Pilotes RODIOSTAR

During the TIPNIS conflict the MAS administration mobilised a number of diverse social, cultural and performative mechanisms that replicate traditional political activity of social movements thus complicating the binary distinction between the ‘state’ and the ‘social movement’. In reference to progressive governments within Latin America, Zibechi has asked ‘[w]ho is better placed to implement complicated tactics that represent the real art of governance than governments that emerge from the movements?’ (2012: 270). Moreover, Gustafson’s analysis of Bolivia’s ‘social-movement state’ (2009b: 255) allows him to query traditional understandings of power relations. Gustafson argues that the MAS has attempted to ‘seat’ state sovereignty in the face of powerful local elites by adopting social movement tactics that have ‘repositioned the link between the state and violence as a political instrument’ (2010: 50). Instead of using force – for the most part – the MAS has reconfigured territoriality by replicating rebellious activities of insurgent movements, traditionally held as distinct from the more formal and systematic forms of politics practiced by the state. Scholarly analyses of the MAS therefore point to the development of an altered state-social movement relationship in which power is entangled in novel ways. In addition, the MAS are in a better position of knowing the terrain of social movement strategies and tactics thus enabling the state to co-opt their discourses and practices. The MAS Party government and affiliated social sectors instigated a number of practices in order to articulate representations of being a ‘government of social movements’ including: counter-marches, rallies and demonstrations, blockades, public meetings, statements to and in public media and the symbolic display of indigenous heritage.

153 First, a few days after arriving in Bolivia, I decided to participate in the government’s ‘Gran Caravana’ (Grand Caravan) to TIPNIS on 07 October 2011. The caravan was set up to counter the media attention circulating around the Eighth March as a result of La Chaparina on 25 September and to show the ‘realities’ of the TIPNIS to media agents. A document provided by the parliamentary brigade stated that ‘[t]he caravan has the goal of becoming acquainted with the local characteristics of the second stretch of the highway project’ (Brigada de Asambleístas de Cochabamba 2011; author’s translation). In particular, the caravan aimed to counter images and rhetoric of the TIPNIS as a ‘virgin’ territory and also show that the indigenous peoples inhabiting the area are actually in favour of the road. I arrived to participate and was placed in a vehicle with one of the leaders of Bartolina Sisa and some government officials. We left Cochabamba as one of approximately fifty vehicles adorned with Bolivian flags on the 120-mile route that would take us through a number of small communities within the TIPNIS. In the town of Isinuta in the coca growing region of the Chapare we were welcomed with a banner that read ‘We support the finalisation of the road from the Tunari to San Ignacio de Moxos – Isinuta is with you Evo’ (‘Apoyamos a la conclusión del tramo de la Tunari – San Ignacio de Moxos – Evo Isinuta esta contigo’) (personal field-notes, 07 October 2011). After dinner we sat through a number of presentations by local leaders in support of the road. The following day we embarked on a trip into the TIPNIS to meet with communities who stated that they wanted the road in order to access markets for the sale of produce such as bananas, oranges, avocados, cassava and rice. The community of Nueva Aroma held a banner that read ‘Yes, to the construction of the road Villa Tunari – San Ignacio de Moxos’ (Figure 6).

154 Figure 6. Pro-Road Caravan to the TIPNIS

Source: Author’s photograph.

Yet, the communities visited on the tour are all within the area of the TIPNIS known as Polygon 7, which is not part of the collective TCO title granted to the Mojeño-Trinitario, Yuracaré and Chimane peoples. Polygon 7 is predominately populated by Andean campesino communities that have been migrating to the lowlands since the 1970s. As the ongoing President of the coca-growers union, the Six Federations of the Tropics of Cochabamba, Evo Morales has strong support in this region and this was mobilised in a media exercise to convince the Bolivian peoples of the demand for the road. As such, the caravan was instigated to counter the claims of the indigenous protestors on the Eighth March and also served to consolidate government support amongst already affiliated sectors. As the last day of the tour drew to a close for lunch I decided to hitch a ride back to Cochabamba with three diplomats. Instead of papayas and bananas lining the pavements, many of the houses were drying coca leaves in the midday sun giving a very different impression of the motivations behind demands for the road (Figure 7).

155 Figure 7. Coca Leaves in Polygon 7

Source: Author’s photograph.

