Dispositius lògics programables: FPGA

This chapter has so far discussed leverage from a holistic point of view.

However, given the differences and nuances between different hosts, it is unlikely that each is seeking to leverage the same outcomes. Therefore, it is now important to consider the different areas that host cities and states wish to leverage.

One of the first ways to categorise areas of leverage is using the ‘triple bottom line’. This is a concept that was introduced in 1994, encouraging firms to look beyond the bottom line of a profit and loss account and, in addition, to consider social and environmental development (Weed, 2009; Ziakas, 2015). However, it does not take more than a cursory glance at the literature to see that states have objectives that move beyond those named in the triple bottom line. While these three areas may be appropriate for a business to focus on, they do not represent the full spectrum of objectives for a nation. Therefore, in addition to economic, social and environmental strategies, leveraging for sports development, nation branding and international prestige will also be considered.

2.3.3.1 Economic

There has long been a view that hosting a mega-event will automatically lead to economic gains. First, hosting is often thought to increase tourism. This increase occurs on a short-term basis, as attendees enter the economy and

2005). Moreover, the hosting of a mega-event leads to wider tourism gains, as people around the world are made aware of the host and its benefits (Karadakis, 2010). Similarly, a nation that hosts a mega-event signals to the rest of the world that it is a nation that can be traded with (Rose and Spiegel, 2011). Finally, hosting a mega-event is thought to lead to job opportunities.

Studies have shown that Barcelona 1992, Atlanta 1996 and Sydney 2000 all saw falls in unemployment around the Games (Centre for Regional Economic Analysis, 1999; Hotchkiss et al., 2003; Malfas et al., 2004).

However, none of these four economic gains is guaranteed. For every example of a nation benefitting economically from hosting a mega-event, there are just as many examples of a negative legacy. For example, there is little guarantee that any money spent will stay within the local economy and it appears to be unlikely given the international nature of the organisations involved in mega-events (Matheson, 2009). Even if local businesses are selected to work with the event, it is possible that the organisers will source products and services from outside the local area (Porter and Fletcher, 2008).

Furthermore, the hosting of an event may actually discourage spending. There is evidence to suggest that a displacement effect may occur, as people actively avoid the area that is hosting due to fears of artificially raised prices and overcrowding (Karadakis et al., 2010). Finally, while unemployment may reduce during an event, this is also likely to be problematic. First, it is possible that additional employees are brought in from other areas, and indeed other countries, but if these workers then move their earnings outside the economic area, then the host region does not benefit economically. Second, many of

these jobs are likely to be in construction, and therefore not sustainable post-event (Briedenhann, 2011).

Consequently, if economic benefits do not occur naturally, hosts need to put in place strategies and tactics to ensure that the local area does benefit.

Indeed, the first leveraging model focused on ensuring economic benefits.

This model, and the one that will be central to this research, is Chalip’s (2004) schematic representation of event leverage. In this model, Chalip divides leveraging strategies into two areas: immediate and long-term leverage.

Immediate leverage focuses on maximising the spending by visitors to the event, with Chalip offering four means by which to achieve this. First, visitors who attend the event should be encouraged to spend more. There will likely already have been spending on tickets, food and drink, but visitors should also be persuaded to visit local tourist attractions. A way of encouraging this is to increase the length of time that visitors remain in the host area, as the longer a visitor stays, the more money they will spend. Chalip also recognises the earlier mentioned issue of keeping money in the local economy by engaging local businesses in the event. This also contributes to Chalip’s final point;

enhancing business relationships. The hosting of mega-events provides a unique opportunity for local businesses to work with international sponsors (Chalip, 2004).

Grix et al. (2017) argue that local businesses are often excluded in favour of international organisations. Kirby et al. (2018) take this idea and modify Chalip’s (2004) model to incorporate the ways in which micro and small businesses can be included within the hosting of a mega-event. Kirby et al.

identify three phases of the hosting process (bidding and selection, planning, and delivery and handover) and provide a series of strategies and tactics for bidders and hosts to leverage a mega-event to benefit local businesses. Many of these strategies involve the harnessing of greater cohesion, both between the event organisers and local businesses, but also between the businesses themselves.

