FACTS:
In his decision in April 30, 2010, the Labor Arbiter (LA) found that Hilongo was illegally dismissed by petitioner. Petitioner was ordered to pay backwages from the date of the illegal dismissal up to the date of said decision and also awarded him separation pay. The computation of awards of the LA was P170,520. Petitioner appealed to the NLRC who revered the decision. Hilongo filed a petition for certiorari with the CA who ruled in favor of him. Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration, which was denied with finality in its Resolution dated March 26, 2013. Petitioners no longer appealed the decision of the CA prompting Hilongo to file a motion for Entry of Judgment and a motion for clarification of decision/resolution praying that the March 26, 2013 Resolution of the CA include the amount of the award as stated in the Labor Arbiter’s Decision dated April 30, 2010 and additional award computed from May 1, 2010 to March 26, 2013.
In its Resolution dated June 11, 2013, the CA granted the motion for entry of judgment and noted Hilongo’s motion for clarification of decision/resolution. The CA held that when an appellate court affirms the Labor Arbiter’s ruling, it is understood that awards due to the illegally dismissed employee shall be recomputed in order to account for the period of time that has lapsed from the rendition of the Labor Arbiter’s decision up to its finality. The case was then remanded to the Labor Arbiter which however ruled that the computation in the April 30, 2010 prevails. Hilongos filed for extraordinary remedy with the NLRC which was dismissed and his Motion for Reconsideration also being denied,
he filed a petition for certiorari with the CA. The CA granted Hilongo’s petition.
ISSUE(S):
Whether the CA in re-computing the monetary awards in favor of Hilongo has violated the principle of immutability of final and executory judgments..
RULING:
The re- computation of the consequences of illegal dismissal upon execution of the decision does not constitute an alteration or amendment of the final decision being implemented. The illegal dismissal ruling stands; only the computation of monetary consequences of this dismissal is affected, and this is not a violation of the principle of immutability of final judgments.
Said CA Decision dated September 7, 2012 became final and executory on April 26, 2013. Thus, the April 30, 2010 Decision of the Labor Arbiter which ordered the payment of separation pay in lieu of reinstatement, effectively ended the employment relationship of the parties on April 26, 2013, the date the CA decision became final. Since the Labor Arbiter’s computation of Hilongo’s monetary award was up to the date of his April 30, 2010 Decision only, the CA properly decreed the computation of additional back wages and separation pay.
However, the CA incorrectly concluded that the April 30, 2010 Decision of the Labor Arbiter became final on June 11, 2013, contrary to its own finding that it became final and executory on April 26, 2013. This led to its erroneous computation of the additional back wages and separation pay of Hilongo, as well as reckoning the date of the 12% legal interest. Following the teaching of Nacar v. Gallery Frames that the computation of the monetary consequences (back wages and separation pay) of the illegal dismissal decision should be reckoned from its finality, the additional back wages and separation pay of Hilongo should be computed from May 1, 2010 to April 26, 2013. Further, the payment of legal interest of 12% per annum should also be from April 26, 2013 up to June 30, 2013. Thereafter, in accordance with Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas Monetary Board’s Circular No. 799, series of 2013, the legal interest computed from July 1, 2013 until the monetary awards were fully satisfied will be 6% per annum.
12 SEACREST MARTIME MANAGEMENT vs PICAR, G.R. No. 209383, March 11, 2015
FACTS:
Mauricio Picar, Jr. was employed by Sealion Shipping Limited-United Kingdom through its local manning agent Seacrest Maritime Management, Inc., as Chief Cook continuously for several contracts from April 2005 until his last employment contract in 2010, on board the vessel, “MV Toisa Paladin.” The last contract was for a fixed duration of three (3) months which commenced on September 5, 2010 with a basic salary of USD630.00 exclusive of overtime pay and other benefits.
