Operaciones mina

In this section, I consider some of the management strategies that have been

documented in the literature on the management of change and what the literature suggests about the reasons why managers select one strategy or another. Commentators have pointed out that managers continually face tensions between a wish to control employees and their wish to gain the commitment of employees through various strategies that imply

empowerment rather than control

The underlying conflict, between labour and labour power in labour process theory, is that there is an inescapable compulsion to produce surplus value and there is a resultant antagonism between the functions of capital and labour and the need for managerial mechanisms of surveillance and discipline. At the same time, the labour process does not represent the whole ‘circuit of capital [Thompson, cited in Spencer, 2000: 232]. It does not provide the whole explanation for production, accumulation and realisation of surplus value. Furthermore, this rather abstract theorisation of the imperatives characterising the capitalist labour process does not in itself provide sufficient tools to understand variations in

I will therefore consider the debate about the relationship between responsible

autonomy and direct control as a less abstract way of addressing management options, but one which retains a concern with the extraction of a surplus from labour. This will allow me to elaborate upon the various ways in which employees are perceived at different points of time by the organisation, collectively as well as individually, and consider how projects designed to empower or control them influence their responses to change management. Within

mainstream management literature, by writers who hail from the competitive advantage perspective like Michael Porter [2011: 4] identify the main features of corporate strategy, the adoption of which influences the extant adoption of its responsible autonomy or direct control to manage its employees:

Strategy is the creation of a unique and valuable position, involving a different set of activities. Strategy requires you to make trade-offs in competing to choose what not to do. Some competitive activities are incompatible; thus, gains in one area can be achieved only at the expense of another area. Strategy involves creating “fit” among a company’s activities. Fit has to do with the ways a company’s activities interact and reinforce one another.

However, it should also be recognised that Hyman uses his broader discussion of the challenges management faces in organising the extraction of a surplus to make a crucial point about the

limitations of neat functional typologies of management strategy such as the above definition, when he emphasises that:

Managerial strategy is best conceptualised as programmatic choice among alternatives none of which can prove satisfactory. The internal coherence of managerial activity as a collective labour process cannot be taken for granted. [Hyman, 1987: 30]

Nevertheless, managers manage their workplaces and understand change management in different modes, and we first need to understand the ways in which managerial activities are perceived in terms of both their consequences and the ways in which managers perceive themselves. Dealing with and managing other managers and workers within management is, as Thompson and McHugh [2002: 12] point out, a fundamental challenge of management begins with an undercurrent running through ‘managerialism’ They write:

Common to all versions of rational efficiency is that the logical basis of action is held to reside with the manager. In contrast, employees who restrict or oppose such action are frequently held to be acting irrationally, governed by a ‘logic of sentiment’ rather than one of efficiency.

The challenge for management is to encourage employees to do their best on their own volition through a range of employee initiatives that exclude conventional collective bargaining but involve representative participation, including joint consultation and Japanese-style company councils; downward communications, including team briefing, employee Financial reports, and other media; Financial Employee involvement, including Employee Share Ownership Plans and profit sharing/ bonus schemes; and upward problem solving, including suggestion schemes, quality circles, and Total Quality Management. [Ackers, 2010: 68]

The panoply of these measures are otherwise also known as Quality of Working Life initiatives (QWL)[Katz, 2004: 301] which according to Katz and Kochan [Katz, 2004: 301], are “oriented towards improving organisational performance and working lives of employees. They operate at the lowest level of industrial relations activity, namely the shop floor through the involvement of groups of workers.” The obverse critique of autonomy is that the managerial strategy of direct control lays down tightly prescribed procedures, closely integrates production processes, monitors employees minutely, and lays down stringent strictures against their violation.

