Dimensionado de la red de aguas residuales

The Sandiganbayan found accused Nathaniel S. Manipon, Jr., 31, guilty of direct bribery, dated September 30, 1981. Manipon came to this Court on petition for review on certiorari seeking the reversal of the judgment of conviction. The Court dismissed the petition, "the question raised being factual and for lack of merit." 1 However, upon motion for reconsideration, the Court reconsidered its resolution and gave due course to the petition. 2 Nathaniel S. Manipon, Jr., a deputy sheriff of the Court of First Instance of Baguio City and Benguet, Branch IV, was assigned to enforce an order of the Minister of Labor.

Pursuant to that assignment, Manipon sent a notice to the COMTRUST garnishing the bank accounts of Dominguez. The bank agreed to hold the accounts. For one reason or another, Manipon did not inform the labor arbiter of the garnishment nor did he exert efforts to immediately satisfy the judgment under execution.

Manipon's help was sought by Dominguez in the withdrawal of the garnished account.

Manipon told Dominguez that the money could not be withdrawn.

However, when the two met again, Manipon told Dominguez that he "can remedy the withdrawal so they will have something for the New Year." Dominguez interpreted this to mean that Manipon would withdraw the garnished amount for a consideration. Dominguez agreed and they arranged to meet at the bank later in the afternoon. After Manipon left, Dominguez confided the offer to NISA Sub-Station Commander Luisito Sanchez. They then hatched up a plan to entrap Manipon by paying him with marked money the next day.

Col. Sanchez and a Col. Aguana were able to put up P700.00 in fifty-peso bills which were then authenticated, Xeroxed and dusted with fluorescent powder.

Issue:

Whether or not accused committed direct bribery?

Held:

Yes. Manipon maintains that Dominguez had framed him up because of a grudge. He said that in 1978 he and Flora had levied execution against several vehicles owned by Dominguez, an act which the latter had openly resented.

The defense theory is so incredible that it leaves no doubt whatsoever in the Court's mind that Manipon is guilty of the crime charged.

It is very strange indeed that for such an important agreement that would modify a final judgment, no one took the bother of putting it down on paper. Of course Manipon would have us believe that there was no need for it because he trusted Dominguez and Tabek. And yet did he not also claim that Dominguez had framed him up because of a grudge? And if there was really an agreement to alter the judgment, why did he not inform the labor arbiter about it considering that it was the labor arbiter who had issued the order of execution?

Manipon could not give satisfactory explanations because there was no such agreement in the first place.

The temporary receipt 20 adduced by Manipon, as correctly pointed out by the Solicitor General, is a last-minute fabrication to provide proof of the alleged agreement for the trial payment of the judgment debt. Contrary to Manipon's claim, it is hard to believe that Dominguez was not interested in getting said temporary receipt because precisely that was the proof he needed to show that he had partially complied with his legal obligation.

Indeed, Manipon's behavior at the very outset, had been marked with irregularities. As early as November 9, 1979, he had already garnished the bank accounts of Dominguez at Comtrust, but he did not notify the labor arbiter so that the corresponding order for the payment by the bank of the garnished amount could be made and the sum withdrawn immediately to satisfy the judgment under execution. His lame excuse was that he was very busy in the sheriff's office, attending to voluminous exhibits and court proceedings.

That was also the same excuse he gave for not informing the labor arbiter of the novation.

In fact he candidly admitted that he never communicated with the NLRC concerning the garnishment. He returned the writ unsatisfied only on February 20, 1980 although by its express terms, it was returnable within thirty days from October 29, 1979. 22 Clearly, Manipon had planned to get Dominguez to acquiesce to a consideration for lifting the garnishment order.

Dwelling on one last point, Manipon has pointed out that the P1,000.00 was illegally seized because there was no valid March warrant and therefore inadmissible.

The argument is untenable. The rule that searches and seizures must be supported by a valid warrant is not an absolute rule. There are at least three exceptions to the rule recognized in this jurisdiction. These are: 1) search incidental to an arrest, 2) search of a moving vehicle, and 3) seizure of evidence in plain view. This falls on the first exception.

SORIANO vs. SANDIGANBAYAN Facts:

The City Fiscal of Quezon City lodged a complaint with the accused Thomas N. Tan of qualified theft. The case was docketed as I.S. No. 82-2964 and assigned for investigation to the petitioner who was then an Assistant City Fiscal. In the course of the investigation the petitioner demanded P4,000.00 from Tan as the price for dismissing the case. Tan reported the demand to the National Bureau of Investigation which set up an entrapment. Because Tan was hard put to raise the required amount only P2,000.00 in bills were marked by the NBI which had to supply one-half thereof. The entrapment succeeded and an information was filed with the Sandiganbayan in Criminal Case No. 7393 which reads as follows:

The undersigned Tanodbayan Special Prosecutor accuses LAURO G. SORIANO, for Violation of Section 3, paragraph (b) of Republic Act 3019, otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act.