Second, on 12 October 2011, I heard the bang of firecrackers echoing around the streets of Cochabamba and decided to seek out the source. I came across a mass of unions and federations affiliated with the MAS descending on Cochabamba, including the Six Federations of the Tropics of Cochabamba and Bartolina Sisa. The throng concentrated in the central Plaza 14 de Septiembre around noon for a series of presentations by leaders and representatives of the MAS. The speakers rallied support for Evo Morales, the ‘proceso de cambio’ and the upcoming judicial elections. Of the speakers, Zacarías Rojas (Federación de Campesinos de Chimoré; Federation of Peasants of Chimoré), Joel Flores (President of FEJUVE in Cochabamba) and Leonilda Zurita (a representative of Bartolina Sisa and the MAS) called for support for the Villa Tunari-San Ignacio de Moxos road. This was strategic timing with the Eighth March just 60 km outside of La Paz. On 10 December 2011, a similar concentration occurred at a viaduct on the outskirts of Cochabamba (Figure 8). It is unclear, however, whether the people participating on both these occasions are staunch supporters of the MAS since many of them work for or are affiliated to federations, syndicates and co-operatives that claim financial backing from the government. Indeed, not only did the MAS administration provide and pay for much of the transportation to these events but I also witnessed people checking their names off attendance lists. It was evident that the MAS were in a strong position to mobilise a

156 number of powerful social movement sectors to endorse the government’s ‘process of change’ and discredit those in opposition to the TIPNIS road.

Figure 8. Pro-Government Concentration in Cochabamba

Source: Author’s photograph.

Third, the union organisation CONISUR organised a counter-march to reject the announcement of Ley No. 180. The march, headed by inhabitants of the southernmost part of the TIPNIS (located outside of the TIOC), left from the town of Isinuta on 20 December 2011 arriving into La Paz on 30 January 2012. The pro-road march covered a distance of 400 km and sadly resulted in the death of a child, Hipólito Vargas. Because of CONISUR’s connection with the coca growing federation and hence with the MAS, representatives of CIDOB and the TIPNIS attempted to discredit the marchers by calling them ‘cocaleros’. In turn, this rhetoric triggered the defence of the march by the President of CONISUR Gumercindo Pradel who declared that ‘[t]here are no cocaleros in the zone, what we have is our production. […] I produce rice, banana, cassava and maize’ (cited in Opinión 2012). CONISUR’s connections to the government seemed clear, however, when the march reached La Paz and was supported by both Bartolina Sisa and CSCIB, both of which remain within the Unity Pact. Although the march resulted in the implementation of Ley No. 222 that would annul the previous law cancelling the road, the march received very little broader civil society support or media coverage. I witnessed the march as it

157 proceeded through the streets of Cochabamba to the indifference of the city’s inhabitants (personal field-notes, 30 December 2011).

Fourth, between 12 and 14 December 2011 the government conducted a national summit in Cochabamba entitled the Primer Encuentro Plurinacional para Profundizar el Cambio (First Plurinational Meeting to Deepen Change), referred to as the Cumbre Social (Social Summit). The MAS invited indigenous and campesino organisations, neighbourhood federations, the business sector and governors of departments to discuss how the ‘process of change’ could move forwards. At the meeting, Morales stated that:

The profound changes in recent years reflect the conversion from a patriarchal, clientelist and exclusive colonial state to an inclusive state, that hosts cultural diversity in its structures of power, and revolves around sub-national entities based on the rupture of the monopoly of political drive at the central level, guaranteeing the control of economic surplus and the application of mechanisms of access to the better distribution of social wealth. (Los Tiempos 2011d; author’s translation)

The meeting operated through several working tables covering a number of issues such as ‘economic development’, ‘industrialisation and integration’ and ‘land’. The Social Summit furthered notions of the MAS Party as a ‘government of social movements’ not divorced from civil society groups. CIDOB and CONAMAQ, amongst other sectors and individuals critical of the government, did not participate in the meeting arguing for the need for a meeting away from political parties. Instead, CIDOB conducted a parallel summit in Santa Cruz, which I attended. This had alternative working tables, such as ‘territory and land’, ‘platform of the Eighth March’, and ‘geopolitics and relations’ (personal field-notes, 14 December 2011). CIDOB formally invited Evo Morales and government representatives to the counter-summit with the argument that it was the true social summit, not one designed and controlled by a still centralised government.

This section shows that the government has acted to instigate a number of social movement practices in order to articulate representations of being ‘a government of social movements’. As such, the ‘progressive governments’ are often ‘the most effective agent at disarming the anti-systemic nature of the social movements, operating deep within their territory’ (Zibechi 2012: 290). In some ways, this has acted to solidify support within pro- Evo areas of Bolivia. These practices have also acted to subvert the allegiances with some social movement sectors remaining within the Unity Pact to the advantage of the

158 government. Nonetheless, these strategies have largely furthered romantic representations of the Bolivian government to international audiences rather than Bolivian society.