affected by a decision of ERB may file a petition with SC” was superseded by the Constitution stating that jurisdiction of SC cannot be made to increase without its advice and concurrence.
Sec. 32:
Subic Bay Metropolitan Authority vs COMELEC - Initiative is entirely the work of electorate; the process of law-making by the people themselves - Referendum consists merely of the electorate
approving or rejecting what has been drawn up or enacted by a legislative body.
- Case at bar: COMELEC erred in implementing a Resolution when respondents filed petition for Initiative and not Referendum.
EXECUTIVE DEPARTMENT Sec. 1:
- The President has “residual powers.” The President is more than the sum of specific powers enumerated in the Constitution.
- What is not part of the legislative and judicial departments is deemed part of the executive. - The 1987 Constitution provided for a limitation of specific powers of the President, particularly those relating to the commander-in-chief clause, but not a diminution of the general grant of executive power. Soliven vs Makasiar
- The privilege of immunity from suit is to assure the exercise of Presidential duties free from any
hindrance or distraction considering that being the Chief Executive demands undivided attention.
- The privilege pertains to the President by virtue of the office and may be invoked only by the holder of the office. There is nothing which prohibits the President to waive this privilege.
Estrada vs Desierto
- A non-sitting President does not enjoy immunity from suit (immunity is only during the tenure)
- Even a sitting President is not immune from suit for non-official acts or from wrongdoing. (Public office is
a public trust. The rule is that unlawful acts of public officials are not acts of the State and the officer who acts illegally is not acting as such but stands in the same footing as any other trespasser.)
Sec. 13:
Doromal vs Sandiganbayan
- Sec Sec. 13, Art. VII is applicable in a case where the accused has not signed any document of any bid of the family corporation of which he is a member, submitted to any government department.
- Case at bar: Petitioner has at least an indirect interest with the transaction with DECS and NMYC. Civil Liberties Union vs Executive Secretary - EO No. 284 is unconstitutional insofar it allows a member of the Cabinet to hold not more than two positions in the government. (Respondent's
contention that Sec. 7, Art. IX-B is an exception would defeat the obvious legislative intent which is to prohibit cabinet members from holding multiple offices.)
Aytona vs Castillo
be reconsidered where the appointee has qualified. Exception: ad interim appointments issued in the last hours of an outgoing Chief Executive (midnight
appointments – made for buying votes). In re Valenzuela and Vallarta
- Sec. 15 (President shall not make appointments within 2 months prior to the next Presidential election) is applicable to the members of the Judiciary.
- This sort of appointment is made for partisan considerations.
De Castro vs. JBC
Sec. 16:
Binamira vs Garrucho
- Appointment or designation involves exercise of discretion which cannot be delegated. Even if it be assumed that the power could be exercised by Minister of Tourism, it could be recalled by the President.
- Designation is considered only an acting or
temporary appointment, which does not confer security of tenure.
Sarmiento vs Mison
- 4 groups of officers whom the President shall appoint:
(a) heads of the executive departments, ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls, officers of the armed forces from the rank of colonel or naval captain, and other whose appointments are vested in him in this Constitution
(b) all other officers of the Government whose appointments are not otherwise provided for by law
(c) those whom the President may be authorized by law to appoint
(d) officers lower in rank whose appointments the Congress may by law vest in the President alone. - Case at bar: Confirmation of COA is not needed in appointment of Commissioner of Bureau of Customs because a bureau head is not among those within
the first group of appointments where consent of
COA is required. Bautista vs Salonga
- Confirmation of COA is not needed in appointment of Chairman of Commission of Human Rights
President in the Constitution. The President appoints Chairman of CHR pursuant to EO 163 (CHR
Chairman is thus within the 3rd group of officers)
Quintos-Deles vs Commission of Appointments - The appointment of Sectoral Representatives requires confirmation by the Commission on Appointments. The seats reserved for sectoral
representatives may be filled by appointment by the President by express provision of Sec.7, Article XVIII of the Constitution (hence, sectoral representatives are within the 1st group of officers)
- Exceptions to those officers within the 1st group: (1)
Ombudsman and his deputies, and (2) members of the Supreme Court and judges of lower courts. Calderon vs Carale
- Confirmation by COA is required only for
presidential appointees that are within the 1st group
of officers as mentioned in Sarmiento vs Mison. - Congress may not expand the list of appointments needing confirmation.
