Dinámica

he rendered? Why?

ANS. -A judge cannot be held to account or answer, criminally, civilly, or administratively for an erroneous decision rendered by him in good faith. While the Supreme Court does not require perfection and infallibility, it reasonably expects a faithful and intelligent discharge of duty by those who are selected to fill the positions of administrators of justice.

Q - A judge has already retired when an administrative case was filed against him. Is he still within the court's jurisdiction? Why?

ANS. - Yes. Even if a judge has already retired before the administrative case was filed against him, the Supre me Court held that the court has not lost its jurisdiction over him even if his retirement has been approved, for his retirement benefits have not yet been paid. The reason for this is that the people would have no remedy left anymore. By reason of public policy, the Court must assert and maintain jurisdiction for acts performed in office which are inimical to the service and prejudicial to the interest of the litigants and the general public.

Q -Maya judge who exercises his judicial function be made liable for damages? Why?

ANS. -A judge who exercises his judicial functions cannot be liable for damages. The test of liability is not jurisdiction, but the nature of the question which is being determined when the error complained of is committed by the court. (Aparicio vs. Andal, G.R. No. 8658793, July 25, 1989). He is not liable even though there is in reality absolute failure of jurisdiction over the subject matter. For, judges are excluded from liability under Art. 32, New Civil Code, provided, their acts do not constitute a violation of the Revised Penal Code.

Q - An RTC Judge was removed on charges of immorality and conduct unbecoming of a public official. It was alleged that he maintained a mistress, having been the father of two children with her, inspite his being a married man. Is the act of the judge proper? Why?

ANS. -No, because the judge has behaved in a manner not becoming of his

robes and as a model of rectitude, betrayed the people's high expectations, and diminished the esteem in which they hold the judiciary in general.

The circumstances show a lack of circumspection and delicadeza on the part of the respondent judge by failing to avoid situations that make him suspect to committing immorality and worse, having that suspicion confirmed especially so that under Canon 1, Rule 1.01, a judge should be

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the embodiment of competence, integrity, probity and independence. The Code of Judicial Ethics mandates that the conduct of a judge must be free from impropriety not only with respect to the performance of his judicial duties, but also to his behavior outside his sala and as a private individual. There is no dichotomy of morality: a public official is also judged by his private morals. The Code dictates that a judge, in order to promote public confidence in the integrity and impartiality of the judiciary, must behave with propriety at all times. A judge's official life can not simply be detached or separated from his personal existence. Thus:

"Being the subject of constant public scrutiny, a judge should freely and willingly accept restrictions on conduct that might be viewed as burdensome by the ordinary citizen."

Q - Explain the res ipsa loquitor doctrine in the investigation of errant judges.

ANS. -In these res ipsa loquitur resolutions, there was on the face of the assailed decisions an inexplicable grave error bereft of any redeeming feature, a patent railroading of a case to bring about an unjust decision, or a manifestly deliberate intent to wreak an injustice against a hapless party.

The res ipsa loquitur doctrine does not accept or dispense with the necessity of proving the facts on which the inference or evil intent is had. It merely expresses the clearly sound and reasonable conclusion that when such facts are admitted or are already shown by the record, and no credible explanation that would negative the strong inference of evil intent is forthcoming, no further hearing to establish them to support a judgment as to the culpability of a respondent is necessary. (In re: Judge Baltazar Dizon, Adm. Case No. 3086, May 31, 1989).

Q - In Clemencio Sabitsana, Jr. vs. Judge Adriano Villamore, RTJ No. 90-474, Oct. 4, 1991, a complaint was filed alleging that in his monthly certificates of service, he made it appear that he had resolved all cases submitted for decision within the 90-day period when in truth, he had 15 cases undecided from 5 years back or from March 1985. Was the act of the judge proper? Why?

ANS. -No. A member of the Bench cannot pay mere lip service to the 90-day requirement, but should, in fact, persevere in its implementation. The Certificate of Service is not merely a means to one's paycheck, but an instrument by which the Courts can fulfill the constitutional mandate of the people's right to a speedy disposition of cases. Thus, it has been ruled:

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belong to the low income group, would be greatly impaired if decisions are long in coming, more so from trial courts which unlike collegiate tribunals where there is a need for extended deliberation, could be expected to act with dispatch." (Magdamo vs. Pahimulin, Adm. Matter No. 662-MJ, 30 September 1976, 73 SCRA 110).

Q - Should a judge show undue interest in a pending case before another court? Why?

ANS. -No. Cardinal is the rule that a judge should avoid impropriety in all activities. The Canons mince no words in mandating that a judge shall refrain from influencing in any manner the outcome of litigation or dispute pending before another Court. (Canon 2, Rule 2.04). Interference by members of the Bench in pending suits with the end in view of influencing the course or the result of litigation does not only subvert the independence of the judiciary but also undermines the people's faith in its integrity and impartiality. (Commentaries on the Code of Judicial Conduct). On this point, Impao vs. Makilala (A.M. No. MTJ-88-184, October 13, 1989, 178 SCRA 541) expounds:

"It is an important judicial norm that a judge's private as well as official conduct must at all times be free from the appearance of im- propriety." (Lugue vs. Kayanan, G.R. No. L

26828, August 29, 1969,29 SCRA 165; x x x). As held by this Court in the case of Dela Paz vs. Inutan, Adm. Matter No. 201 MJ, June 30, 1975, 64 SCRA 540:

"The judge is the visible representation of the law and, more importantly, of justice. From him, the people draw their will and awareness to obey the law. They see in him an intermediary of justice between two conflicting interests, especially in the station of municipal judges, like respondent Judge, who have that close and direct contact with the people before anybody else in the judiciary. Thus, for the judge to return that regard, he must be the first to abide by the law and weave an example for the others to follow."

