Factores socio-ambientales e interpersonales en el centro escolar (aula

instigation from the makers and distributors of apparatuses of war beyond Africa. It will cause illegal proliferation of purchase, distribution and use of military wares across Africa, particularly, in states where government is not living up to the people‘s expectations or where ethnic differences are not properly managed. Such states abound in Africa with Nigeria, Somalia,and South Sudan as few examples.

CHAPTER SIX

FACTORS THAT INCAPACITATD AFRICAN UNION’S RESPONSES TO THE LIBYA CRISIS

Introduction

This chapter looks at the basic factors that incapacitated the African Union‘s responses to the Libyan Crisis. This becomes necessary following the failure by the existing texts to adequately expose and consider deep-rooted factors that incapacitated AU‘s effort in Libya. In addition, the need for corrective measures to strengthen AU‘s conflict response capacity requires academic understanding of the basic challenges that undermined the union capacity. To this end, the chapter tests the following hypothesis:

AU was incapacitated by lack of fund, donor disappointments, no strong military force and leadership ineptitude.

what, at that early stage was regarded as internal affairs of Libya. The union‘s Constitute Act only allowed in Article 4(h) for intervention when the government has lost control of the state, occurrence of genocide or gross human right violation. The Act was silent on early warning response which supposed to have provided the opportunity for early diplomatic mediation by the AU High Level ad-hoc Committee on Libya. It is important to note that following AU‘s Constitute Act, the union could not have mediated successfully at the point military actions were the order of the day without having military backup to deliver her diplomatic message to already charged warring factions. It was a clear case of legal handicap at the early stage when diplomatic solution was most suitable andlegal consent at the stagewhen diplomacy was already surrounded by hostile militarized environment. The Constitute Act should have added a clause that would enable the union start mediation earlier in a crisis state without necessarily constituting interference in the internal affairs of that state. AU‘s Constitute Act, Article 3(a-n), provides a number of objectives and functions for the union without creating conducive environment and instruments for their implementation. It aims to:

a. achieve greater unity and solidarity between the African countries and the peoples of Africa;

b. defend the sovereignty, territorial integrity and independence of its Member States;

c. accelerate the political and socio-economic integration of the continent;

d. promote and defend African common positions on issues of interest to the continent and its people;

e. encourage international cooperation, taking due account of the Charter of the United Nations and Universal Declaration of Human Rights;

f. promote peace, security and stability on the continent;

g. promote democratic principles and institutions, popular participation and good governance;

h. promote and protect human and peoples‘ rights in accordance with the African Charter on Human and Peoples‘ Rights and other relevant human rights instruments;

i. establish the necessary conditions which enable the continent play its rightful roles in the global economy and international negotiations;

j. promote sustainable development at the economic, social and cultural levels as well as integration of African economies;

k. promote co-operation in all fields of human activities to raise living standards of African peoples;

l. coordinate and harmonise the policies between the existing and future Regional Economic Communities for the gradual attainment of the objectives of the union;

m. advance the development of the continent by promoting research in all fields, in particular in science and technology;

n. work with relevant international partners in the eradication of preventable diseases and the promotion of good health on the continent.

The above objectives, no doubt provide the AU with an all-encompassing task of ensuring the general well-being of the continent of Africa and its people, resolution of conflict inclusive. Therefore, AU‘s involvement in issues that may lead to conflict should be early enough without constituting interference.

UN Resolution 1973 and Its No-Fly-Zone Ban: The United Nations‘

Resolution 1973 placed ban on flights within Libya air space in what it called no-fly-zone. By that resolution, the AU had to take permission from the United Nations before it could travel to Libya. Zuma led AU High-Level ad-hoc

Committee on Libya was initially denied permission to enter Libya in furtherance of its mediation process. The committee was shock and demoralised for not been allowed to enter a member state for mediation exercise known to the United Nations. Though the permission was later granted after some delay, but that was when NATO had concluded its readiness to intervene in Libya. The atmosphere at that time was more of war than diplomacy and it contributed to AU‘s untimely departure from Libya. Thus, AU was fundamentally handicapped by legal provisions which did not allow her operate freely. It therefore, becomes unacademic when such handicaps are not put into serious consideration when assessing AU‘s performance.

Deficiency in AU’s Roadmap: Despite highly commendable potency of the AU roadmap, it failed to state the position of Muammar Gaddafi in the transition to democratisation programme for Libya. Though, members of the AU High Level ad-hoc Committee agreed and Gaddafi initially accepted not to be part of the transition. The implication was that Gaddafi would step aside from Libya seat of power. Unfortunately, this understanding was not contained in the roadmap and this omission was a major reason expressed by the NTC leader, Mustafa Abdel Jilil for rejecting the roadmap. This inadequacy in the roadmap contributed to denying the AU High Level ad-hoc Committee its expected success in the Libyan mediation.

AU’s Leadership Ineptitude: Leadership of a continental organization like the AU should be a firm and well-articulated body capable of holding its member to her principles and opinions. Unfortunately, what transpired in 2011 response to Libyan crisis was an indication where foreign policy, external as well as internal friendship and personal interest could not allow AU leadership hold the entire African states together to speak in one voice over the unions decisions on Libya.

The capacity to lead efficiently was lacking and that resulted in the inability of the union to gather resources required for the mission. It resulted to the difference between the union‘s position on foreign intervention in Libya and the votes of the three African representatives to the United Nations Security Council namely Nigeria, South Africa and Gabon who voted in favour of foreign intervention (Resolution 1973) in Libya. Nigeria, South Africa and Gabon are all leading members of the African union but were not adequately controlled by AU leadership to tow the union‘s way and provide the resources to support the decision.

It is obvious that fifty four member states of the AU can finance the union if they are sincerely committed to AU projects. However, it requires a leadership competent enough to cause the submission of all members to the union‘s course.

The inability to mobilize adequate men and resources to wage hostility in Libya while negotiation went on was a clear indication of leadership incompetence. If AU leadership was competent, the union could have gathered adequate support from the United Nations to encourage her diplomatic option for Libya crisis.

Such weakness in leadership should be an issue of serious consideration in evaluating or appraising the African Union‘s response to Libya crisis. The union‘s leadership was surrounded by people friendly to Muammar Gaddafi and their sense of friendship and sprit-d-corps to group of fellow Heads of State did not allow them mount adequate pressure on Gaddafi to relinquish power long before the United Nations Resolution 1973 on Libya came into being. Again, there was fear among leading Heads of State that an AU military force if organized and used in Libya may one day affect them. AU was therefore left with mediation that was not backed by a military force that could have wedged the war for the mediation to continue. This situation was at the background of what contributed the AU‘s failure.