Diseño y construcción de labores de avance

The workplace ethnographies discussed above suggest that significant elements of many workers’ experience of lean production are quite negative, primarily because of work intensification and declining job security, and that these features can undermine management claims that workers will be empowered in a more positive way by the changes they are introducing. At the same time these ethnographies document a wide range of worker responses. Some workers, such as those in Delbridge’s [1998] Nippon Co (which dominated its market and recruited in an area where employment prospects were

difficult) largely accommodated management demands, though they resented overtime and tried to avoid involvement activities where these were discretionary. In this case there was a union at the firm but it was largely quiescent and accepted management priorities. Some workers, such as many of those in Graham’s [1995] study, tried to resist some management demands, such as acceptance of unscheduled overtime, in more subtle ways, through informal understandings whereby they obstructed the work flow. The

degree of resistance varied with the position and gender of workers. Women workers who had children to care for were forthright and blunt with management and even refused when there were calls for overtime, though others participated in management’s attempts to ‘manufacture consent’. However, there was no trade union as unions had been excluded from Graham’s factory, helping to explain why worker resistance was limited and largely covert.

In other cases, trade unions articulated worker grievances in a more active way, as was the case in the firms studied by Rinehart et al. [1997] and Durand and Hatzfeld [2003], but even in such cases there were important differences in the coverage, unity and efficacy of trade union representation. At Peugeot both the workforce and the unions were divided, partly along inter-generational lines, though this did not preclude

substantial resistance and bargaining by the more militant union. Thus the older permanent workers had seen change management programmes come and go they had survived and were more likely to participate in resistance, though some were more eager to fade into the background. Meanwhile, the younger workers on probation were often enthusiastic and eager to embrace change management as they aspired to upward

mobility and career growth. Furthermore, both the NUMMI [Adler, 1992] and the CAMI [Rhinehart, et al,1997] cases illustrate how the trade union of was initially a cooperative partner in management’s intensive attempts to implement lean manufacturing and in the latter the case the CAMI’s union was initially only lukewarm in its protest against the slew of incremental lean innovations rolled by CAMI’s plant management. [Rinehart et al., 1997]. It was only later in NUMMI [Adler, 1992: 45-52], with the growth of

workers’ resentment, that the union was forced out of inaction to protest at

management’s policies, and in the CAMI case the union was forced to protest more robustly and take a proactive stance against lean manufacturing [Rhinehart et

these factories found themselves fighting a day-to-day battle just to hold on to their jobs and had little scope for resistance. Indeed, their responses were determined primarily by the character of the supplier relationships, whether or not there was a trade union in the plant [Graham, 2006: 343-346].

In the rest of this section I will look briefly at some wider discussions of

industrial relations and trade unionism to locate my ethnographic findings in terms of a broader framework that addresses the articulation of workplace grievances and the role of trade unions in the collective organisation and representation of workers. In

particular, existing debates on the manner in which different categories of workers and types of unions respond to change management, and when and who might or will resist, will be examined here. This will be set in the overall context of the widespread decline in trade union coverage, membership [Hyman, 1999: 3] and activity in many countries over the last thirty years or more.

Against this broad background, Kelly [1998] has drawn particularly upon ‘mobilization theory’ to explore the processes involved in the formulation of shared grievances and the pursuit of common interests by workers, especially through union organisation and activity. This leads him to focus first on the conditions in which workers may develop a sense of grievance and injustice, and then second on the circumstances in which such injustice is attributed to the actions of an employer and respond collectively to them. A central feature of Kelly’s argument concerns the presence of an effective organisation through which worker mobilisation could occur, coupled with confidence among those workers that collective action will be efficacious and result in the righting of some injustice. In particular he highlights the intervention of leaders who frame issues and legitimise collective action in the face of collective opposition. In this respect he develops a theme that was emphasised earlier by Eric Batstone and his collaborators [Batstone et al, 1979] in their discussion of the role of ‘leader’ stewards in articulating

union principles (see below), but gives this argument a more radical form by explicitly recognising that the ideological horizons of trade unions may go beyond collective bargaining.

While Kelly’s [1998] discussion focuses particularly on the role of union leaders and activists in articulating grievances, it has also been recognised that wider patterns of work and community socialisation and processes of intergenerational transfer play important roles, while management traditions and ideologies can also become influential in forming worker responses. Thus the formulation of grievances and wider conceptions of shared interests involve social complexity and can generate ideological ambiguities. In this context, rival conceptions of injustices and shared interests may come into play, which can lead to mutual recriminations and accusations of, for example, ‘selling out’ or ‘sectionalism’ [Batstone et al., 1979].