After trial the Sandiganbayan rendered a decision finding accused Lauro G. Soriano, Jr., GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt, as Principal in the Information, for Violation of Section 3, paragraph (b), of Republic Act No. 3019, as amended, otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act.

A motion to reconsider the decision was denied by the Sandiganbayan; hence the instant petition.

Issue:

Whether or not accused is guilty of Bribery?

Held:

Yes. The principal issue is whether or not the investigation conducted by the petitioner can be regarded as a "contract or transaction" within the purview of Sec. 3 (b) of R.A. No.

3019. On this issue the petition is highly impressed with merit.

The petitioner states:

Assuming in gratia argumenti, petitioner's guilt, the facts make out a case of Direct Bribery defined and penalized under the provision of Article 210 of the Revised Penal Code and not a violation of Section 3, subparagraph (b) of Rep. Act 3019, as amended.

The evidence for the prosecution clearly and undoubtedly support, if at all the offense of Direct Bribery, which is not the offense charged and is not likewise included in or is necessarily included in the offense charged, which is for violation of Section 3, subparagraph (b) of Rep. Act 3019, as amended. The prosecution showed that: the accused

is a public officer; in consideration of P4,000.00 which was allegedly solicited, P2,000.00 of which was allegedly received, the petitioner undertook or promised to dismiss a criminal complaint pending preliminary investigation before him, which may or may not constitute a crime; that the act of dismissing the criminal complaint pending before petitioner was related to the exercise of the function of his office. Therefore, it is with pristine clarity that the offense proved, if at all is Direct Bribery. (Petition, p. 5.)

Upon the other hand, the respondents claim:

A reading of the above-quoted provision would show that the term 'transaction' as used thereof is not limited in its scope or meaning to a commercial or business transaction but includes all kinds of transaction, whether commercial, civil or administrative in nature, pending with the government. This must be so, otherwise, the Act would have so stated in the "Definition of Terms", Section 2 thereof. But it did not, perforce leaving no other interpretation than that the expressed purpose and object is to embrace all kinds of transaction between the government and other party wherein the public officer would intervene under the law. (Comment, p. 8.)

It is obvious that the investigation conducted by the petitioner was not a contract. Neither was it a transaction because this term must be construed as analogous to the term which precedes it. A transaction, like a contract, is one which involves some consideration as in credit transactions and this element (consideration) is absent in the investigation conducted by the petitioner.

In the light of the foregoing, We agree with the petitioner that it was error for the Sandiganbayan to have convicted him of violating Sec. 3 (b) of R.A. No. 3019.

The petitioner also claims that he cannot be convicted of bribery under the Revised Penal Code because to do so would be violative of as constitutional right to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him. Wrong. A reading of the information which has been reproduced herein clearly makes out a case of bribery so that the petitioner cannot claim deprivation of the right to be informed.

INDIRECT BRIBERY

FORMELIZA V. SANDIGANBAYAN Facts:

Petitioner Leonor Formilleza has been with the government service for around 20 years.She was the personnel supervisor of the regional office of the National IrrigationAdministration (NIA) in Tacloban City, Leyte since October 1, 1982. Her duties include theprocessing of the appointment papers of employees.A certain Mrs. Estrella Mutia was employed with NIA on a project basis and she wasterminated on December 31, 1983. Pursuant to the verbal instructions of the regional directorof the Administration, however, she continued working. According to Mrs. Mutia, she tooksteps to obtain

either a permanent or at the least a renewed appointment. When sheapproached the regional director about it, she was advised to see the petitioner but the latterrefused to attend to her appointment unless given some money. On February 27, 1984, Mrs.Mutia reported her problem to the Philippine Constabulary (PC) authorities in the province.The PC officials, who are colleagues of Mrs. Mutia’s husband, arranged for an entrapmentwith marked money bills worth P100 as the entrapment equipment. On February 29, 1984,the petitioner and Mrs. Mutia agreed to meet at the canteen at 9:00am.

Mrs. Mutia thennotified the PC authorities, Sergeants Eddie Bonjoc, Efren Abanes and Ignacio Labong aboutthe arrangement. At the canteen, petitioner and Mrs. Mutia occupied a table and were joinedby some officemates – Mrs. Florida Sevilla and Mrs. Dimaano, while the PC officials occupiedseparate tables. Sergeant Abanes brought along a camera to document the entrapment.Mrs. Mutia maintains that after taking the snacks she handed the marked money bills underthe table with her right hand to the petitioner who received the money with her left hand. Atthat moment, the PC officials approached the petitioner and held her hand holding the money.Sergeant Abanes took photographs of the sequence of events. The petitioner was arrestedand was brought to the PC crime where she was found positive for ultra-violet powder. The respondent court found the petitioner guilty of Indirect Bribery and sentenced her tofour months of arresto mayor, suspension from public office, profession or calling, includingthe right of suffrage, and public censure. The petitioner elevated the case to the SupremeCourt by way of the Instant Petition for Review.

Issue:

Whether or not the petitioner accepted the supposed bribe money.

