Diseño y cálculo de las alternativas

The struggle towards a lived plurinational future looks set to take a turn towards electoral politics. The indigenous movement of the lowlands and highlands, represented by the organisations CIDOB and CONAMAQ, are currently working to create a new political instrument. During my participation on the Ninth March and in interviews with representatives of the lowland indigenous movements, most leaders refused to discuss this issue with me in taped recordings. Juan José Sardinas, the cacique of the Chicas nation within CONAMAQ talked about this as a long-term process in order ‘to create a political

162 instrument, a tool to take the power’85

(personal interview, 17 June 2012). This process aims to recover the ‘political instrument of the people’ from the MAS for the indigenous movements of the lowlands and highlands. More recently, it has been announced by CIDOB that Fernando Vargas, the President of TIPNIS Sub-Central, will stand as a candidate for presidency in the general elections due to take place in late 2014 (Erbol 2014). Vargas will represent the Movimiento de Integración por la Libertad Total e Irrestricta, Pacto Nacional de Igualdad Social (Mil-TIPNIS; Integration Movement for Total and Unrestricted Freedom, National Pact of Social Equality), a political party fashioned in February 2014 by the organic structure of CIDOB. Here, the acronym of the TIPNIS has been re-signified for the name of the new political party.

The creation of a new political instrument is a contentious issue both within CIDOB and for urban solidarity networks in the TIPNIS conflict. Yashar highlights the following potential issues when indigenous movements begin engaging in electoral politics: (i) experienced leaders get lost to state politics; (ii) the task of delivering demands becomes monumental; (iii) leaders won’t necessarily be embraced by indigenous communities; and finally (iv) they may fall prey to partisan competition and political cleavages (2005: 302- 305). The indigenous movement is entering electoral politics in order to struggle for and retain their territorial sovereignty, self-determination and autonomy. Yet, this seems somewhat contradictory to many and it remains unclear how CIDOB would be able to maintain the estructura orgánica whilst occupying state institutions born from colonialism. There is growing concern within CIDOB that the fourth issue identified by Yashar – that of partisan competition and political cleavages – is already emerging. Indeed, one of the pervasive internal tensions of the lowland indigenous movement is the debate over whether CIDOB should align itself to political parties. On the one hand, one of the key principles of the organisation is ‘to maintain partisan political and religious independence’ inline with the organic structure (CIDOB 2005; author’s translation). This also echoes the words of one of the ‘founding fathers’ of the indigenous movement, a Guaraní man known as the Sombra Grande (Great Shade), whose legacy is maintained in CIDOB through the motto to ‘[k]eep the unity of the organisation and the independence from political parties’ (CIDOB 2008: 79; author’s translation). On the other hand, representatives of CIDOB have aligned themselves to political parties on a number of occasions. For instance, ex-President of CIDOB Marcial Fabricano ran for Vice-President on the ticket of the Movimiento Bolivia

85

163 Libre (MBL; Free Bolivia Movement) in the 1997 general elections, the country’s fifth- largest political party, causing a crisis in the organisation (Assies & Salman 2005). Again, in the early 2000s, tensions were strained as some leaders of CIDOB chose to align themselves to the MIR and others to the MAS. Postero (2004) notes that these tensions proliferated in 2002 when indigenous leaders of CIDOB disagreed over strategies for the March for Popular Sovereignty, Territory and Natural Resources to demand a Constituent Assembly. The marchers separated into two groups ‘making a divided and confusing public representation’ (Postero 2004: 206). Furthermore, in October 2002 the indigenous organisation of the Beni region – CPIB – separated into two groups because of irrevocable differences (Bazoberry Chali 2008). Internal conflicts emerged as representatives of the Mojeño peoples sought political participation at the national level through traditional political parties unlike other ethnic groups in the region. This split resulted in the formation of CPEM-B, which has since had a vital political influence in the Beni and nationally through its leaders’ ability to link grievances to affiliated social sectors (Bazoberry Chali 2008; CIDOB 2008). In late 2004 a representative of the CPEM-B named Sixto Vejarano Congo was even elected Mayor of San Ignacio de Moxos, a first for indigenous peoples in the municipality.

During the TIPNIS conflict, some interview participants expressed unease over new linkages formed with political parties. A technical expert from CIDOB told me of his worry that the indigenous movement would fall prey to the problem of war-lordism, or the problem of progressive governments centralising decisions when they take power. Certainly, on the Ninth March, it was evident that many backdoor negotiations and decisions were taking place and that the technical experts from within CIDOB were being ignored for advice from NGOs, political parties and economic elites. A technical expert from CIDOB spoke to me about his concern over the involvement of the ‘right’ in the political decisions of the lowland indigenous movement:

During the Constituent Assembly, they [the right] have ordered the beating or the dismantling of the offices of CIDOB primarily as a symbol of indigenous peoples. And now we are allies with them, how [can we] agree, right? As if nothing had happened. So, I think we need an internal reflection, real and transparent, on the part of the main leaders of CIDOB. I am very concerned that, in terms of the lack of transparency and

164 honesty, we will be the losers once again, the indigenous peoples, for the irresponsibility of our leaders.86