On September 24, 2010, Picar experienced high fever, chilling, lumbar back pain, and difficulty in urinating accompanied with blood. He was referred for medical treatment to the Maritime Medical Center (MMC) in Singapore. He was diagnosed with Urinary Tract Infection (UTI) and Renal Calculus. After his check-up, he was required to go back to the vessel and take a rest. On September 28, 2010, he was brought back back to MMC where he was confined until October 1, 2010. On October 2, 2010, he was repatriated. Upon his arrival in Manila, Picar was referred to Dr. Alegre. He underwent sonography of his kidney and urinary bladder, which showed “renal cyst on his right kidney; calyceal
lithiasis, right; and normal urinary bladder; slightly enlarged prostate gland was noted.”
Dr. Alegre repeatedly recommended that he undergo extracorporeal shockwave lithotripsy for the dissolution of his right kidney stone.
On February 23, 2011, Picar consulted Dr. Vicaldo who also diagnosed him to be suffering from Right Renal Calculus, Essential Hypertension. Dr. Vicaldo considered his illness as work aggravated/related and declared him unfit to resume work as a seafarer in any capacity.
Picar then filed a complaint for permanent disability compensation, balance of sick wages, reimbursement of medical expenses, moral and exemplary damages, and attorney’s fees.
The Labor Arbiter rendered judgment in favor of Picar. The LA found that his illness was work-related and that the nature of his work as a chief cook contributed to the aggravation of his condition.
On appeal, the NLRC affirmed in toto the decision of the LA. The NLRC ruled that Picar’s disability was permanent as he was totally unable to perform his job for more than 120 days from his repatriation.
Petitioners elevated the matter to the CA, while Picar moved for the execution of the LA decision. On July 3, 2012, the LA issued a Writ of Execution for the enforcement and full satisfaction of its decisions. Consequently, petitioners paid the judgment award as evidenced by the Satisfaction of Judgment pursuant to a Writ of Execution with Acknowledgment Receipt executed by the NLRC-NCR Sheriff on August 31, 2012. The CA, in its assailed decision, dated May 2, 2013, dismissed the petition. The CA, citing Career Philippines Ship Management, Inc. vs. Madjus, ruled that the payment by petitioners of the judgment award constituted an amicable settlement that had rendered the petition moot and academic.
ISSUE(S):
WON the petition for certiorari before the CA became moot and academic by the satisfaction of the judgment award
RULING:
No. The petition for certiorari before the CA was not rendered moot and academic by the petitioner’s satisfaction of the judgment award in compliance with the writ of execution rendered by the Labor Arbiter.
Petitioners were correct in contending that the settlement of the judgment award was by virtue of a writ of execution duly issued and was effected specifically without prejudice to further recourse before the CA. There was nothing voluntary about the satisfaction of the judgment award made in strict and compulsory compliance with Rule XI, Section 8 of the 2011 NLRC Rules of Procedure. The terms of the settlement were fair to both the employer and employee.
The case cited by the Court of Appeals, Career Philippines vs. Madjus, finds no application in the present case. In the said case, while petitioner employer had the luxury of having other remedies available to it such as its petition for certiorari pending before the CA and an eventual appeal to the SC, respondent seafarer could no longer pursue other claims, including interests that may accrue during the pendency of the case. Thus it was there held that the LA and the CA could not be faulted for interpreting petitioner’s “conditional settelement” to be tantamount to an amicable settlement of the case resulting in the mootness of the petition for certiorari.
payment of the judgment award without prejudice by petitioners required no obligations whatsoever on the part of Picar.
Petitioners satisfied the judgment award in strict compliance with the duly issued writ of execution and pursuant to terms fair to both parties. The equitable ruling in Career
Philippines vs. Madjus would certainly be unfair to petitioners in this case as they still
have a remedy under the rules. The CA, therefore, was in error in dismissing the petition for being moot and academic.
13 WATERFRONT CEBU CITY CASINO HOTEL Vs LEDESMA, G.R. No. 197556, March 25, 2015 FACTS:
Debrando Ledesma was employed as a House Detective at Waterfront. He was dismissed on the basis of the complaints filed before Waterfront by Christe Mandal, a supplier of a concessionaire of Waterfron, and Rosanna Lofranco, who was seeking a job at the same hotel. It was found, based on the affidavits and testimonies of Mandal and Lofranco during the administrative hearings conducted by Waterfront, that Ledesma kissed and mashed the breasts of Mandal inside the hotel’s elevator, and exhibited his penis and asked Lofranco to masturbate him at the conference room of the hotel.