Held:

Petitioner Leonor Formilleza is ACQUITTED. The Decision of the Sandiganbayan isSET ASIDE. An exception to the general rule that only questions of law may be raised in a petition ofthis character calls for application in this case. There are substantial facts and circumstanceswhich appear to be favorable to the accused but which were not carefully considered by theSandiganbayan. The failure to do so is most unfortunate considering that the Sandiganbayanis the first and last recourse of the accused before her case reaches the Supreme Courtwhere findings of fact are generally conclusive and binding. The essential ingredient ofindirect bribery as defined in Article 211 of the Revised Penal Code is that the public officerconcerned must have accepted the gift of material consideration. There must be a clearintention on the part of the public officer to take the gift so offered and consider the same ashis own property from then on, such as putting away the gift for safekeeping or pocketing thesame. Mere physical receipt unaccompanied by any other sign, circumstances or act to showsuch acceptance is not sufficient to lead the

court to conclude that the crime of indirect briberyhas been committed. To hold otherwise will encourage unscrupulous individuals to frame up

public officers by simply putting within their physical custody some gift, money or otherproperty. If the petitioner knew and was prepared to accept the money from Mrs. Mutia at thecanteen, the petitioner would not have invited her officemates Mrs.

Sevilla and Mrs. Dimaanoto join them. According to Mrs. Sevilla she did not see the alleged passing of the moneyunder the table. What she was sure was that when they were about to leave the canteen, twomen approached petitioner, one of whom took pictures and the petitioner shouted at Mrs.Mutia, “What are you trying to do to me?” The reaction of petitioner is far from one with a guiltyconscience. Without the standard of certainty, it may not be said that the guilt of the accusedin a criminal proceeding has been proved beyond reasonable doubt.

CORRUPTION OF PUBLIC OFFICIAL

CHUA vs. NUESTRO Facts:

Rina V. Chua being the complainant, filed an administrative charge against the respondent for allegedly delaying the enforcement of the writ of execution in her favor after demanding and getting from her the sum of 1500 pesos. The court issued a writ of execution, On September 12, 1988, Chua and counsel asked respondent Deputy-Sheriff Edgardo D. Nuestro to immediately enforce the writ of execution against the defendant, and for the purpose, they agreed to give 1000 pesos to the respondent. Respondent received the amount of 1000 pesos on September 12, 1988; however, the next day, they saw the respondent talking with counsel of defendant and that the respondent was hesitantin proceeding to carry out the writ of execution. Respondent even asked for a additionalamount of P500.00; consequently, in the afternoon of the same day, respondent went to the premises in question and when he arrived there, but he was told by the judge not to proceed because a supersede as bond was filed. Nevertheless, he found the premises locked, and at the insistence of the complainant, they broke the padlock and entered portion B of the premises. Later, counsel for defendant arrived and showed them the official receipt of payment of the supersede as bond and so he discontinued the execution proceedings.

Issue:

Whether Chua and counsel be charged of corruption of public official when they gave to therespondent the amount of 1500 pesos in consideration of enforcing the writ of execution.

Held:

While we cannot fault the sheriff for his hesitance to immediately carry out the writ of execution because the defendant still had time to file supersedeas bond to stay execution, we find duly proved by preponderance of evidence that the respondent Deputy Sheriff Edgardo D. Nuestro received the amount of P1,500.00 from the complainant and her lawyer as a consideration for the performance of his work. This amount is distinct from the sheriffs fee and expenses of execution and was not intended for that purpose. It was indeed a bribe given and received by respondent deputy sheriff from the complainant.

RA 3019 – ANTI GRAFT AND CORRUPT PRACTICES ACT

CHANG V. PEOPLE Facts:

Roberto Chang, the Municipal Treasurer of Makati and Pacifico San Mateo, the Chief of Operations, Business Revenue Examination, Audit Division, Makati Treasurer's Office found out that GDI has a tax deficiency of P494,000. The Office of the Treasurer then issued an

Assessment notice to GDI to pay the unpayed taxes. GDI asked for a validation of the assessment and petitioners asked for a meeting with GDI representatives. On that meeting, petitioners offered GDI that if they could pay P125,000, the tax would be “settled.”

Thinking that it was the right tax assessment, GDI prepared P125,000 in check. Petitioners made it clear that it was not the tax due and gave two options: either to pay the petitioners P125,000 or pay the

Municipality P494,000. GDI then alerted the NBI and the petitioners were caught in an entrapment operation.

Issue:

Whether petitioners were indeed guilty of corrupt practices by illiciting bribe to fix tax deficits.

Held:

Yes. The fact that petitioners willingness to meet with GDI representatives despite the receipt of the latter of deficiency assessments notices to settle tax deficiencies, refusal to accept of the initial payment of P125,000 for the municipality, and the petitioners' handing over to GDI representatives the Certificate of Examination on which was annotated "NO

TAX LIABILITY INVOLVED" establishes that the criminal intent originated from the minds of petitioners to illicit bribes.

BUSTILOO V. SANDIGANBAYAN