electoral outcomes and an even more likely effect would be on party strategy.

In terms of influencing electoral behaviour preferential voting probably has very little effect on the partisan outlook of voters that differs from any effect simple plurality voting might have. Many Australian voters simply follow their party's "how to vote" advice in ordering their preferences. While preferential voting might make minor and centre parties more influential in elections it does not appear to help them to be more popular in their own right and it certainly does not make them more electorally successful. In elections from 1960 to 1 9 8 3 minor parties in New Zealand averaged 1 2 . 6

per cent of the total valid vote; in Australia over the same period minor parties averaged just under 8 per cent of the vote. If the leading minor party at each election in each nation is considered on its own the gap is even greater (the figures are 1 1 . 4 per cent in New Zealand and 5 . 8 per cent in Australia).^ In both countries minor parties have been singularly unsuccessful in their attempts to win electoral representation (the recent efforts of Social Credit in New Zealand notwithstanding).

Preferential voting can, on the other hand, be seen as an agency which facilitates the continuance of the Liberal and National parties operating as separate organizations. Each has its own domain and in

1_{In case there remains any doubt in the mind of the reader, it is}

worth reinforcing that the National Party of Australia is not considered with the minor parties because for the most part it is treated throughout this thesis as being part of the major non-Labor coalition. In terms of votes won, the principal minor parties since the Second World War have been, in Australia, the Democratic Labor Party (from 1 9 55 to 1 9 7 2 and again in 1 9 7 5), the Australia Party

(1 9 7 4), and the Australian Democrats (since 1 9 7 7); in New Zealand,

areas where domination is not clear-cut the two parties are able to field competing candidates in electoral divisions where they can be sure that the Labor Party will not win an absolute majority initially, safe in the assurance that whichever is the more popular will inherit the other party's preferences. That this happens in only about 10 per

1

cent of electoral divisions, however, adds weight to the argument from Chapter One in favour of treating the coalition partners as one party for most purposes. The corollary of this is that we therefore treat Australia as having a two-party system. Survey evidence also

2

supports the argument. if the Liberal and National parties are thus treated as one it can then be shown that New Zealand and Australia

3

score similarly on R a e 's "fractionalization" index. In fact Australia is reduced from being rather higher on the index than New Zealand when

4