Andrew Friedman [1977] pioneered the analysis of this strategic dualism, whilst also seeking to grasp the tensions and limitations of each end of the spectrum of managerial

control and employee discretion and thus the complex mixes of policy that could actually result. He started from the observation that management is not a two-tier process where work organisation designed by engineers is primary, and the exercise of management counter pressure to worker resistance is secondary. Both are managerial problems that are measured in terms of profits. If the costs in terms of worker resistance are too great, alternative

strategies would have to be tried and these will involve changes in the organisation of work [Friedman, 1977: 45].

As Friedman [2000: 68] in his later writing suggests, “There are systematic,

predictable influences on the direction management moves along the continuum in response to changing product and labour market conditions, changing technological conditions and

internal interactions.” Friedman [1977: 48] argues that the “responsible autonomy” approach entails allowing workers a wide measure of mental and physical agency over the direction of their tasks whilst getting them to identify with the competitive aims of the enterprise so that they will act ‘responsibly’ with the minimal amount of supervision, thus saving senior plant management time and money. This characterisation is given a distinctive twist by a

perspective from labour economics, which argues that it is cheaper to pay efficiency wages where it is costly to monitor the performance of employees and when the overall long-term goal is to attain a lower wage-cost equilibrium in an employer’s iso-cost curve [McConnell et al., 2007: 254]. The expectation on the part of the employer is that higher wages and the feeling of autonomy will offset the tendency of employees not to identify with corporate management targets and goals. Empowerment policies can be seen as one form of such a strategy of ‘responsible autonomy’, and as such have also been depicted as a requisite

stepping stone for ‘High Performance Work Organisations’ applying strategic HRM practices. [Applebaum and Batt, 1994].

Both Friedman and the ‘efficiency wage’ theorists suggest that strategies emphasising ‘responsible autonomy’ may be more attractive to some managers and firms than to others. One influence noted by Friedman is the level of trade union organisation and worker

cohesion, which may represent a particular challenge to policies of direct control and encourage managers to co-opt or bargain with well-organised workers. Another influence noted by economists is the level of complexity and uncertainty of the production process and the product market. This suggests, for example, that if the product market for commercial vehicles needed polyvalent workers with extended training, it might make sense to adopt some variant of a ‘responsible autonomy’ strategy.

Thus Friedman’s argument about ‘responsible autonomy’ versus ‘direct control’ provides a valuable point of departure for the analysis of varied and changing management policies, particularly in regard to the organisation of the labour process and the management of labour, and especially if Hyman’s point about the tensions and limitations facing all policy options is borne in mind. Thus I will shortly draw upon Friedman’s discussion of ‘responsible autonomy’ and ‘direct control’ to review the concept of empowerment. Before doing this, however, I also wish to note that Edwards [2003: 348] draws on his own work and also that of Marsden to develop a more sophisticated version of this typology, and uses it to analyse a wide range of issues including skills, labour market structures and the organisation of pay and incentives, though he does not choose to evaluate the substantive value of his analysis other than using it to organise a wide range of materials.

In my opinion, the utility of these approaches is to situate in a broader historical context the modes of controlling labour and extracting surplus value from it. Edwards suggests that empowered staff were more likely to engage in a beyond contract effort, i.e. beyond the normal call of duty, and he also argues that there has tended to be little union negotiation concerning the principle of such initiatives (an empowerment paradox) with design and planning excluding union involvement. In practice, however, issues arising out of the implementation of empowerment often become industrial relations matters. For example, job enlargement can threaten traditional demarcation lines as well as raise remuneration issues. As the case studies of such researchers as Milkman [1997] and Graham [1995] illustrate, employees tend not to question the principles of empowerment but turn the

promised discourse of empowerment against itself and ask management why it did not deliver on its claims. Edwards [2003: 348] also incorporates the discussion of ‘bleak house’ strategies where employers impose poor terms and conditions and exclude unions, a phrase first used by Sisson [Sisson, 1993: 1108, cited in Marchington and Grugalis] as well as consideration of areas of employee agency and resistance into his model.

