La difícil y discutida identificación del bien jurídico protegi do

Guerin, Morvant-Roux and Servet postulate that as an economic object, the role of money would be to create contractual relationships between equals (2011: 102). Yet historical, sociological, anthropological and even political analysis of monetary practices would reveal this impersonal and anonymous role as illusory (Ibid; see also Zelizer 1994, 2005 and Villarreal 2004). Access to, and use of, money and finance is subject to norms, conventions and formal rules. Hence, money and finance can be seen as social institutions, which engender a constant stress or tension between the individual and the group, between personal aspirations and collective responsibilities (Guerin et al. 2011: 102, see also Guerin 2006). This ongoing tension takes several forms as a means of relating to the group or creating interpersonal bonds of dependence and domination. Financial transactions of debt and lending are therefore regarded as a sign of being accepted in one or more social groups (Ibid: 102-103). Acceptance and membership into different social groups that range from traditionally based (family, ethnicity, caste, gender, religion) to more constructed (professional, neighbourhood and associative groupings) is constantly evolving (Ibid: 103). It therefore becomes indispensible to understand and adapt with these social settings, if MFIs are to accomplish their goals, including the monetarisation of these contemporary societies.

Given this background, it is also important to point out that the very lending mechanisms that most MFIs employ such as group lending, expect the borrowers to know one another and help a group member facing a temporary difficulty in payment. This mechanism works because the social networks of clients have an effective way of reinforcing payments through peer pressure. Fear of ostracism and loss of face within the community provides strong leverage in enforcing instalment payments for the loans (Banerjee and Duflo 2011: 167; Karim 2011: xviii; see also Ashraf 2014). As community members abide by certain norms and codes of conduct, and avoiding others that can bring shame or ostracism, they sustain social institutions and guarantee the conservation of social conventions (see Schweizer 1996).

Communities all over the world have distinctive norms and practices that serve vital functions for their members. How these communities experience and perceive microfinance

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varies widely. It is crucial therefore to take into consideration the local and regional contexts with their specific norms and practices when designing microfinance programmes. Microfinance can have multiple meanings for people, which in turn determine whether they want to use microfinance and how they may use (or misuse) it (Morvant-Roux et al. 2013: 303). In Morocco, for example local perceptions deeply ingrained in historical, political and social constructs of the microcredit markets were far more important than the forces of market supply and demand to shape the sectors’ market (Ibid: 310). Religious norms and cultural practices in Moroccan society is a major hindrance to borrowing (Ibid: 306). Local perceptions of being in debt equate this situation to lacking all control of your life and, as head of a household, having failed to cater to the family’s material needs (Ibid: 306).16 _Many religious injunctions restrain Moroccans from borrowing; for example Muslims cannot go to perform the Hajj (the holy Pilgrimage to Mecca), when in debt (Ibid).

Likewise, cultures that discourage conventional interest on loans, and systems and regimes that forbid or promote certain market forms, are generally not microfinance friendly (see Hes and Polednakova 2013 and Karim 2011; see also Iqbal and Mirakhor 2013). Microfinance thus has a very real chance of being resisted by, for example, many Muslim communities and societies where religious ideologies come into friction with MFI lending practices due to prohibitions on interest-based loans (Hassan et al. 2013). A survey by CGAP in 2007 on Islamic microfinance for example disclosed that almost three quarters of the population in Muslim countries cited religious admonitions on interest based loans as a reason for abstaining from microfinance services (Karim et al. 2008).17 Statistics compiled by another study show that around 155.5 million adults are not integrated into the microfinance market simply due to the fact that they live under Islamic (Sharia) Law,18 which bans conventional microfinance due to the practice of charging interest (Hes and Polednakova 2013: 26).

Within this realm of cultural practices, social conventions and ideology lies another interrelated factor of a more historical nature. Often a lack of a certain “culture” (for the direct and indirect services that the MFIs have to offer) can itself be an impediment to the sector’s outreach and has to be addressed through vigorous advocacy programmes by the microfinance

16 _{Ashraf 2014 presents similar evidence for a study in Bangladesh where subjective norms and beliefs have a} significant negative influence towards intention to participate in MFIs.

17 _{The survey comprised of information on and from over 125 institutions and interviews from experts in 19} Muslim countries (Karim et al. 2008:1)

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providers (see Giesbert 2013: 4, Churchill and Matul 2012: 18 and Kalra 2010: 7-8).19 The issue at hand is that if the services that are offered by MFIs were historically not common or widely accepted within the target populations, then it will take time and investment of resources to establish a culture (of acceptance) of microfinance in the first place. It will take time to change the perception of a diverse range of new organisations offering services that either are assumed to be the responsibility of the extended family or clan, or that were totally absent and unknown before.