La dualidad público-privada de la lucha contra el dopaje y la necesaria participación de los gobiernos

The opinions that the various groups harbour regarding MFIs and their clients within the surveyed communities can be evaluated by their attitude towards the (potential) borrowers and employees of MFIs. Any kind of threats, warnings or provocations that might have been encountered by any of the respondent HHs of the sample is presented in Table 4.5 along with borrower status information within the HH’s community. This outlines the basis of the third component of the decision to take out a loan.

Table 4.5: Component 3: MFI borrower information and threats/ warnings/ provocations encountered by the respondents

Borrower HHs Control Group Difference in sample means 1

N 39 35 16 13

Reported by women men women men

Male guardian/ husband knows of borrower status 37 2 35 - - - MFI status confidential (not made public to peers

in the larger community) 3 2 - - -

(Potential) MFI membership has been a cause of threat/ provocation from

extended family 4 1 4 2 0 .14 **

community chief/ headman 0 0 3 2 0.17 ***

neighbours/ peers 1 1 2 1 0.07

religious factions 1 2 3 1 0.10 *

local moneylenders/ traders 6 3 0 0 -0.12 **

public officials 1 0 1 0 0.02

local politicians/ councillors 1 0 0 0 -0.01

other MFI loan officers 4 3 0 0 -0.09 *

1. The p-value refers to a t-test of the difference in the means for borrower HHs – non-borrower HHs); *p<0.1, **p<0.05 and ***p<0.01 (two-tailed).

2. The two male guardians not knowing of wife’s borrower status had deserted their families according to the women interviewed. In one case, the husband has been missing for 12 years and the son was the loan nominee. In the second case, the husband was abusive and violent and had been kicked out of the house by his wife and children who fended for themselves and had a woodwork business, financed by a NEED loan. Male nominee was the borrower’s son.

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As discussed in the previous section, borrowing in general is an act that many are rather uncomfortable with. This was explicitly depicted in the responses of five borrower HH respondents, who wanted to keep a low profile by keeping their borrower status confidential to their extended family and peers. This was corroborated by the employees of NEED (see Table 4.6), who said that some members preferred to hide their MFI membership status from their families or relatives. From the interviews it became clear that considerable stigma was attached to the act of borrowing. Many respondents automatically assumed that borrowing pointed to living beyond ones means, and assumed that their neighbours and peers would hold this view as well. In turn, this association threatened to tarnish the family’s credibility in the long run. In other words, the perceived danger was that community members, peers and neighbours would look down upon a family seen to be risking its credibility by borrowing, which would eventually displace that family’s social stature within these social milieus. Given this context, the action of wanting to hide MFI client status for fear of reputational damage or displacement of social stature is therefore in line with the general perceptions on borrowing within their communities.

Furthermore, respondents from both the borrower and non-borrower HHs reported having encountered threats and warnings, of one sort or another directly from their extended families, community headmen, neighbours, peers, the religious faction, moneylenders and loan officers of other MFIs. However, local moneylenders and loan officers of other MFIs were reported to be more active in threatening and intimidating the actual MFI (NEED) clients, whereas for all other actors, the control group HH were more affected. The differences in the two sample means between the two HH groups regarding such intimidation from extended family, community headmen, the religious faction, the moneylenders and loan officers of other MFIs were also statistically significant. For respondents from the control group HHs, these intimidating encounters were seen as a preventive and precautionary act from all such actors seeking to dissuade a potential loan take up from an MFI by the HH. The borrowers, on the other hand, were rebuked outright by actors within their social milieus for borrowing from MFIs.

Acts of intimidation, as reported by the respondents, included anything from verbal threats, disputes, quarrelsome attitudes, warnings of sanctions and isolation from family, community and caste members to physical intimidation. Such acts did not have to be violent or vehement, yet the recipient was sensitised to the cues for consequences that might follow. The following statement from a respondent from Sitapur explains the way that these sanctions operate:

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“...my husband’s disposition [regarding MFI membership] is not as harsh as those of his extended family or of our community [chief and men]....my husband is scared of the consequences [of the community’s angered members] in case we were to defy their wishes [meaning refrain from joining a credit group]”

(interview with female non-borrower, Sitapur, UP).

In general, women respondents reported a higher rate of such provocations and threats from the extended family than did men. Upon further probing, it was revealed that the “community members” that the respondent(s) kept referring to were mostly senior men from their family and caste members. Non-borrower HHs also reported confrontation with their community heads who were strongly opposed to the idea of borrowing with MFIs because they were of the opinion that MFIs distract women from their traditional obligation of caring for their families. According to one respondent:

“The men of my community are of the opinion that all [the obligations] that come with an MFI membership like weekly or monthly meetings are a waste of time and distract women from their first and foremost obligations of serving their families” (interview with female non-borrower, Bihar).

This sentiment was echoed by another respondent who exclaimed that “...if she [his

wife] were to waste all her time with these useless meetings of the SHGs, who would prepare the meals for me when I come home from work or take care of the children and family” (interview with male non-borrower, Lucknow, UP).

