The entry of the British mission into Tibet raised
Chandra 3hamsher*s hope that in the likely event of an Anglo-TLbet- an war, he would assist the British government and obtain in return some Tibetan territory# Earlier Deb. Shamsher had told the Viceroy that the Indian government were just to "wink an eye in his direc tion" and in no time the Nepalese army would march into Tibet, Chandra Shamsher, so Colonel C.W*Ravenshaw, the Resident, informed 54. HC. Vol.210. Ho.2405; Vol.212, ffos.2580, 26^3. PSLI, Vol.151,
Reg#No#182, Secret Despatch to India, No#5* 27 February 1905» Vol#158, Reg#No#1504* Minutes of the Members of the India
Council# CRP, Vol#l62, Hamilton to Curzon, 19 February, 28 May
1905.
55« Lamb, op#cit#, p#290#
56• Younghusband, op#cit#,pp# 116-61 • 0 .Seaver, Francis Younghusband
177 Younghusband,was "thirsting for a fight with 'Tibet" and was "quite prepared"# Chandra Shamsher hinted that he wanted "rectification" of Nepalfs boundary with Tibet and kept his troops ready at four days5inarch from Khambajong# Younghusband, although against engaging Chandra Shamsher*s troops in Tibetan campaign, would let the Prime Minister occupy the strategic area around the Kerung pass and so enable him to realise the cherished desire of successive Nepalese statesmen; Youn^iusband would also post a Nepalese contingent at Khambajong to protect north Sikkim when the mission would move forward to Phari# Curzon, however, was opposed to any military
involvement by Chandra Shamsher, but he accepted the latter*s offer of yaks and transport to show the Tibetans that Nepal was on the
57 British side#
Curzon*s attitude must have disappointed Chandra Sham sher. From the Nepalese point of view some form of active involve ment in the Tibetan crisis was very necessary if for no other rea son than to impress on the British that Nepal was vitally interes ted in the matter and,therefore, the British while making a settle ment with the Tibetans must not overlook or harm Nepal*s interests.
'The only wajr for Chandra Shamsher to put himself forward was by assuming the role of a mediator in the Anglo-Tibetan dispute and to resolve it throu^i pressure on the Dalai Lama# Curzon, for his
57• F,Q., 7^6/7, Ylounghnsband .to Ravenshaw# 28 July# 19 August. 12 September 1905j Ravenshaw to Younghusband, 8 August, 50 August 1905, Chandra Shamsher to Ravenshaw, 29 August 1905# CRP, Vol. 160, Curzon to Hamilton, 14 August 1901# PSLI, Vol.159, Reg.No. : 1592A, Younghusband to Govt., Telg.5 October 1905* Reg.No. 1605, Govt, to Resident, Telg. 28 October 1905#
178
part, had no ground for objection, considering especially the Home government*s feelings about Nepal.
Jit Bahadur kept reasoning with the Kajis that the Tibetan government should forthwith start; negotiations with the British for a settlement ; the Kajis replied that the fault lay squarely with the British who were "by nature always aggressive, just like a drop of. oil on a sheet of paper which gradually spreads itself"; that any concession to them whetted their ambition for more and induced other powers to press similar claims; the fate of China was, indeed, a warning for ‘Tibet, and the Kajis repeatedly
53
stressed this point. Chandra Shamsher accused the Dalai Lama of having made a "serious mistake" in not sending delegates to confer with Younghusband who was still at Khambajong. This intransigent attitude, the Prime Minister warned the Kajis, would compel the British to adopt tougher measures which might lead to even destruc
tion of Tibet. The British, he assured, had no territorial ambi tions in Tibet; they only wanted to safeguard their treaty rights in Tibet which China, 'Tibet’s suzerain , had recognised. They would never interfere with Tibetan religion; in fact, Chandra Shamsher pointed out, the British had genuine interest in Buddhism as evi denced by their careful preservation of Buddhist monuments in India.
The Prime Minister cited the friendly relations between Nepal and So British India to prove that contact with the British was not /.that
179 dangerous. 'The British, Chandra Shamsher added, had not only scru pulously abstained from interfering with Nepal’s "religious and social prejudices" but had "actually helped us to maintain the autonomy, of our country" instead of tampering with it. Nepal had
59 also obtained from them territorial reward.
Chandra Shamsher kept Curzon posted wmth his diplo matic efforts at Lhasa which., however, so it appeared from Jit Bahadur’s reports, were not proving successful. 'These reports spoke of the Dalai Lama’s many meetings with Dorjieff, the fresh arrival of Russian arms at Lhasa, the sight of Russian-1 ooking troops on the Ilbetan-Mongolian border, mobilisation orders to the Lhasa troops and the Amban’s futile efforts to persyade the Dalai Lama to send delegates to . Younghusband•s camp at Khambajong. It was obvious to Jit Bahadur that
these Tibetans do not listen to what the Amban says and considering circumstances it does not seem that they pay much heed to us also. 60
Such, too, was the impression of Curzon and Younghusband both of whom, after reading Jit Bahadur*s"accmunts" were "certain" that
Dorjieff is now at Lhasa, that he has promised 'Tibetans Russian support; that Tibetans believe Russian support will be given to them and that Russian arms have already been given. 6l
In such circumstances Curzon saw no reason to regard the Russian government’s disclaimers as having any "canonical sanctity". 59* Ibid., Reg.No. 1592A., Resident to Govt., 4 September 1905*
enclosing Chandra Shamsher*s letter to Kajis.
60. Ibid., Reg,Nos.1605, 1639* 1659*1660; Vol.161, Reg.N0s.329* 344, 373, 407, 1214; Vol.162, Reg.No.528, REA, 21 November 1903; Vol.165, Reg.No.1180; Vol.166, Reg.No.1282, RNA, 18 October 1903*
61. HC, Vol.216, No.3357* Viceroy to Secy.Of State, Telg.13 December 1903*
180
The only explanation of the Dalai Lama’s continued obduracy in face of Anglo-Nepalese diplomatic pressure lay, Curzon argued, in his expectation of Russian support* So felt Chandra Shamsher also who, as he told Ravenshaw, seu^io prospect of the Dalai Lama’s agreeing to open negotiations at Khambajong; therefore, if the mission advanced further, Tibetan resistance and a full-scale war could not be averted. Curzo^who had been insisting on such advance^ claimed that &e had been completely vindicated. Younghusband, he asserted,must press on to Gyantse to avomd “needless sacrifice” of British prestige in Nepal, Bhutan and Sikkim where Britain’s
62