- Case at bar: RA 6715, which requires the COA confirmation in appointments of NLRC Chairman and Commissioners, transgresses Sec. 16, Art. VII. The appointments of NLRC Chairman and
Commissioners do not need COA confirmation
because they fall under the 3rd group of officers. Tarrosa vs Singson
- affirmed the ruling in Calderon vs Carale
- Case at bar: Appointment of Central Bank Governor does not need COA confirmation.
Flores vs Drilon
- A law which limits the President to only one
appointee is an encroachment to the prerogative of the President because appointment involves
discretion to choose who to appoint. Luego vs Civil Service Commission
- CSC is without authority to revoke an appointment because of its belief that another person was better qualified, which is an encroachment on the discretion vested solely in the appointing authority.
- The permanent appointment made by the
appointing authority may not be reversed by CSC and call it temporary.
Pobre vs Mendieta
- The vacancy in the position of Chairman of the Professional Regulation Commission cannot be filled by the Senior Associate Commissioner by operation of law (or by succession) because it will deprive the
President of the power to appoint the Chairman. Sec. 17
Drilon vs Lim
- Distinction between power and control:
An officer in control lays down the rules in the doing of an act. if they are not followed, he may, in his discretion, order the act undone or re-done by his subordinate or he may even decide to do it by himself.
Supervision does not cover such authority. The
supervisor merely sees to it that rules are followed, but he himself does not lay down such rules, nor does he have the discretion to modify or replace them. If the rules are not observed, he may order the work done or re-done but only to conform to the prescribed rules. He may not prescribe his own manner except to see to it that the rules are
followed.
(Note) Power of control pertains to power of an officer to alter, modify, nullify, or set aside what a subordinate has done in the performance of his duties and to substitute his judgment to that of the former [Mondano vs Silvosa]
Villena vs Secretary of the Interior
- Doctrine of Qualified Political Agency (alter ego
principle) -acts of the Secretaries of Executive
Departments, when performed and promulgated in the regular course of business or unless disapproved or reprobated by the Chief Executive, are
presumptively the acts of the Chief Executive - Case at bar: Secretary of the Interior is invested with the authority to order the investigation of the charges against the petitioner and to appoint a special investigator for that purpose.
Lacson-Magallanes Co., Inc. vs Pano - Department heads are President's “men of
confidence.” His is the power to appoint them; his, too, is the privilege to dismiss them at pleasure. Normally, he controls and directs their acts. Implicit then is his authority to go over, confirm, modify or reverse the action taken by his department
secretaries.
- Case at bar: The President, through his Executive Secretary, may undo an act of the Director of Lands City of Iligan vs Director of Lands
- The President has the power to grant portions of public domain to any government entity like the City of Iligan because he has control over the Director of
Lands, who has direct executive control in the lease, sale or any form of concession or disposition of the land of public domain.
Gascon vs Arroyo
- Case at bar: Executive Secretary has the power and authority to enter into the Agreement to Arbitrate with the ABS CBN as he acted for and in behalf of the President when he signed it.
Kilusan Bayan vs Dominguez
- An administrative officer has only such powers as are expressly granted to him and those necessarily implied in the exercise thereof. These powers should not be extended by implication beyond what may be necessary for their just and reasonable execution. Angangco vs Castillo
- The power to remove is inherent in the power to appoint, but not with regard to those officers or
employees who belong to the classified service for as to them the inherent power cannot be exercised
NAMARCO vs Arca
- Executive power of control extends to government- owned corporations.
Sec. 18:
Guazon vs De Villa
- The President has the power to ordain saturation drives. There is nothing in the Constitution which denies the authority of the Chief Exec. to order police actions to stop unabated criminality, rising
lawlessness, and alarming communist activities. Ruffy vs Chief of Staff
- Courts martial are simply instrumentalities of the executive power, provided by the Congress for the President as Commander in chief to aid him in properly commanding the army and navy and
enforcing discipline therein and utilize under his order those of his authorized military representatives.