This leads to an appreciation of the wide variety of perspectives on employment relations and understandings of workers’ interests both within specific unions and across different trade unions that may have prior ideological commitments, or represent

specific interests or espouse wider agendas that go beyond their functional role of representing workers. Thus unions may be linked to larger ideologies and may embody different degrees

of pragmatism, and, as a result, differ in their inclinations to challenge the dominant structure of industry, whether through strike action or political mobilisation. At the factory level, Batstone et al. [1979] emphasise, through their comparison of manual and white-collar and also leader and populist stewards, that workplace trade unions are not uniform or timeless entities, but differ in their orientations to bargaining with

management and in their relationships with their memberships. Meanwhile, Hyman, writing in the later half of the 1970s [Hyman, 1979b: 42, in Darlington and Upchurch,

2011: 89] has emphasised that the process of bureaucratisation could alter the relationships between union leaders, activists and members in the manner described:

Shop stewards too [became] “managers of discontent”: sustaining job control within the boundaries of negotiation with management authority and capitalist priorities, rather than (apart from the most exceptional circumstances) pursuing frontal opposition.

Hyman termed this phenomenon ‘the bureaucratisation of the rank and file’ [Hyman, in Mcllory, 2012: 63] which may mean that the effectiveness of workplace union organisation becomes compromised, either by becoming an end in itself or even by unwittingly

becoming an agent of management. The main characteristics of this trade union

bureaucracy identified by Hyman [1989a: 181-182, in Darlington and Upchurch, 2011: 79] are comprised of three sets of social relations: a separation of representation from

mobilisation, a hierarchy of control and activism, and the detachment of formal

mechanisms of policy and decision-making from the experience of members. However, as an analytic heuristic, it may be valuable to register a departure between Hyman’s writings in the 1970s-80s, and his subsequent later writings, which place less emphasis on these

tendencies and instead highlight a series of dilemmas that face all unions and which are only partially resolved in different ways by different union traditions.

Against this background, many students of industrial relations have emphasised that bargaining between unions and management can create a web of rules that forms a basis for accommodation and relative stability, but there has also been recognition of the fragility and potential disruption of such agreements. This forms the background to the discussion of the role of shop stewards in “the organization of workplace conflict and accommodation” by Batstone et al. [1979]. In particular, these authors suggest that those they call ‘leader stewards’ were most effective because they were aware of the

balance of power and the nature of rules existing in the plant, and by articulating their demands at opportune times were able to give legitimacy and plausibility to them. What mattered were the gains these stewards could make for their members, on the one hand by articulating grievances in a way which generated membership unity and (where necessary) mobilisation, and on the other hand by a realistic calculation of the bases for a deal with management. This was captured in a quote from a management informant at the plant, who commented that:

“The personal approach is important. You’ve got to be able to talk to the stewards without them immediately taking a conflict line. I like to keep an open door. The real stewards who lead their men get rewards for them; [the men] may have a lot of moans against them but you find that they’re very rarely defeated in elections and they’re [Leaders] not soft on management. Often they’re very tough but you know that if they agree to something the section will follow them and they’ll tell the section off if necessary. [Batstone et al., 1979: 166]

This emphasises that there were incentives for management to make concessions to workers represented by such ‘strong bargainers’, even if the concessions also imposed costs on the firm. Similarly, there were incentives for leader stewards to impose discipline on their members as well as to articulate their grievances and protect their interests. That is why managements sometimes prefer stronger bargaining arrangements with unions and leaders who have a steady pair of hands instead of populists and stooges who might lack the authority to defend the agreements reached.

On this basis, managers might refuse concessions or unions might resort to strike action, but such decisions would reflect careful assessments of the costs and benefits

involved, a feature that has been emphasised in Chamberlain’s analysis of the calculations informing the offers made and the sanctions deployed during collective bargaining. It should also be recognised, however, that both Batstone et al. [1979] and Kelly [1998] emphasise the significance of the active articulation of grievances and mobilisation of union power, rather than simply pragmatic calculations of existing power relations. At the same time, workers and trade unions face dilemmas about the demands they make and the settlements they accept because, apart from exceptional circumstances, they still retain an interest in the survival of their workplace and, though more

equivocally, the profitability of ‘their’ company.

Thus the existing frameworks of locally agreed rules that guide management and labour are widely acknowledged in day-to-day union activity, while challenges to these rules are usually specific and piecemeal, operating alongside continual accommodation between workers and managers which may take varied forms in different workplaces and even parts of a single workplace. This reflects the risks and limitations of more radical or revolutionary union action, even if union members wanted it. In recent years, however, it has more usually been management that has challenged existing workplace agreements, underlining the limitations of traditional forms of union bargaining in hostile conditions. After all, Batstone et al. [1979] conducted their study in a period and at a workplace where trade unionism was particularly strong and well organised. Contemporary capitalist firms beset with intense competition in their search to maximise financial performance and to satiate the interests of their shareholders and other stakeholders inevitably marginalise trade unions.