On August 12, 2008, Ledesma filed a complaint for illegal dismissal.
The Labor Arbiter found that the allegations leveled against Ledesma are mere concoctions, and concluded that Ledesma was illegally dismissed. The LA ordered the Waterfront to reinstate him to his former position without loss of seniority right and with full backwages reckoned from the date of the suspension up to actual reinstatement. It further required the respondent to pay Ledesma his service incentive leave amounting to 3,910.50.
On appeal, the NLRC reversed the ruling of the LA and held that Ledesma’s act of sexual overtures to Christe Mandal and Rosanna Lofranco constituted grave misconduct justifying his dismissal from employment.
The NLRC denied Ledesma’s motion for reconsideration in a Resolution dated February 22, 2010. A copy of such Resolution was received by Atty. Abellana, Ledesma’s consel of record, on March 15, 2010.
On May 17, 2010, or 63 days after Atty. Abellana received a copy of the NLRC’s Resolution denying the motion for reconsideration, said counsel filed before the CA a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court.
On August 5, 2010, Ledesma, now assisted by a new counsel, filed a motion for leave to file amended petition, and sought the admission of his Amended Petition for Certiorari. In the amended petition, he contended that his receipt on March 24, 2010 (and not the receipt on March 15, 2010 by Atty. Abellana), is the reckoning date of the 60-day reglementary period within which to file the petition. Hence, Ledesma claims that the petition was timely filed on May 17, 2010.
ISSUE(S):
WON the petition for certiorari was timely filed with the Court of Appeals RULING:
the 60-day period is a ground for the outright dismissal of said petition.
Atty. Abellana, Ledesma’s counsel, admittedly received a copy of the NLRC Resolution denying the Motion for Reconsideration on March 15, 2010 while Ledesma received his copy on March 24, 2010. The last day to file his petition for certiorari is on May 14, 2010, a Friday. Ledesma therefore belatedly filed his petition on May 17, 2010. When a party to a suit appears by counsel, service of every judgment and all orders of the court must be sent to the counsel. This is so because notice to counsel is an effective notice to the client, while notice to the client and not his counsel is not notice in law. Receipt of notice by the counsel of record is the reckoning point of the reglementary period.
The negligence of Atty. Abellana in the computation of the 60-day period, and reckoning such period from the party’s receipt of the assailed resolution were similar arguments rejected in Labao vs. Flores. In the Labao case, the respondents meaintained that they should not suffer the negligence of their counsel in the late filing of their petition for certiorari, and the 60-day period be reckoned from their own notice of the NLRC’s denial of their MR. The Supreme Court, however, said that the general rule is: a client is bound by the acts, even mistakes, of his counsel in the realm of procedural technique.
With the expiration of the 60-day period to file a petition for certiorari, a review of the Resolution of the NLRC will be beyond the jurisdiction of any court. No longer assailable, the NLRC Resolution could not be altered or modified. In Labao vs. Flores, the Supreme Court has said that the NLRC’s resolution became final ten days after counsel’s receipt, and the respondents’ failure to file the petition within the required 60- day period rendered it impervious to any attack through a Rule 65 petition for certiorari. Thus, no court can exercise jurisdiction to review the resolution.
The relaxation of procedural rules may be allowed only when there are exceptional circumstances to justify the same. There should be an effort on the part of the party invoking liberality to advance a reasonable or meritorious explanation for his/her failiure to comply with the rules.
Both in his petition and amended petition, Ledesma never invoked the liberality of the CA nor endeavored to justify the belated filing of his petition. Absent valid and compelling reasons for the procedural lapse, the desired leniency cannot be accorded to him.
Assuming for a moment that the petition for certiorari was timely filed with the CA, said recourse should suffer the same fate of dismissal for lack of merit. Otherwise stated, there is no substantial justice that may be served here in disregarding the procedural flaw committed by Ledesma because the NLRC correctly found him guilty of misconduct or improper behavior in committing lascivious conduct and demanding sexual favors from Christe Mandal and Rosanna Lofranco.