Indeed, one of the earliest leveraging strategies to be discussed in the literature was Sydney 2000’s Business Club Australia initiative (O'Brien, 2006). The Australian government recognised that the Sydney 2000 Olympic Games would involve a wide range of corporations; from local businesses supplying the Games to international conglomerates which pay large sums in sponsorship fees. Yet, there was no formal way for these disparate organisations to connect (O'Brien, 2006). Thus, Business Club Australia was formed, with a wide range of stakeholders in the Games; businesses, executives attending the Games, and sponsors were all included. Business Club Australia had both a physical and virtual hub, with international visitors being paired with potential domestic business partners to enhance international trade (O'Brien, 2006). O’Brien reported that the Business Club Australia initiative was successful, and several similar schemes have been implemented in the years since. However, the initiative was not without issue.

As has already been discussed, timing is also very important in leveraging strategies, and O’Brien found that Business Club Australia was marketed to Australian businesses too early. In addition, the inclusion of Olympic sponsors,

although adding a degree of legitimacy to the initiative, precluded other potential businesses from taking part.

Mhanna et al. (2017) tested the immediate leveraging strategies of Chalip’s model on London’s hosting of the 2012 Olympic Games. The key finding of this work was that without carefully planned strategies, economic benefits do not occur. First, there was an issue with the location of the Games. London 2012 was deliberately built in the East End of London to regenerate the area.

Indeed, the hosting of the Games was itself a leveraging strategy. As the Mayor of London at the time of the bid, Ken Livingstone, said: “I didn’t bid for the Olympics because I wanted three weeks of sport. I bid for the Olympics because it’s the only way to get the billions of pounds out of the government to develop the East End” (Evening Standard, 2008). Using a mega-event to catalyse regeneration of an area is prominent in the literature (Barghchi et al., 2009; Stevens, 2005). However, this causes difficulties if principal tourist attractions are elsewhere in the city. Mhanna et al. (2017) found that visitors to the East End were reluctant to travel to the other areas of the city housing the tourist attractions. In addition, the excitement generated throughout the UK surrounding the Olympic Games meant that many people preferred to watch the Games rather than partake in more conventional leisure activities. This supports Green’s (2001) work around subculture. It is not enough to expect that visitors will automatically visit the tourist attractions that are already there;

rather, hosts should seek to augment the mega-event with additional activities and entertainment.

In addition to issues in enticing visitor spend while in London, there were also problems with increasing the length of visitor stays. As Chalip (2002) himself had previously noted, many visitors base their travel around the event itself and have their travel booked long in advance (Mhanna et al., 2017).

Furthermore, tickets are often sold through approved agencies which have little interest in encouraging visitors to stay longer (Chalip, 2002). This adds weight to the earlier assertion that the ‘pregnancy period’ is an important period for leveraging strategies. If a host waits until the event itself to attempt to lengthen visitor stays, this is likely to be far too late.

Chalip’s (2004) model also identifies strategies for long-term economic benefits, both of which lead to enhancing the image of the host. A mega-event will have the eyes of the world upon it via the global media (Karadakis et al., 2010; Knott et al., 2015). For example, the broadcasting rights to the 2018 Football World Cup were sold to 219 territories across the globe (Bason et al., 2018). A mega-event, and a sporting event in particular, is a unique opportunity for a host to get its message to the rest of the world. In order to do this, the host needs to work with various external organisations. First, the event will be advertised by the governing body (i.e. IOC or FIFA), and the host should seek to build relevant images of the regional area into this advertising (Chalip, 2004). Second, the event will be reported on by various media outlets. Green et al. (2003) suggest that media outlets and reporters should be provided with the information and images that the host wishes to convey to the world. Finally, many sponsors will use images of the host region to strengthen their links with the event in the eyes of the consumer and avoid being ambushed by marketing

(Chalip, 2004). Again, it would be prudent for the host region to work with sponsors to ensure the images and messages being conveyed are the ones that the host wishes to communicate.

