LAS DOCE GRANDES JERARQUÍAS CREADORAS O DOCE SIGNOS ZODIACALES

The end result of the Sydney Convention of 1891 was a Draft Constitution which was intended to form the basis of public discussion and in particular of debate in the colonial parliaments. A feature of the comment aroused by the Draft Constitution was criticism of the provisions relating to the Governor-General.

It was noted, shortly after the Convention had dissolved, that exception was being taken to clauses referring to the Governor-General 'on the ground that they propose to confer

1. Con. Deb. Syd. 1891, pp 578-579. 2 . Ibid ., p . 580 .

“enormous" powers on Her Majesty's Representative'.^ Complaints of excessive powers were prominent in all

colonies. Some who expressed these fears belonged to the more radical, republican element in the community, whose

sniping at the institution 'Government House' was to remain a persistent feature of the following years but whose

strength was minimal. Others siezed upon the charge of an overpowerful Governor-General as a convenient ground of attack on either the idea of federation or the 1891 Draft

Constitution. However, there were others, neither republicans nor opponents of federation, who expressed fears of the

possible outcome if extreme powers were vested in the Governor-General.

One who felt that the Draft Constitution was

objectionable on these grounds was the Victorian Chief Justice, Higinbotham. He warned that the granting of

extensive powers to an officer who was 'subject exclusively to the control of the Imperial Government' would 'efface all

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semblance of self government'. Higinbotham's views were influenced by his long-standing distrust of the 'sinister and

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clandestine policy' of the colonial office. This suspicion was not resolved at least until his recommendations concerning

1. G.B. Barton, Draft Bill to Constitute the Commonwealth of Australia (Sydney, 1891), p. 15. Barton, a

barrister, Journalist and literary critic, was elder brother to Edmund Barton.

2. Higinbotham to Deakin, 4 April 1891. Deakin papers, MS 1540/2445. A.N.L. See too his letter to A.I. Clark,

8 March 1891 quoted in Bennett (ed.), The Making of The Commonwealth, pp. 160-161.

3. Higinbotham to Knutsford quoted in Morris, Higinbotham, p. 201, without indication of date.

the alterations of Governors' Instructions were implemented in 1892.

During discussions on the Draft Constitution which took place in the Victorian and Tasmanian parliaments the subject of the excessive powers of the Governor-General was raised but was successfully defended by supporters of federation. Deakin satisfied the Victorian Legislative Assembly that while the measure appeared 'to create a Governor-General who is almost despotic', clauses which vested control of

taxation and expenditure in the hands of Parliament would protect the Commonwealth from 'aggression or oppression of the Crown or its representatives'.'*' Similarly the Tasmanian House of Assembly accepted without demur its Attorney

General's assurance that the great power apparently entrusted 2 to the Governor-General was only a 'constitutional fiction'.

In South Australia the suggestion that the Representative of the Crown be elected was revived by Cockburn. But he was strongly opposed by his colleague Kingston, who by then had come to feel that such a proposal would be 'a standing menace to democracy'. In his view an Imperial official was

tolerable only so long as he 'confined himself to the discharge of duties properly appertaining to a social and

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ornamental figurehead and to a political dummy'. In the event this view prevailed, the majority in South Australia's Assembly preferring not to experiment with the election of a Governor-General.

1. V.P.D., 1891, p. 431.

2. Debate 3 September 1891 reported in Mercury 4 September 1891.

It was in New South Wales that the most vigorous attack was launched upon the provisions referring to the Governor-General in the Draft Constitution of 1891. For various reasons, including political and personal

jealousies, economic distress and a general lack of

interest among politicians, the matter was not debated in the Assembly until late 1892. Discussion even then was brief and unenthusiastic. However, in the general debate, clauses referring to the powers of the Governor-General were among the most fully discussed.

The attack upon these sections had been begun in New South Wales by George Reid, a capable politician at the start of a distinguished public career. In a speech to the electors of East Sydney during April 1891 he had examined the proposed Draft Constitution in detail and spelled out his attitude to the measure. The list of complaints was long and among them was an objection that there was no provision in the Bill requiring the Governor- General to act solely upon the advice of his Executive Council.^

Reid's criticism was the mild precursor of what became quite a widely voiced objection to the Draft Constitution in

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New South Wales. The Bulletin took up cudgels on the

1. S.M.H.,17 April 1891.

2. Reid was a Free Trader. For a Protectionist viewpoint see Archibald Forsyth, Australian National Federation on Democratic Lines (Sydney, 1891). This pamphlet offered various suggestions as to how the Draft Bill could be amended to counter objections to its

'Imperialistic and anti-Democratic spirit', under which heading he included the 'excessive and dangerous'

matter when G.B. Barton's annotated Draft Bill was

published.^- The journal argued that under the proposed constitution the position of Governor-General would be

'that of a despot, restrained only by public opinion'. Barton's reassurance that there would be constitutional checks upon his actions were decried as 'pamphleteering jargon' and 'deception'. The Bulletin assured its

readers that:

Over the decrees of the Governor-General, the personnel of the Federal Executive Council, and even the acts of the Ministers of State, the Parliament will have no control whatever.2

Having thus answered the question: how much influence would the Governor-General have after federation? the Bulletin proceeded to ask in whose interest would that

influence be exercised? It suggested that:

in the easily conceivable event of projects of vital importance to the Imperial authorities clashing with interests of equal importance to Australians, the iron hand would make itself

felt under the soft glove of superficial constitutional practice.

The warning was explicit. An Imperial officer would

represent Imperial interests to the detriment of Australia. There was some pertinence in the Bulletin's claim that Imperial and Australian interests might diverge and that the Governor-General was an officer charged with protecting the former rather than the latter. Opinion in Britain

recognized this. In April 1891, commenting upon Grey's attempt to make the office elective, The Times emphasized that if the colonies wished to remain within the British

1. See above p. 40.

Empire, they were required to admit within their Executive a direct mouthpiece of the central authority. An elected Governor-General would be unlikely to 'endeavour to

maintain the policy of the Confederation in harmony with that of the Empire'.^"

Most Australians in 1891 were prepared to acknowledge the right of the Imperial Government to a 'mouthpiece' within their Executive in return for the benefits provided by membership of the Empire. But in the New South Wales Assembly, when Edmund Barton finally introduced the Draft Constitution, during November 1892, several members objected

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