SHG meetings can take quite a lot of the women’s time. Meetings take place weekly to fortnightly. At these meetings, which are obligatory for all members, all matters of concern to the 20-25 women members are discussed, savings collected and loans, if any, disbursed. In contrast, JLG groups meet only once a month for collections or payment of instalments. All the members do not need to appear at the branch office in person; instead, members can take turns to collectively bring in the instalments of the other members along with theirs. However, SHGs have a much broader social agenda, and thus have a greater overall impact on the women who take part (and also on their children), as they address other social issues and woes, whereas JLGs are formed only for the sole purpose of credit (see appendix 4.1 for details on the structure and functions). Since it is easier for the MFI and its clients to manage communal pressures better when it comes to women’s time allocation, NEED too has changed tracks, focussing more on JLGs than on SHG lending methodologies. This is yet another sign that MFIs have to adapt to the perceptions and preferences of local actors to target their clientele.

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A lot of the men within the communities were of the opinion that the loans from MFIs were a cause of disruption in the “natural” flow of family affairs. They were of the belief that the women’s first obligation is seeing to the comforts of the other family members, and expressed the opinion that this obligation came before her decision for a loan for some economic activity that might not only bring her more financial independence but also benefit the family in terms of income. These conservative opinions regarding women’s roles within households and communities is a clear indication of considerable potential for strife and confrontation if the women were to still opt for a loan despite opposition from immediate or extended families or peers and community members. The time that women invest in the group meetings required by MFIs, or in the economic activity undertaken with the support of the loan, inevitably comes at the cost of time that they normally spend in unpaid household work, like preparing meals, taking care of the family and children and attending to other domestic chores. The norms of family lifestyle and the respective gendered roles within the HHs were a central theme amongst many of the respondent conversations during interviews. This was also one reason why many of the control HH women who were employed and had an income before their marriages (see Table 4.1) did not continue working after their marriages, despite the fact that many of them wished to do so. The perceptions of the family and of the men of the family in particular, were decisive eventually. The fact that the women’s willingness to take out a loan for an economic activity, or work after marriage for that matter, would eventually contribute to the family’s income and the general well-being of the HH’s children seemed to be secondary. The concerns over women failing or falling short of their primary obligations to their families were paramount.

Intimidations from the local religious faction, preacher or foremen were reported mostly from the Muslim HHs among the control group, due to the fact that Islam prohibits interest-based loans and local religious leaders therefore deem them as un-Islamic. Indeed, all the respondents answering in the affirmative for intimidation regarding MFI membership from the religious foremen of their communities in Table 4.5 above were Muslims. Thus this resistance to MFIs on behalf of the religious groups is justified on ideological grounds and is much in line with the theoretical argumentations as presented in Chapter 2.

Borrower HHs also reported being harassed or verbally threatened by the loan officers of other MFIs operating in their areas, presumably in trying to dissuade them from borrowing further with NEED. According to NEED clients, employees of other MFIs operating in the same areas as NEED were among those who harassed them and spread misconceptions about

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NEED operations.11 Loan officers and NEED staff, however, denied engaging in any such activities themselves towards their competing MFI staff members, who covered the same villages and operational areas. Such harassments from rival MFIs were, however, not the only examples of cutthroat competition. Most of what the HHs had to report on such unpleasant demeanour from the various actors, like employees of other MFIs or moneylenders, towards them was (at least partly) also confirmed by the loan officers of NEED. In particular, 7 out of 10 loan officers explicitly reported moneylenders hindering them in their work when in the field (see Table 4.6). Within this context one loan officer reported:

“.... moneylenders have no license for officially lending money on commercial rates, so they are wary of us – and since they are mostly influential men, their devotees are always ready to provoke and cause trouble – like spreading misconceptions about NEED, thus creating extra work for us” (interview with

development manager, Sitapur, UP).

Note that private money lending is regulated and illegal in India unless registered (see Verma 2014). NEED employees in the field reported of agents-cum-goons engaged by moneylenders to spread negative propaganda regarding their activities, which meant that NEED employees had to put in additional work educating communities and dispel the negative impressions created by this propaganda. For the employees of competing MFIs and moneylenders, perhaps such acts of discrediting NEED’s reputation were simply a means to hamper NEEDs operations in the hope of extending their own operations or winning over more clients. This might appear short-sighted of rival MFI employees, as it damages impressions of the microfinance sector as a whole. Nonetheless, reaching their personal targets of winning over clients might be a priority that entails financial compensation for individual employees, giving them additional incentive to prioritise building the client base of their own organisation over the long-term image-building of the sector.

The case of moneylenders here deserves special attention. According to one loan officer’s statement

“....my client was forced to use his loan from NEED to pay off an older loan of the moneylender...[the moneylender] also intimidated my client with never ever coming to him for a loan again because he now borrows from NEED”

(interview with NEED loan officer, Sitapur, UP).

