very depressing sight and an unequal match”; he expected that the Indian government would not like Nepal "to remain in a completely unprepared state” when a sudden Russian thrust towards India was not impossible# The contrast between what Chandra Shamsher " termed "free and generous supply of arms" to the Amir of Afghanistan and the restrictions on this supply to Nepal annoyed the Nepalese gov ernment most. The Durand Agreement (1893) committed the British to both allowing the Amir unrestricted importation of arms and
41
munition^ as well as assisting him in their procurement. But the arms arrangement made with Bir Shamsher at the same time had restric tions, and some conditions had to be fulfilled by the Nepalese
42
government before the British permitted them to import arms. This to Chandra Shamsher was gross discrimination. Curzon, however, re fused to entertain this grievance. He strongly believed that Bri tish influence on the border states decreased injproportion as they became militarily strong; and this belief had been confirmed by his cool relations with the Amir whose extensive acquisition
43 of arms Curzon viewed with great suspicion and utter disapproval. Curzon strongly suspected that the Nepalese were going the Afghan way. Lansdowne*s arms arrangement with Bir Shamsher, in Curzon*s opinion, was "somewhat similar” to the Durand Agreement with Abdur Rahman and equally regrettable. The Viceroy wanted to put more 41* Aitchison, op,cit., XI, P*3^2, Article VII.
42. see Chapter III, pp. 99-101*
43* Ronaldshay, op, cit., pp.265-71* Lovat Eraser, India under Curzon and After, p.66.
171 stringent restrictions on arms supply to Nepal. He took strong exception to the fact that the Nepalese government had set up an arms manufacturing factory in 1894 which had been kept from the Resident*s knowledge until 1900. This he took as a clear breach of Bir Shamsher*s assurance to Lansdowne and Elgin that the Nepal ese government would keep the Resident informed of their military establishments and their outturn in order to Justify their perio dical procurement of arms through the British government. Curzon also knew about Deb Shamsher*s claim of having established a new gun powder factory which had increased the production of gun pow der ten fold. Deb had also taken measures to manufacture 8000 rifles in imitation of Martini Henry rifles and six batteries of 7-pounder guns. Lansdowne and Elgin in permitting Nepal to import arms had expected that she would not manufacture them locally but get them through the Indian government alone-this expectation had been be lied. As a further instance of Nepalese "deception", it was reported that large quantities of brass sheets recently imported by the
Nepalese government ostensibly for roofing temples had actually been used for manufacturing cartridges. All this indicated that the
Nepalese government were "clearly engaged in a surreptitious attempt to convert Nepal into a second Afghanistan", their idea presumably being "to hold the scales between the Russians and the English and to prevent the entry to their country by eithe3P", Curzon was aware of the Nepalese sensitivity about their independence but himself looked upon Nepal^nothing but an Indian protectorate the defence of which was the British governments responsibility. He
172 would not, in short, let Chandra Shamsher exploit the Russian
intrigues with the Dalai Lama as an excuse to make Nepal militarily strong and proportionately independent of British influence. The Prime Minister had accordingly been warned s "we are not going to
44
wink at another Afghanistan" • Hamilton saw the force in Curzon* s arguments but did not quite like that the Viceroy should make arms an issue with: the Nepalese and Afghans and antagonise both at the same time. He advised Curzon thus :
The keenness of qriental rulers to obtain arms necessitates gentte handling where restrictions upon the imports of arms have to be imposed. It is quite true that Nepal cannot advance any plea that she is in danger from external aggression, and although that may be a conclusive reason from our point of view for stopping the accumulation of arms in Nepal, the Nepalese will not look at the matter in the same light. 45
In December 1902 Chandra Shamsher, while in Calcutta on his way to Delhi to attend the Durbar, assured Curzon that he regarded the interests of Nepal as "entirely bound up with the British government in India", and so he would heartily cooperate with the British in any measure they took against the Dalai Lama. Nepal, Chandra Shamsher added, could not allow Russian ascendancy
46 in Tibet, for that would mean "good-bye to her [Nepal's! independence". Chandra Shamsher's frankness was "almost a surprise" for Curzon, who, however, did not disclose his own Tibetan policy to the Prime
44* CRP, Vol.l6l, Curzon to Hamilton, 9 July* 1 October 1902, Curzon to A.Godley, Permanent Undersecretary, 30 October 1902. F.Q, 766/5* Beb Shamsher to Chandra, 2 December 1901. PSLI, Vol.150, Reg.No.l551A, Chandra to Ravenshaw, 6 October
1902
.
45. CRP, Vol.l^l, Hamilton to Curzon, 31 July 1902.
46* PSLI, Vol.151, Reg.No.182. CRP, Vol.162, Curzon to Hamilton, 28 December 1902.
173 47
Minister except in "a general and non-committal manner*.1 The main object of the meeting, so far as Curzon was concerned, was to test the genuineness of the Nepalese government's repotted concern over the Tibetan situatioh.