As CIDOB enters into electoral politics, a cycle of dependency is being created in which the organisation is relying on the financial support of external agents and/or partisan cleavages with conservative political parties. This is especially true since funds previously supplied by the MAS administration have been cut off after the breakdown of the Unity Pact. The decision to enter electoral politics has undoubtedly been strengthened by such shifts in allegiances, with the influence of external consultants and intellectuals from organisations such as the World Bank playing a major role. I argue that there is a danger that this close alliance with NGOs and some political parties could weaken the demands of the indigenous movement and its emancipatory potential. Criticisms are also present within the urban solidarity networks resisting the road. As such, some groups of anarchists and self-proclaimed Trotskyists have criticised the current initiative and stated the need for maintaining autonomy from the state. Whatever the reasons, ideological or political, for this criticism it could potentially breakdown the left-indigenous solidarity networks established during the TIPNIS conflict.

Secondly, it would appear that Yashar’s third issue – that indigenous communities won’t necessarily embrace candidates – is also evident. For instance, the indigenous leader Pedro Nuni was positioned as a candidate for the Governor of Beni in January 2013, with the full backing and support of CIDOB. However, Nuni lost the elections with less than 2.65 percent of the vote, a bleak electoral defeat that shows that even the communities represented by CIDOB did not vote for him (El Deber 2013c). Similarly, Marcial Fabricano’s bid for vice presidency in 1997 under MBL failed disastrously (Yashar 2005). I suggest that this is part of the legacy of clientelism and the pervasive power to buy votes. It therefore remains unclear how these processes will unfold and I have suggested certain dangers that CIDOB need to be careful to avoid. However, what becomes clear is an agenda in which the indigenous movement are not adverse to state politics or indeed anti- state. Rather they seek to enact change from within state institutions in order to gain rights to autonomy. I would therefore disagree with scholars such as Dangl (2007, 2010) and

86 _{‘Durante la asamblea constituyente, ellos mismos han ordenado el apaleamiento o el desmantelamiento de}

las oficinas de la CIDOB principalmente como símbolo de los pueblos indígenas. Y ahora nos vemos aliados con ellos, como acuerdos ¿no? como si no hubiera pasado nada. Entonces, yo creo que falta una reflexión interna, real y transparente, de parte de los dirigentes principales de la CIDOB. Me preocupa mucho esto, en términos de la falta de transparencia y honestidad, que los perdedores nuevamente seamos nosotros los pueblos indígenas por la irresponsabilidad de nuestros dirigentes’.

165 Zibechi (2010b, 2012) who state that there is a choice between co-optation or autonomy. Instead, I would argue that the MAS Party government has opened up important changes within the state that could be furthered through other progressive governments. This would be a long and arduous process but if the indigenous movement can seek autonomy by making demands on the state, they could also reconstruct the Westphalian state model from within the transient institutions of government. That said, the indigenous movement might fall under the same traps of the MAS Party, such as the limits to transformatory potential imposed by the inheritance of colonial state bureaucracies.

5.10 Conclusion

The Ninth March will be much bigger, because they will participate; it will have the support of all of civil society. This time [on the Eighth March] the marchers came alone, now I’ll bet that it will be all - all of the people of the countryside, the city, they will unite, and they will join and they will march.87 (Huascar Bustillos Cayoja, activist in the CDAPMA, personal interview, 17 March 2012)

The above statement was made by an activist in Santa Cruz between the Eighth and Ninth indigenous marches in defence of the TIPNIS. He predicted that the Ninth March would be bigger as it would have built up momentum from the Eighth March when tens of thousands of people welcomed it into La Paz. However, the strategies of the MAS to undermine the lowland indigenous movement, as outlined in this chapter, led to less indigenous people participating in the march and less consolidated support from the Bolivian population. That said, this has not been a simple process of co-optation and domination by the state. Rather, the MAS has sought to rework the boundaries between the ‘state’ and ‘social movements’ and has broken several glass ceilings for the campesino and cocalero sectors. Despite these progressive advances, the process of change based on reseating national sovereignty feeds into a neo-extractivist development model that conflicts the scale-making claims of indigenous territoriality. Fundamentally, state recentralisation shuts down the emancipatory potential of the plurinational project and reifies relations of power that act to subalternise the lowland indigenous peoples as they have not gained access to the state machinery. I therefore argue that, in some respects, the concept of the ‘Plurination’ has acted as a smokescreen for the continued repression of lowland indigenous groups in

87 _{‘La novena marcha va a ser mucho más grande, porque van a participar, va tener el apoyo de toda la}

sociedad civil. Esta vez los marchistas vinieron solos, ahora yo te apuesto que va a ser todos, toda la gente del campo, la ciudad, se van a unir, y van a ingresar y van a marchar’.

166 Bolivia (see Laing 2012). Yet, despite these criticisms a recent poll suggests that 45 percent of Bolivians intend to vote for the MAS in the 2014 general elections (Stefanoni 2014). This shows that cultural hegemony is an inherently spatial process since the MAS enjoys uneven and geographically divided support but is still likely to win a third term in electoral office.

167 Chapter VI