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Intervention in armed conflict at the international level is a capital intensive project and the African Union was not financially sufficient to give Libyan crisis the needed response. Such intervention at the level of escalated armed struggle needed a strong military force that could stand between the forces loyal to Muammar Gaddafi and the NTC led rebel forces while the AU‘s High Level ad-hoc Committee went on with its mediation. Lack of finance made the existence of such military force not possible and the same problem hampered a quick formation of a military force at that time the crisis had started. The union

therefore relied only on diplomatic approach to the crisis while military hostility from the two sides increasingly continued to claim lives and properties in Libya.AU‘s financial incapacitation is also clear when you consider the fact that most of her development partners that would have supported her financially did not accept her response proposal to the crisis and so the union was left alone to suffer her financial weakness which led to its inability to give her response the required funding. NATO hampered AU financially and politically. EU for instance sponsors a major part of AU‘s conflict response budget including a small but flexible fund for rapid response for political emergencies but in Libyan case, the response to AU‘s request for funding was delayed.

AU development partners as they are called include Canada, Sweden Germany, the Netherlands, the United States, the United Kingdom, Spain, China and Turkey as well as organisations such as the World Bank and European Union.

These donors contribute about two-third of AU annual budget. In order to demonstrate our argument let us look at the income and expenditure of the African Union and amounts contributed by AU member states and foreign partners between 2007 and 2015.

Financial year

2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015

Estimate 133.0 140.0 164.3 250.5 256.8 274.9 278.2 395.2 522.1 Contribution

from MS

96.7 107.7 93.8 111.8 122.6 na 122.9 137.9 147.3

Contribution from FP

36.3 32.4 57.4 133.7 134.1 na 155.4 257.3 374.8

Diff. b/w MS &

FP Contr.

60.4 75.3 36.4 21.9 11.5 - 32.5 119.4 227.5

AU Budget Estimate and Sources of Funding 2007-2015 (in US$mn)

Fig 6.1 Source: Constructed from the AU Assembly and Council’s data published in Engel U.

(2011)

The above table reveals the nature of the African Union‘s funding. It shows African Union‘s budget estimate and sources of funding 2007-2015. The first row shows AU‘s annual budget estimate of the respective years while the second row represents contributions from AU member states (MS) and the third row carries the contributions of the AU foreign partners (FP). A close look at the table reveals that AU budget estimates continued to increase from 133.0 in 2007 to 522.1 in 2015. Important information also in the table is that contributions from member states were only greater than those of the foreign partners in 2007, 2008 and 2009 but as from 2010 -2015, foreign partners continued to dominate AU funding.This is an indication of the fact that when development partners like the US, EU, Britain, France, World Bank and other western donors rejected AU‘s roadmap to Libya, funding became a fundamental handicap. AU at that point had no option than to organise her programme of action according to funds at herdisposal. It is important to note also that even in occasion where these partners assisted in the funding of AU operations, they did not transfer the money to AU; rather they manage the fund themselves. In the case of the Libyan Crisis, AU‘s request for fund was delayed and denied.

We therefore, argue that lack of fund and foreign donors‘ disappointment were part of the factors that undermined AU‘s responses to the Libyan Crisis. This argument is in recognition of the fact the revenue accruing to the AU comes from contributions of the member states according to a scale of assessment, additional voluntary contributions by members to the Solidarity Fund and funds provided by external partners. To this end, failure by either members or foreign partners is likely to undermine AU plan of action. This manifested itself during the 2011 Libyan crisis when foreign partner disappointed the union by delaying their contributions. Her dependence on foreign donors also reflects in the bar chart below:

The above chart shows funding of the African Union by her member states and foreign partners from 2007 to 2015. The blue bars represent contributions from AU member states standing side by side with orange colour bars representing contributionsfrom foreign partners (FP). The Y axis indicates respective financial years while X axis represents funds contributed in these years in United States million dollars. The chart proves that the AU was continually dependent on foreign donors and this is attributed to lack of commitment by the member states and failure of many of them to transfer their dues to the AU. The dependence as we can see is in increasing progression rising from 36.3US$min 2007 to 374US$m in 2015 with high percentage. See pie charts below:

96.7 107.7

93.8 111.8 122.6

0

122.9 137.9 147.3

36.3 32.4

57.4

133.7 134.1

0

155.4

257.3

374.8

2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015

Chart Title

CMS CFP

Fig 6.2 Source: Constructed from the AU Assembly and Council‘s data published in Engel U. (2011)

Fig. 6.3 Pie Chart Showing Local & ForeignFinancial Contributions to the African Union in 2011

Source: Constructed from the AU Assembly and Council‘s data published in Engel U. (2011)

This pie chart shows the gap between what the AU can provide and what it sourced externally to make up its budget in 2011. It shows great financial weakness in the part of the AU. AU‘s proposal could not have based on the actual amount needed for its annual business but must recognize the fact that the union could only raise about one-third of its budget. Every other consideration on the budget had to be mindful of what foreign development partners could offer. The implication of that situation was the facts that the AU was not finically competent to provide the needful due to its weak financial base and dependence on foreign donors. It has to depend on what was available not what was required to carry out it functions – humanitarian intervention inclusive. The situation is worse when you consider the fact that many AU members fail to pay their dues as at when due. The bar chart below shows the few responsive members out of 54 member nations of the union.

CFP, 52.20%

CMS, 47.80%

Table Showing Few AU Members Who Paid their Fees on Time

Fig. 6.4 Source: http://africajournalismtheworld.com/tag/african-union-finances/

Fig. 6.3 above shows a few AU member countries that paid their dues on time in 2014. It shows South Africa, Angola, Nigeria and Algeria as the only members that paid their dues on time. Egypt, Libya (after Gaddafi‘s death), Sudan and Cameroon were struggling to pay their 2013 arrears. Other members remained indebted to the union. Such indebtedness is a major bottleneck to boasting AU‘s financial base and such behaviour had been there before the Libyan Crisis. It worsened after the crisis considering the death of Muammar Gaddafi, a major contributor to the union‘s fund. Green bars on the chart show contributions made by AU members while gold colour represents arrears.