Olaguer vs Military Commission No. 34
- Due process of law demands that in all criminal prosecutions the accused be entitled to a trial. The trial contemplated by the due process clause is trial by judicial process. Military Commissions are not courts within the Philippine judicial system. Judicial power is vested only in the courts. Military
commissions pertain to the executive department and are instrumentalities of the President as
commander-in-chief to aid him in enforcing discipline in the armed forces.
Quilona vs General Court Martial Gudani vs Senga
- The President has constitutional authority to
prevent a member of the armed forces from testifying before a legislative inquiry, by virtue of her power as commander-in-chief, and that as a consequence, a military officer who defies such injunction is liable under military justice. At the same time, the Court also holds that any chamber of Congress which seeks the appearance befoe it of a military officer against the consent of the President has adequate remedies under law to compel such attendance. Any military officer whom the Congress summons to testify before it may be compelled to do so by the President. If the President is not so inclined, the President may be commanded by judicial order to compel the attendance of the military officer. Final judicial orders have the force of the law of the land which the President has the duty to faithfully execute. Sec. 19:
Torres vs Gonzales
- A judicial pronouncement is not necessary in
determining whether the conditions in the pardon are violated. The determination of whether there is a violations of the conditions rests exclusively in the sound judgment of the President.
Monsanto vs Factoran
- Pardon implies guilt. While it relieves the party pardoned from all punitive consequences of his criminal act, it relieves him from nothing more. It does not, therefore, restore a convicted felon to public office forfeited by reason of conviction. People vs Salle, Jr.
- Pardon may be granted only by final judgment. Where the judgment of conviction is still pending appeal, executive clemency may not yet be granted. Before an appellant may be granted pardon, he must first ask for the withdrawal of his appeal.
Garcia vs COA
- President's grant of executive clemency to a person dismissed from his office pursuant to an
administrative case (but where the latter has been acquitted in a criminal case based on the same facts alleged in the criminal case) entitles the latter to
automatic reinstatement and backwages. Sabello vs DECS
- Pardon (in a criminal case) frees the individual from all the penalties and disabilities and restores him to all his civil rights. Although such pardon may restore a person's eligibility to public office, it does not entitle him to automatic reinstatement. He should apply for reappointment to said office.
- [Compare with Garcia vs COA] Llamas vs Orbos
- In granting the power of executive clemency, the Constitution does not distinguish between criminal and administrative cases.
Sec. 18:
Constantino, Jr. vs Cuisia
- The debt-relief contracts, providing for buy-back and bond-conversion schemes, entered into pursuant to Financing Program are not beyond the powers granted to the President under Sec. 20, Art. VII. The only restriction that the Constitution provides, aside from the prior concurrence of the Monetary Board, is that loans must be subject to limitations provided by
law. Accordingly, the contention that buy-back and bond-conversion schemes are neither “loans” nor “guarantees,” and hence beyond the President’s power to execute, are without merit.
Sec. 21:
Commissioner of Customs vs Eastern Sea Trading (1961)
- The concurrence of the House of Congress is required by our fundamental law in the making of treaties which are however distinct and different from executive agreements which may be validly entered without such concurrence.
Pimentel, Jr. vs Exec. Sec.
- The power to ratify is vested in the President,
subject to concurrence of the Senate. The role of the Senate is limited only to giving or withholding its consent or concurrence to the ratification. Hence, it is within the authority of the President to refuse to submit a treaty to the Senate or having secured its consent for its ratification, refuse to ratify it. This discretion to ratify lies within the President's competence alone.
(a) negotiation
(b) signing of the treaty (simply a means of authenticating the instrument and a symbol of good faith)
(c) ratification (formal act by which a statute confirms and accepts the provisions of a treaty)
(d) exchange of instruments of ratification - In the case at bar, the treaty was merely signed.
JUDICIAL DEPARTMENT