Edwards and Belanger [2006: 306,308] analyse the empirical evidence relating to the extent of control and autonomy, which illustrates the need for careful consideration of such case-study data before arriving at theoretical generalisations. Their appraisal of case studies of workplace ethnographies case studies indicated that “managements applied a top-down and unitarist approach, and trust relations were absent or weak. The participation “schemes were operated at the discretion of management since there was no commitment by management to be bound by discussions”. A valuable insight offered by is the requirement of combining the analytic findings and insights of several ethnographic case studies bearing in mind the underlying determinants of industrial relations such as market conditions, technology and production organisation and managerial strategy in order to explicate the effects of managerial policies of control or discretion upon employees I will return to their arguments and analysis in Section 5, which considers worker responses to change management initiatives.

The implications of this discussion of managerial control and autonomy culminate in the following research themes that form the subtext of my first two research questions: first, ‘What overall strategies for the organisation of production and the management of labour have managers in my case-study company developed in recent years?’ and second, ‘How far do these strategies involve a focus on ‘responsible autonomy’ or how far are they characterised by ‘direct control’?’

The next section takes its cue from the discussion on responsible autonomy and investigates, given an a priori assumption that if employees were granted responsible autonomy, what would be the main features of this employee discretion, and in what ways would employees be expected to exercise it. The definitions may be as broad and all-inclusive

as ‘any form of delegation to or consultation with employees’, or as narrow as a ‘formal, on- going structure of direct communications’ such as through the mechanism of team briefing. Some authors refer to involvement as participation while others use empowerment, voice, or communications, often without extracting the conceptual meanings or differences that are used in practice [Wilkinson and Dundon, in Wilkinson, Golan Marchington and Levin (eds), 2010: 168]. The features of direct participation and its effect on employees are broadly termed as empowerment, comprised of: 'information sharing' of the companies’ challenges; future plans and why and where employees’ active participation beyond their employment contract is needed; 'upward problem solving'; 'task autonomy'; and, finally, through 'voice systems', which broadly implies various modes of granting voice to employees’ concerns through downward communication of management's plans [Wilkinson and Dundon, in Wilkinson, Golan Marchington and Levin (eds), 2010: 171-178]. I will now turn my attention to understanding empowerment and its main features.

2.2 The rhetoric of empowerment and changing employees’ attitudes

It is argued by some authors that empowering employees promotes more egalitarian workplaces, where through effective leadership practices and by deploying Total Quality Management, managers and the managed go beyond a contractual transactional relationship and strive to achieve quality and productivity that could not come out in a more authoritarian frame work [Guillen and Gonzalez, 2010: 186]. Wilkinson [1998] identifies some of the key elements of the rhetoric associated with empowerment. In this new discourse, managers are exhorted to trust and involve employees; different forms of control are demanded from earlier supervisory arrangements. Wilkinson [1998: 150] refers to “simultaneous loose-tight

properties” of the resulting arrangements, with specific reference to control through shared values (of ‘customer service’, etc.) so that employees have greater discretion with regard to how they carry out their jobs to meet these core corporate values. In this context, he directs the reader towards Morton’s [1994] idea that workers have two jobs: one is to carry out

designated tasks and the other is to search for improvements. In this view, middle managers [Wilkinson, 1998: 43] become facilitators, coaches and motivators, encouraging participation, teamwork and the delegation of responsibility and accountability which helps foster pride, job satisfaction and better work. At the same time, there are rival justifications of an

empowerment strategy within the business studies literature, ranging from perceptions of employees as resources associated with the ‘Hard’ model of HRM, to regarding them as agents that can develop the organisation’s core competencies, to seeking them as sources of individual competitive advantage [Legge, 2003: 87]. A related strand of the mainstream management literature claims that if line managers are delegated greater power and freedom to take quick decisions, they will participate more robustly in realising their immediate senior management’s objectives. This is because they will feel a sense of ownership over the tasks they perform, feel responsible and find meaning in their work. This implies they will be accountable for the tasks that they perform [Bowen and Lawler, 1992: 33].