I am of the view, based upon my readings from a wide range of commentators, including accounts of managerial strategies by Jackall [1988: 91-95], that with an eye on financial expediency and faced with the threat of withdrawal of mobile investor capital [Wilkinson and Wood, 2012: 379], managers focus on short-term goals, adopt cost-

saving strategies, which Jackall terms as “milking”, and optimising their use of existing plants rather than investing in new equipment which would dent profits. This runs simultaneously alongside the devolution of management decision-making towards line management [Davis, 2006: 71; Sisson and Marginson cited in Edwards, 2003: 178] which in my view undermines the HR function, “linking of individualised fortunes to organisational fortunes” [Wilkinson and Wood, 2012: 379]. Line managers, faced with high levels of accountability, then focus on the delivery of the short-term results that will protect their own positions to the exclusion of other concerns. All of these trends over time have cumulatively influenced managerial avoidance of trade unions and their marginalisation.

In summary, management and labour are in a constant state of realignment of rules, for the intensity of worker response and resistance varies in time. In times of crisis, workers may face workforce reduction, plant closures, wage curbs, wage cuts, work intensification and the replacement of collective bargaining by joint consultation, and sometimes an increasingly hostile state response to workers’ interests, a trend that continues to hold true in India from the early 1990s until the present [Ramaswamy, 1983: 976-977]. Another repercussion on workers, common to India as well, as

Teitelbaum [2011: 38-39] points out, is the trend of managements resorting to increasing capital investments as a means of supplanting workers and reducing headcount. Many companies have sought to adapt their organisational forms and impose new sets of rules that suit their interests, and even creating what some writers theorise as the transitions into newer “regimes of accumulation” [Corriat and Dosi, in Boyer, 2002: 308-309]. All of these developments have weakened union capacities to resist, though as Kelly [Frege and Kelly, 2003: 9-14] emphasises, this has also prompted efforts to renew and

Some of these developments and also their contradictory features can be seen reflected in the varied and changing patterns of worker response, accommodation and resistance documented in the workplace ethnographies discussed at the start of this section. There have not been many attempts to draw out the wider implications of the findings of such studies, but Edwards, Belanger and Wright [2006] and Edwards and Belanger [2007] have made one such attempt, which is useful in helping me to refine my research questions.

These authors are interested in explaining the varied mixes of conflict and

cooperation that characterise different workplaces, and in particular the rare conditions in which participation and involvement schemes offer substantial gains for both

management and workers. They recognise the conflicting character of employment relations, but their starting point is a critique of a simple conflict of interests model because it fails to recognise several points. First, the underlying interests of both workers and managers may be quite complex and even contradictory (keeping a job but also gaining better terms and conditions; controlling workers but also eliciting commitment). Second, both parties act upon their own understanding of their ‘concerns’ rather than on the basis of imputed underlying interests. This provides the basis for mapping different patterns of conflict, accommodation and cooperation in different workplaces, according to how employers prioritise and seek to combine detailed control and long term

productivity gains, and how workers prioritise and seek to combine their control of the work process and their longer term influence and security within the enterprise. This allows them to locate and compare a range of detailed workplace studies, to explain why certain options don’t exist and to explore the specific dynamics of those that do. In this regard the authors devise two analytic constructs: developmental concerns and control concerns. The firm's developmental concerns address the issue ofefficiency as reflected in the reorganisation of work, training, and the development of skills, technological

change, or organisational innovation more generally. These concerns are linked to the firm’s ability to respond to new competitive pressures and the continued improvement of the forces of production. On the other hand, control concerns have to do with rights and power in day-to-day relations – that is, the regulation of the forces of production as they are at a given time, in a given context. Edwards, Balanger and Wright [2006: 131] say that they relate to ‘power over’, the ability to control the other group, with the threat of sanctions for non-compliance. They concern the wage-effort bargain and the managerial prerogative to hire and fire. Labour, they argue, has concerns such as the need for the company to continue to be profitable so that they can continue in employment, but have other concerns such as the secure working conditions and job security. Edwards,

Balanger and Wright [2006: 132] develop a nice analytic tabular column model with the column spaces delineating scenarios that extend from the situation in which the

managerial agenda is characterised by ‘developmental concerns’, but with

marginalisation of labour and where managerial objectives overpower workers and collective representation, to a mutual gains enterprise scenario in which workers’ concerns and interests reflect long-term developmental concerns, often in post capitalist or socialist conditions, and capitalism is at its weakest [workers management of firms for instance], to another where the firm’s developmental concerns are under-emphasised and the tussle between management and workers is confined to control. Within these analytic constructs they fit in the ethnographic case such as studies and analyse the points of convergence and departure of capital and labour's concerns, and locate the case studies in the columns wherein either management or labour's interests prevail. For instance, Rinehart’s [1997] case study plant, where capital's developmental concerns outweighed labour's concerns – in spite of it being a highly unionised plant. The obverse was true in Volvo, where control of workers was economically unviable because the prevalent wage structure was unsustainable. Finally, they link the survival and erosion of different

patterns of workplace relations to wider technological, market and (crucially) institutional conditions, which facilitate, preclude or erode workplace cooperation.

As Allan Flanders [1975: 135-137] points out, the workplace is comprised of management and organised labour whose interests vary from one another. Hyman [1978] points out that these interests are rarely reconcilable. In this section, I have tried to excavate how and in what manner workers and trade unions react to managerial