Chandra Shamsher's assurance of cooperation strength ened Curzon*s hands vis-gt-vis the India Office whose fear of mis understanding with the durbar regarding the Tibetan issue proved baseless. Curzon now maintained that the Nepalese were not only anxious about Russian threat to their interests but looked to the British government to remove that threat; therefore, if the latter did not take necessary measures to allay the Nepalese anxiety, British prestige in Nepal would be seriosly compromised. This
constituted an important argument in Curzon*s secret despatch to Hamilton, dated 8 January 1903* where after giving a masterly account of how British policy in Tibet had failed, the Viceroy established that the only solution to the Tibetan problem lay in an Anglo-Tibetan treaty negotiated at Lhasa and the posting of a permanent British representative there to ensure the observance
48 of the treaty by the Tibetan government.
Hamilton was impressed by these arguments but not Lee Warner who contended that if military use of Nepal was consi-
. make
dered risky, Curzon could at|Leastpolitical use of "the card which we have in our hands"-that is, he should 11take advantage of our
49 relations with Nepal and Nepal's treaty relations with Tibet". 47* Ibid.
48. PSLI, Vol.151, Reg.No.182.
174 Instead of sending a mission to Lhasa, Curzon, Lee Warner sugges ted, should warn the Dalai Lama through Jit Bahadur. It was like ly that Anglo-Nepalese diplomatic pressure might oblige the Dalai Lama to agree soon to negotiate with the British government-sooner,
50
if the number of Jit Bahadur*s escorts were increased, su^esting possible military action by' Nepal. However, if all this proved unavailing and if a mission were at all sent, Lee Warner would
prefer a Nepalese mission. He was in no doubt that Nepal had strong grounds to intervene in the matter while the British had "no ri^it to force down the throats of the Tibetans a mission to which they object. A British mission to Lhasa would appear as an invasion of Chinese territory^while Nepalese Intervention^Jasna5Savoidable step taken by Chandra Shamsher' for no other feason than the pro tection of Nepal*s interests based on treaty and recognised by both Tibet and China for about fifty years. John Edge, a Member of the India Council,agreed with Lee Warner and noted s
In fact, our object might be better, more surely and more easily effected by turning Nepal on to the Government of Tibet than by the hazardous expedient of. a so called pacific mission which, if necessary, should be converted into a mission by force. 53-
In other words, British hands had better not be openly shown when they could work, quite effectively inside Nepalese gloves. However, if China and Russia opposed the Nepalese mission the British would have to come to Nepal's assistance. And then,
50. Jit Bahadur had thirty one escorts.
51. PSLI, Vol.150, Reg.No.l590A, Note on Tibet by J.Edge, 7 January 1903.
175 If the worst comes to the worst, we or the Nepalese are In possession of Lhasa without having been the first to break our own declarations of the integrity of China, 52
Hamilton, on the other hand, was Inclined to support Curzon and to persuade the Cabinet to approve of the Viceroy*s plan, The Secretary of State was "really pleased" that the Nepalese durbar had taken "so sensible and wholehearted a view of a Russian erup
tion into Tibet" which had served to "simplify the situation". One of Hamilton*s arguments with his Cabinet colleagues was that Russ ian influence in Tibet would make greater British control over Nepal's foreign relations a compellingr necessity, but then, any attempt to seuure that control would irritate the Nepalese govern ment, The (far Office, too, had already drawn attention to this
53 point.
But the Cabinet "almost spontaneously and unanimously" rejected Hamilton's contention and stuck to its opposition to any local solution of the ‘Tibetan problem as desired by Curzon; it would not allow a mission to Lhasa, It preferred Instead to exert diplow matic pressure on the Russian government and ask them to keep off from ‘Tibet, The Chinese government arlso w$re warned against giving Russia any special position in Tibet, In reply, the Russian govern ment disclaimed any intention to meddle in Tibet and warned the
53A.
British not to disturb the political statusjquo. of Tibet, This dis- 52, Ibid,, Private Notes addressed by Lee Warner to Godley, Lee
Warner's Notes; Vol,151* Reg,No,182, Lee Warner's Note, 16 February 1903*
53* CRP, Vol,l62, Hamilton to Curzon, 25 January, 28 January 1903. PSLI, Vol.154, Reg.No,86l. HO_, Vol.206, N0.265I, Col.Robert- son's Memo on Tibet, 25 September 1902.
53A., The British government also disclaimed any intention of annex ing Tibetan territory. Younghusband, op.cit., pp.79-83»
176
claimer and warning, the Cabinet $eld, made despatching a British mission to Lhasa at once unnecessary and inexpedient# And Hamilton informed Curzon accordingly# The Cabinet, feowever, approved of Curzon*s proposal of conducting negotiations on trade matters with Chinese and Tibetan representatives at Khambajong, about twelve miles inside the Tibetan territory# The declared object of the negotiations was to obtain commercial facilities of a nature which
54
Nepalese traders in Tibet enjoyed# Lamb points out that
the chief significance of the mission to Khambajong must have been that the Home government had accepted
the necessity for some form of British mission on to Tibetan soil; if Khambajong failed, the only direction that mission could possibly move was forward# 55
The mission headed by Colonel Francis Younghubband reached Khamba jong in July 1905* There it impatiently waited for four months for duly accredited 'Tibetan negotiators to arrive and then marched
56