Q - If a judge reconsiders his decision/order, can he be charged administratively? Why?

ANS. -No. It is the prerogative of a judge to correct his own decision before it becomes final and executory, so as to make it conform to the evidence presented and the applicable laws. (Baguyo vs. Leviste, 107 SCRA 35). The rule is true for as long as the judge is in good faith which is always possessed.

A judge is not administratively accountable for every erroneous ruling or decision rendered, provided, he acts in good faith and without

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malice. (Mendoza vs. Villaluz, 106 SCRA 664). The proper remedy of the aggrieved party is not an administrative charge against the judge but an appeal or petition for review of his decision. (Martin vs. Judge Placido Vallarta, A.M. No. MTJ-90-495, Aug. 12, 1991).

Q - What is the effect if a judge allows the release of an accused who was convicted of a non-bailable offense? Why?

ANS. - The judge is guilty of gross misconduct when he allowed accused individuals duly convicted of non-bailable offenses and drug pushers at that - to enjoy provisional liberty by way of bail. Under the facts obtain- ing in these cases, good faith cannot be presumed on the part of the respondent judge. The suspicious circumstances attending the cases in point are far too glaring to ignore. (Villa vs. Amonoy, A.C. RTJ-89-395, Feb. 13, 1991).

Q - How do you describe the office of a judge? Explain.

ANS. -The office of a judge exists for one solemn end – to promote justice by administering it fairly and impartially. (Gonzales vs. Austria M. Abaya, 176 SCRA 634). The judge is the visible representation of the law and of justice. From him, the people draw their will and awareness to obey the law. As such, he should avoid even the slightest infraction of the law. (Inciong vs. De Guia, 154 SCRA 93; Dela Paz vs. Inutan, 64 SCRA 56, 177 SCRA 435). In Santos vs. Lumang, it was said that a judge who, through gross ignorance of the laws or serious misconduct, frustrates the people's search for justice, commits a rank disservice to the cause of justice which calls for rectification and the imposition of appropriate disciplinary measures. In Summers vs. Ozaeta, 81 Phil. 754, it has been said that a judge's position demands equanimity, prudence, fortitude and courage.

Q - For failure to pay a just debt, a judge was finedP20,OOO.OO. Was the penalty proper? Why?

ANS. -Yes. Willful failure to pay a just debt is a serious offense under Rule 140 of the Rules of Court, as amended by the resolution of the Supreme Court, dated July 25, 1974. The amount involved (P4,500.00) is not big. He could easily have paid it, but it appears that he was bent on frustrating the complainant's best efforts to obtain satisfaction of her lawful claim, ap- parently for no other intention than to annoy and oppress her for having haled him and his wife into court. While an ejectment case is supposed to be summary in nature, respondent judge, through dilatory tactics, stretched the trial over a period of ten (10) years, and dragged the case all the way from the municipal court to the Court of Appeals. After the decision had become final, he delayed payment for two more years. He came across only after the complainant in exasperation had filed this administrative charge against him.

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and unbecoming a member of the judiciary. He used his position and his legal knowledge to welsh on a just debt and to harass his creditor. His example erodes public faith in the capacity of courts to administer justice. He violated Rule 2.0l. Canon 2 of the Code of Judicial conduct which re- quires that "a judge should so behave at all times as to promote public confidence in the integrity and impartiality of the judiciary. (De Julio vs. Judge Benjamin Vega, A.M. No. RTJ-89-406, July 18, 1991).

Q - What should the Office of the Ombudsman do if a criminal complaint against judge is filed with that office? Why?

ANS. -Where a criminal complaint against a judge or other court employees arises from their administrative duties, the Ombudsman must defer action on said complaint and refer the same to the Supreme Court for determination whether said judge or court employee had acted within the scope of their administrative duties. This is so because Article VIII, Section 6 of the 1987 Constitution exclusively vests in the Supreme Court administrative supervision over all courts and court personnel, from the Presiding Justice of the Court of Appeals down to the lowest municipal trial court clerk. By virtue of this power, it is only the Supreme Court that can oversee the judges and court personnel's compliance with all laws, and take the proper administrative action against them if they commit any violation thereof. No other branch of government may intrude into this power, without running afoul of the doctrine of separation of powers. (Maceda vs. Vasquez, 221 SCRA 464, April 22, 1993).

Q - Mayan action of a judge in the exercise of his judicial function be the subject of a disciplinary action? Is the rule absolute?

ANS. -No. As a general rule, the acts done by a judge in his judicial capacity are not subject to disciplinary action, even though erroneous. These acts become subject to disciplinary power only when they are attended by fraud, dishonesty, corruption or bad faith. (Abiera vs. Maceda, 52 SCAD 581, 233 SCRA 520, June 30, 1994).

A judge is not administratively accountable for every erroneous ruling or decision rendered, provided, he acts in good faith and without malice. (Martin vs. Vallarta, 200 SCRA 469, Aug. 12, 1991).

Good faith and absence of malice, corrupt motives and improper consideration are sufficient defenses that may be availed of by a judicial officer charged with ignorance of the law and promulgation of an unjust decision from being held accountable for errors of judgment, on the premise that no one called upon to try the fact or interpret the law in the administration of justice can be infallible. (Pilipinas Bank vs. Tirona-Liwag, 190 SCRA 834, Oct. 18, 1990).

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