Since elections became the norm in Sub-Saharan Africa, an increasing number of regimes have lost power to opposition parties through electoral defeat (Goldsmith, 2001). However, not only do elections present a threat to regimes, but also act as a mechanism for the regime (if they retain power) to gain key information about support for opposition parties, the distribution of opposition votes and which subnational groups are loyal to the regime and the opposition, respectively (Cassani, 2017).55
Elections in Africa are commonly framed as one of the methods by which elites compete over access to state resources (Choi and Kim, 2018; Gandhi and Lust-Okar, 2009; Van de Walle, 2007). Elites outside the regime can gain access by getting co-opted into the incumbent regime or replacing it. Consequently, electoral contests in Africa frequently feature ‘recycled elites’ – long-standing opposition politicians, disgruntled former government insiders or members of previous regimes – which compete for the presidency or leading parliamentary parties (Kuenzi and Lambright, 2005; Bratton and Van de Walle, 1992). The importance of elites to galvanise support for or against the regime is demonstrated by the key role elite defections have played in the electoral downfall of regimes (Bratton and Van de Walle, 1992; Arriola, 2013; Reuter and Gandhi, 2011).
The political importance of elites in elections is partly due to their role as key representatives of subnational groups, which are either incorporated into or excluded from the regime (De Mesquita et al., 2005). In the immediate post-independence period, many ruling parties were broad-based alliances which governed through accommodating a coalition of elites that represented different subgroups within the country (Van de Walle, 2007). With the emergence of regular elections, regimes have engaged in different strategies of representation regarding the elite representatives of different ethno-regional groups.
Hegemonic regimes that face little threat of electoral loss continue to incorporate a wide array of subnational elites within their structures and draw support from many sections of society (Cheeseman and Ford, 2007; Carbone, 2007; Wahman, 2017). Examples include Tanzania’s Chama Cha Mapinduzi (CCM), South Africa’s African National Congress (ANC) and the Ethiopian People's Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPDRF). Voters in hegemonic regimes typically have no choice but to vote for the incumbent, protest through voting for an opposition party or abstain (Bratton et al., 2012). In cases where the opposition has no chance to dislodge the regime, nominal opposition parties may act as satellites of the dominant party: non-regime elites may compete in elections to signal potential utility to the regime as vote suppliers in the hope of being co-opted into the government (Magaloni, 2006; Van
55 This remains the case in spite of regimes frequently attempting to distort the vote. Regimes and leaders are
generally unable to create completely fraudulent voting outcomes without suffering a destabilising crisis of legitimacy (Levistky and Way, 2002). The tactics used by regimes to tilt elections in their favour include violating the impartiality of electoral management bodies, gerrymandering, ballot stuffing, repression or the annulment of unfavourable results (Ochieng'Opalo, 2012; Resnick, 2017; Hassan, 2017; Fox, 1997; Ikpe, 2014).
de Walle, 2007; Chabal and Daloz, 1999; Mozaffar et al., 2003). Parties and elites not seeking incorporation will be resigned to the role of ‘perpetual opposition’56 and adopt a confrontational stance
against the regime without posing a serious political threat.
In cases where the regime faces a real possibility of losing power through elections – such as Ghana, Kenya and Ivory Coast – competing parties typically seek to align their electoral fortunes with a particular constellation of ethnic and regional groups (Langer, 2005; Laakso, 2007; Wahman, 2017). In these competitive political and electoral environments, voters are faced with a real choice and are more likely to vote in ethnic blocs (Posner, 2007; Eifert et al., 2010). Consequently, in competitive regimes, non-regime elites can form parties or coalitions with the intention of replacing the incumbent and granting fellow supporters – voters and elites – ‘their turn to eat’ (Langer, 2005; Ndegwa, 1997). A major factor governing the efficacy of the opposition, apart from the status of the regime, is the unity or cohesion of opposition parties and elites. Existing research has shown that opposition coalitions or a monopolised opposition arena significantly increases the probability of a democratic transfer in power (Arriola, 2013; Wahman, 2013; Ladd, 2013). Competitive regimes have managed to retain power through encouraging the fragmentation of the opposition but have fallen when facing a dominant opposition party or coalition.57 Formerly hegemonic regimes have similarly witnessed their electoral
dominance eroded by a strong opposition candidate, and formerly ‘perpetual opposition’ candidates have come to power after the incumbent regime’s status shifted from hegemonic to competitive.58
The electoral results enable regimes to estimate whether they can be classed as electorally vulnerable or hegemonic and the cohesion of the opposition. Existing research has demonstrated how the results of elections allow regimes to calibrate policies and the distribution of state resources to reward supporters and sway or punish potential opposition supporters (Magaloni, 2006; Jablonski, 2014; Miller, 2015; Masaki, 2018). However, the study of the relationship between electoral results and regime strategies of survival has not been applied to a leader’s strategy of elite power sharing. No leader rules alone but instead relies on a coalition of elites to ensure political survival (De Mesquita et al., 2005). Elections provide a key instance in which leaders and regimes can assess the political threat posed by the opposition and remake the ruling coalition to diffuse threats through co-option, capitalising on opportunities by feeding the regime’s core base or deterring opposition through punishment. These
56 Examples include Kizza Besigye of Uganda, John Fru Ndi of Cameroon and Etienne Tshisekedi of Congo-
Kinshasa.
57 Illustrative of this dynamic is the KANU regime’s retention of power in Kenya when facing a divided opposition
in 1992 and 1997, only to fall to a coalition of opposition parties in 2002.
58 Examples include the Zimbabwe African National Union – Patriotic Front regime (ZANU-PF) in Zimbabwe,
the PS regime in Senegal and the Democratic Party of Côte d'Ivoire (PDCI) in Ivory Coast. Examples of perpetual opposition candidates who subsequently became leaders include Abdoulaye Wade of Senegal, Alpha Conde of Guinea, Laurent Gbagbo of Ivory Coast and Muhammadu Buhari of Nigeria.
various strategies, along with how they would visibly affect the ruling coalition, are outlined below as the politics of co-option, politics of the belly and the politics of punishment.