Meanwhile, the practice of continuous improvement is seen as increasing employee involvement in decision-making, although there is little discussion as to whether it is relatively low grade, task-centred involvement or a more significant form of participation and shared decision-making. In practice, there is a basic ambiguity in TQM in that, while employers seek the commitment and empowerment of their employees, increased employee responsibility for the work process is a cornerstone of the approach [Hill and Wilkinson, 1995: 14-16].

As these comments suggest, there are varied conceptualisations and interpretations of ‘empowerment’, and the effects of such policies are also strongly contested. Indeed, there is no clear agreement in the literature on what the term ‘empowerment’ implies, and

disagreements cover basic questions around what powers or capacities are granted to the empowered, how their power is enhanced, what areas of activity or decision-making they cover, and who is included in these processes [Hales, 2000: 502]. For example,

Cummings and Wilson (eds), 2003: 87], designed to implement organisational attitudinal change, or it may be seen as an aspect of broader changes in work organisation, such as TQM, lean manufacturing or even Swedish versions of group working. This also leaves open important questions about the ways in which such changes in the responsibilities of

employees are tied to payment and reward systems, for example through ‘performance- related pay’ or symbolic rewards and recognition.

Most crucially, there are major questions about the boundaries of any control that workers may be granted. Does management retain a veto over the ways in which workers use their enhanced involvement, over the implications for effort or manning levels for example, so that worker empowerment is only pursued within these limits? Put another way, is ‘empowerment’ a zero-sum or a non zero-sum game (Hales, 2000: 502): are managers relinquishing power as it is delegated to workers, or can they grant power to workers while also retaining or even enhancing their own capabilities? Relatedly, does empowerment mean the acquisition of power by workers, or rather its passive receipt simply because someone else in the organisation has given up notional charge of organisational functions previously held by employees higher up in the organisation? And does this mean loading more

‘responsibility’ than ‘autonomy’ on to non-managerial jobs, even though employees may not necessarily be given adequate means to discharge their new responsibilities? Furthermore, Hales [2000: 502] also poses the question of whether empowerment is specifically about “more autonomy or choice over how work is done or greater voice in the [wider] decisions of the work place or organisation as a whole”. Even the optimistic literature suggests that the first option is more likely for ordinary employees, though middle managers may be

empowered to encourage wider innovation and change.

Overall, then, it is management that empowers employees, and such initiatives have tended to cover direct workforce involvement over only a relatively small number of issues usually connected with the production process or service delivery. Furthermore, Wilkinson [1997: 47] develops the argument that direct management communication of ‘company

challenges’ reduces the room for maneuver of operators and employees, and it is in this context that managers allow employees to communicate horizontally so they can collect information outside their workgroup and are able to make effective customer-related decisions (e.g. replacing defective products). Managers can also influence outcomes by their selection and allocation of employees to particular teams. In short, there may be some greater autonomy and responsibility at the point of production or service delivery, but it is usually tightly circumscribed.

Empowerment and self-initiative of employees are encouraged through the direct participation of employees, which is defined by Wilkinson and Dundon [Wilkinson, Gollan and Marchington and Levin (eds), 2010: 168] as, “any form of delegation to or consultation with employees”, or as narrow as a “formal, ongoing structure of direct communications such as through team briefing”.

Empowerment and participation of employees is achieved through the language of “soft Human Resource Management” practice that communicates “images of care and nurturing in order to develop employees as valuable members of the organization who help it achieve its goals” [Harley and Hardy, 2004: 379]. Paraphrasing Wilkinson and Dundon [Wilkinson, Gollan and Marchington and Levin (eds), 2010: 174-179] who identify the main features of Direct Participation of employees:

i) Information sharing: Information on management plans and challenges is passed downwards to employees to win them over and make them empathise with its business decisions and challenges in order to bring out greater employee commitment.