This approach can also work in another beneficial way. A host region can use the idea of the mega-event in its future promotion and advertising material (Chalip, 2004). This can be particularly successful if the event has an image that the host wishes to transfer to its own image and can then build this image into its current marketing mix (Chalip, 2004). However, it should be noted that this is most likely to be successful if the event is contributing to an already existent promotional strategy, rather than being expected to generate interest on its own (Swart and Bob, 2004).

2.3.3.2 Social

Closely linked to economic leveraging are the social impacts of hosting.

Indeed, many commentators have noted that social legacies are a natural by-product of economic leveraging; that is, if a region successfully leverages economic benefits, then it is possible that society within the region will also be made more affluent. However, this can be a double-edged sword, for if event organisers believe that social legacies will occur naturally, then they are less likely to employ economic leveraging strategies (Bob and Swart, 2010).

It is clear that the hosting of events can create positive feelings for residents of the area where the event is taking place. This has been described as

‘community spirit’ (Malfas et al., 2004; Kellett et al., 2008) and was noted during the FIFA World Cup in South Korea (Kim and Morrison, 2005). These positive feelings, or community spirit, are not limited to the immediate local

area, with spillover effects being reported by Deccio and Baloglu (2002), and Ndlovu-Gatsheni (2011). The positive feelings towards an event ex-post are often at odds with negative feelings before the event takes place; Kim et al.

(2006) found that prior to the 2002 Football World Cup, residents ranked social problems as their third largest issue. By the time the event had taken place, social problems were deemed to be the least troubling issue (Kim and Petrick, 2005).

Of a similar nature to community spirit is the ‘feel-good’ factor that can be created. Both these impacts are difficult concepts to quantify, and so data has often been anecdotal. One way in which it can be estimated is through calculating ‘willingness to pay’. Du Plessis and Maennig (2007) found that German residents would pay a cumulative total of €640 million to host the 2006 Football World Cup; however, it should be noted that this is well below the overall cost of over €3 billion (DW.com, 2006).

Given the similarities between community spirit and the feel-good factor, it is unsurprising that the criticisms are similar. First, it is noticeable that many of the cited instances occur when the host team is successful during the tournament. The South Korea, Germany and South Africa national teams all achieved beyond expectation as they hosted World Cups, leading Heere et al.

(2013) to suggest that it might be advantageous for governments to invest in the success of their sports teams rather than hosting events. However, this is not in agreement with Kavestos and Szymanski’s (2010) assertion that hosting an international football tournament increases life satisfaction, but national team success does not. Second, the temporal aspect of both is questionable.

Both tend to occur as the event itself is taking place, with Kim and Petrick (2005) noting that enthusiasm for hosting an event dissipates only three months after the event has taken place.

If these impacts cannot then be classed as legacy, they can still play a part in leveraging social benefits. As with economic leveraging, Chalip (2006) was the initial proponent for leveraging for social outcomes. In this paper, Chalip observes that events can be liminoid; that is, they engender a feeling of communitas within the participants and therefore can be used to generate liminality through the fostering of social interaction and creating a feeling of celebration (2006). Chalip (2014) later notes that the liminoid feeling can be focused to achieve specific social objectives through four primary methods: a) the event can be affiliated with a social cause, b) the sporting subculture can be aligned with the social issue, c) visitor stays may be lengthened to maximise exposure to the social cause, and d) targeting event visitors with specific causes. However, whereas Chalip’s model for economic leverage has been tested at events (O'Brien, 2006; Perić et al., 2016; Mhanna et al., 2017), there has been little empirical analysis into the creation of liminality at events.

Despite this, Grix (2016) suggests that such collective feelings conceptualised in ‘communitas’ and feel-good factor play a crucial role in society letting off steam and developing a sense of ‘we-ness’ amongst its citizens.