11 _{This spreading of misconceptions included, but was not limited to, maligning the company’s image in areas} where local populations are more or less ignorant or scarcely informed of the larger agendas of community development NGOs or MFIs like NEED. This local lack of information provided ample opportunities for goons to spread bad publicity for competing MFIs through word of mouth.

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Other NEED employees also reported loan misuse (use for reasons other than the one stipulated with NEED) due to the need to pay back loans taken out from moneylenders. One might also argue that this is an issue of careless screening regarding the intended purpose of the loan on the part of MFI loan officers. Nonetheless as already touched upon in the last section, it is important to understand that when moneylenders get their loan repayment back on time, this means that they lose the ability to negotiate exploitative repayment terms to their own advantage with their clients. In other words, it is quite possible that when moneylender loans are paid off in time via loans from NEED or other MFIs (even if it is loan misuse for the MFI), it will end the power of the moneylender over the borrower, resulting in a financial loss or loss of power for the moneylender. Thus the negative stance and the resulting actions of the moneylenders toward MFIs become comprehensible when one considers that their preferences lie beyond direct lending competition with the MFIs.

Varying attitudes towards MFIs were dealt with differently by the respondents. The respondents from the borrower HHs had a much more pragmatic attitude to threats from several actors within their social circles. In general, they were less intimidated by such issues as loss of face or fear of moneylenders or loan officers of other MFIs, although they were aware of these threats. Also, most of the male respondents from borrower HHs were less restrictive in their attitudes towards women, their daily activities and roles, leaving the women more freedom in deciding their daily routine. Control group HHs and the women of these HHs in particular were, however, seen to be more restrained by patriarchal forces within their social circles.

On the provider side, NEED employees have also had to encounter trouble in delivering credit services to their targeted clients. Table 4.6 presents some statistics on challenges from various groups that NEED employees faced when working within the communities. As already mentioned, moneylenders topped the list of troublesome actors identified by NEED employees. They were followed on this list by family members of borrowers, loan officers of other competing MFIs and the religious factions. Moneylenders were mostly reported to be indirectly involved in hindering the loan officers’ activities in the communities. The main targets were always the clients, who were harassed or intimidated in different ways. According to NEED loan officers, when they confronted the moneylenders regarding harassment of their clients, the moneylenders would simply deny having said anything to the borrowers. According to NEED staff there was little that they or the borrowers themselves could do to counter such behaviour.

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Table 4.6: Responses from NEED employees concerning problems/ hindrances they face

N 10

When in the field always cautious/ wary of attitude/ surroundings/ people/ language 8 Have faced difficulties/ were hindered in approaching clients from different groups 10 Has encountered clients preferring to keep membership secret from extended family/ neighbours/

peers 4

Groups specified as causing trouble/ difficulties that hinder employees in their work

Moneylenders

Family members of the borrowers

Loan officers/ employees of other MFIs/ banks Members of the religious faction

7 3 3 2 Officer has had clients hindered in paying instalments due to external (third party) influence 7

External influence (third parties) specified via client complains as hindrances in timely instalment payments

Family

Peers/ neighbours Moneylenders

Loan officers/ employees of other MFIs/ banks

4 3 2 1

Trouble or support from government agencies in general

Trouble Support None 1 0 9

Specification of government agencies/ employees who cause trouble

Government officials in the bureaucracy 1

Many loan officers also reported that family members of borrowers would sometimes intimidate the women into not paying the loan instalment when it was due, even when she had put aside money for the instalment to pay back. This created a most difficult situation for the women borrowers, as proving their honesty and loyalty to NEED meant having to disobey the head of the HH, who would usually be her husband or a senior family member. According to the loan officers of NEED, the family members of their clients usually feel that not paying back MFI loans would not entail any sanctions, as only the women are directly responsible for the loans and the money set aside for loan instalments can be put to other uses within the family. Due to this issue NEED, ironically, has had to institute the requirement of having a male nominee, ideally the husband, for every loan issued to a woman within the HH. The reason behind this requirement was stated by NEED management and staff as a strategic practicality. Without this measure, they felt that women would probably be pressured into taking up a loan and in case of non-payment be held accountable for it even when not directly at fault. Senior management indicated this to be a common practice among regional and national MFIs in India. Imposing the condition of a male nominee for a micro-credit was meant to generally curb the attitude of free riding and not taking the loan undertaking seriously as it comes through the women. The family members might be short-sighted and only hope to get away with non-repayment of the instalments, with or without the women borrowers consenting to such behaviour. Also it would be easier for the women who have

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borrowed to simply blame the rest of the family in case of non-payment. Yet, this widely practiced male nominee conditionality by MFIs would seem to fall far short of the women’s empowerment typically touted by the industry. It implies that women who do not get the support of a male guardian as a nominee, or who do not have a qualifying male family member, are not eligible for an MFI loan. This issue is further discussed in the next section