Equalitzador de canal

A prominent legacy of hosting mega-events that is not evident in the leveraging literature, is that of the infrastructure left behind following an event. While no studies explicitly state the fact, the inference is that the bid is seen as an opportunity for a city to leverage development. Rather than use the word leverage, the bid is often described as a ‘catalyst’ for urban regeneration.

Indeed, Oliver (2011a) argues that an Olympic bid is an opportunity for a city to activate urban development strategies that are already in place, with the bid providing the impetus for the development to begin.

Oliver and Lauermann (2017) have extensively researched the impact that bids may have on the infrastructure of a city and are one of the few authors to use the term leverage to describe a city’s strategies. Lauermann (2016a) specifically notes that cities are likely to have pre-existing urban development plans, and an Olympic bid can be used to catalyse these. Lauermann specifically notes two aspects of a bid that provide the opportunity for this.

First, a city may have access to bid-related sources of finance that it would not normally have, based on the potential revenues to be secured from hosting.

Second, an Olympic bid provides a city with access to global networks whose experience can be utilised (Lauermann 2014b). In addition, an Olympic bid, with its finite deadlines, can provide an impetus for development that a city may not otherwise have (Oliver and Lauermann, 2017). Indeed, a study by Lauermann (2015), across bids from 1991 to 2012, found that over 30% of planned use takes place regardless of the success of the bid. This study only considered urban transformation. Had it also included transport development,

it is likely that the figure of 30% would have been much higher. However, it is possible that bidders include urban development plans already in place in their bid documentation that would take place even if a city was not bidding. It is unclear the extent to which plans such as these should be considered as being an impact of a bid.

Lauermann is one of the few authors to consider urban development on a macro scale, as much of the research focuses on individual case studies.

Moss (2011) outlines the numerous improvements to the various areas of New York following its defeat in bidding for the 2012 Olympic Games. The bid deliberately pushed through a number of initiatives, aware that any impetus would die along with the bid (Masterman, 2008; Moss, 2011). Thus, nine different regeneration projects in areas of New York were started as part of the bid, and then continued despite the fact the bid was ultimately unsuccessful. This was not the case during Chicago’s bid, which had little impact on the urban development of the city (van Dijk and Weitkamp, 2014).

The bid from Chicago had no plans for urban development even if the bid had been successful. Even though Chicago’s transportation networks were in need of upgrade, the bid committee did not believe it would be able to secure funding for the development (ibid).

Had Chicago sought to upgrade its transportation network via the bid, this would not have been atypical. As far back as the 1960s, Lyon used its bid for the 1968 Olympic Games to improve its road, rail and air infrastructure (Lindau et al., 2016). More recently, London, Rio and Vancouver all committed to transportation upgrades regardless of whether the outcome of the bid was

successful or not (Brown et al., 2012; Lindau et al., 2016; Sant and Mason, 2015). The fact that all these bids were successful, potentially indicates that this commitment to infrastructural improvements within the cities did not go unnoticed by the IOC. Indeed, Rio’s 2016 bid significantly altered its transportation plans from its two previously unsuccessful bids (Lindau et al., 2016).

Given the nature of the Olympic Games, it should be of no surprise that sporting infrastructure has also been developed as part of a bid, with the same opportunities (funding, short deadlines and access to global networks) all similarly playing a role (Oliver and Lauermann, 2017). Table 3.3 provides a summary of the facilities built by states who lost Olympic bids identified in the literature.

The use of an Olympic bid to develop sport infrastructure dates back to Lyon’s bids for the 1920 and 1924 Olympic Games, as the Stade de Gerland stadium was built even though Lyon’s bids failed, and then upgraded as part of Lyon’s unsuccessful bid for the 1968 Olympic Games (Benneworth and Dauncey, 2010). New York’s urban development as part of its bid for the 2012 Games has already been discussed, but the city also constructed the Citi Field and Yankee Stadium baseball venues as part of its unsuccessful bid for the 2012 Olympic Games (Masterman, 2008; Moss, 2011). Similarly, Berlin saw the city use its bid for the 2000 Olympic Games to accelerate its already existing plans for sport facility development (Alberts, 2009). At the time, Berlin’s sporting infrastructure was not sufficiently developed to deal with the everyday needs of its citizens. The Berlin bid segregated its venue plans into two areas;

bid-dependent and non-bid-dependent projects. As a result, while these venues were developed, other projects, including the Olympic Village, were abandoned following the bid decision (Alberts, 2009).

Table 3.3: Facilities Development as Part of Losing Olympic Bids

City Event bid for Sporting

Facility Bid Impact Reference Lyon 1920/1924

Olympico Built (1937) Bolz, 2015 Lyon 1968 Olympic

Games Velodrome Built (1997) Alberts, 2009 Berlin 2000 Olympic

Games Swimming Hall Built Alberts, 2009 Manchester 2000 Olympic

Games Velodrome Built (1994) Lawson, 2006 Manchester 2000 Olympic

Games

Ice Hockey

arena Built (2007) Lawson, 2006 Manchester 2000 Olympic

A key facet of both Berlin and New York’s sport facility development was that the bid was used to catalyse sporting infrastructure that had previously been identified as being necessary and so was already being planned. Istanbul, however, did not do this, and instead built the Atatürk Olympic Stadium in anticipation of hosting the Games (Bilsel and Zelef, 2011). There was little long-term planning regarding the stadium, which was built 20 kilometres from the city centre in an area that was to be developed via the Games itself and, as a result, is somewhat disconnected from the city. This is further exacerbated by the fact that the stadium is not used on a regular basis.

Istanbul has three major football teams (Beşiktaş, Fenerbahçe and Galatasaray) but each already has their own stadium which is regularly used for other events. The Atatürk Stadium was included in Turkey’s unsuccessful bid for the 2024 UEFA European Football Championship, but would have needed to undergo a further overhaul (The Architects' Journal, 2018).