That is not to say there has been no research into leveraging mega-events for social gain. One of the key criticisms of mega-events, and even their leveraging, is the distribution of benefits. The same impact may benefit one group of stakeholders while at the same time disadvantaging another. While

numerous hosts have stated that society will be better off as a result of hosting a mega-event, these benefits are very rarely focused on the worse off in society (Minnaert, 2012). Indeed, as Smith (2014) notes, those who are already worse off in society are likely to be those most disadvantaged by the event itself. For example, there has been a recent trend of cities using the hosting of mega-events to regenerate poorer areas of a city. However, as Malfas et al. (2004) noted, a direct impact of the Sydney 2000 Olympic Games was an increase in house prices and rents in the poorest areas of the city, by 7% and 38% respectively. This has further implications if public taxes are paying for the event (Kellett et al., 2008).

Parent (2016) offers a potential solution to this issue, through increasing the involvement of all stakeholder groups in the event planning process. Minnaert (2012) notes that there is very little evidence that this has ever occurred, before reviewing the literature to suggest strategies by which this could be achieved. Minnaert argues that a network should be built involving all possible stakeholders in the event, including the socially excluded. As Balsas (2004) recognises, the hosting of a mega-event may accelerate planning processes, with public participation being thrown aside in a bid to ensure that the city is ready to host the event. Leveraging committees also need to recognise that universal programmes are unlikely to reach those who need them most (Minnaert, 2012). If regions have social groups who are already excluded from general society, there is no guarantee that they will be reached by leveraging tactics. Therefore, organisers need to create specifically focused strategies to ensure that those who need them most are positively affected. Finally, the

already discussed ‘pregnancy’ period is identified by Minnaert (2012) as being key, as any potential momentum is likely to be lost post-event.

Rogerson (2016) further analyses the ways in which the Glasgow 2014 Commonwealth Games were leveraged to generate social benefits. While Glasgow sought to regenerate a poor area of the city, it passed responsibility for regeneration to the council rather than the responsibility resting with the organising committee. This had a key benefit in that it was built into the long-term plans for the city rather than being an ad hoc occurrence. As a result, the Athlete Village was built with the knowledge that it would be turned into accommodation post-event, crucially including social housing and accommodation for the elderly (Rogerson, 2016).

While Rogerson (2016) demonstrates the way that the Glasgow 2014 Commonwealth Games were leveraged for social benefits, it was not perfect.

Prior to the event taking place, there were reports in newspapers that many people were being displaced from Glasgow East End (Saltiel, 2013), with anti-homeless ‘spikes’ being installed around the city (Evening Times, 2014). This is typical of the displacement that often takes place during the hosting of mega-events, with The Centre on Housing Rights and Evictions (COHRE) (2007) estimating that two million people have been displaced from their homes due to the Olympic Games since Seoul 1988. Displacement is one of the five human rights issues identified by Worden (2015), with the others being migrant worker mistreatment, suppression of the media (including journalist incarceration), suppression of free speech and discrimination.

As yet, much of the literature has sought to view how mega-events can be leveraged to bring positive impacts for a region. Weed (2009) argues that this should not be the sole focus. Rather than seeking to leverage positive results, cities should seek to leverage outcomes that mitigate the negative impacts associated with hosting mega-events.

2.3.3.3 Environment

The third aspect of the triple-bottom-line is the environment. The impact that hosting a mega-event has on the environment is often included in leveraging social impacts (Grix et al., 2017). It is perhaps because of this that there is a stark lack of literature surrounding the ways in which a mega-event can be specifically leveraged for environmental gains. This is despite there being a wealth of literature detailing the negative impacts that a sport mega-event may have; an area that has received intense scrutiny since the environmental disaster of the Albertville 1992 Winter Olympic Games (Cantelon and Letters, 2000). A consequence of this environmental disaster was the consideration by the IOC of the environmental impacts of all Olympic Games, resulting in the

‘environment’ ultimately being added as the third strand of Olympism, together

‘environment’ ultimately being added as the third strand of Olympism, together