This proposition was greeted with general approval but no such clause was inserted. The Hobart Mercury deprecated the lost opportunity. It pointed out that the discussion left the Governor-General 'in precisely the same position as the Governors ... that is to say nobody knows what they can and
3 what they cannot d o '.
Despite this omission, Convention delegates clearly assumed that the Governor-General could exercise little authority independent of his Commonwealth Executive. This was revealed in discussion of a clause providing that, after
federation, all communications between State Governors and 4
the Crown should be through the Governor-General. The
argument centred on the division of responsibilities between State and Commonwealth Governments, rather than on the role
1. Con, Deb. Syd. 1891, p. 574. 2 . Ibid., p . 57 5 .
3. Mercury, 16 April 18 91.
of chief executive officer as channel of communication. Those wh o supported the retention of the clause did not intend that the Queen's R e p resentative in the C o m m o n w e a l t h should have any independent supervisory power over State Governors. It was regarded as self-evident that to give him control over the channel of communications wou l d allow such control to pass to his Executive Council.
The real divi s i o n r e vealed by this debate was between 'centralists' and 'p r o v i n c i a l i s t s '. D e akin and Parkes repr e s e n t e d those who, hoping for a strong C o m m o n w e a l t h Executive, w ished to provide that it have a single voice in m a t t e r s of external policy. Deakin, in particular,
argued that if the clause were omitted they w o u l d 'not only d e p rive the governo r - g e n e r a l of his influence, but ... will deprive the c o m monwealth of its influence'.^ For the other side Gillies, Douglas and Downer spoke of the danger of too extensive C o m m o n w e a l t h interference in State affairs. Adye Douglas, of Tasmania, expressed the v i e w that 'The states
should retain as m u c h power as possible, and surrender as 2
little as possible to the federal parliament'. W hen it came to a vote the clause was retained by a m a j o r i t y of only six, several delegates such as Griffith and Baker, otherwise strong champions of states rights, voting for the centralist, Deakinite, position. The decision was rev e r s e d in 1897 and the clause omitted from the Con s t i t u t i o n as it emerged in 1900. But the problem of the role of G o v e r n o r - G e n e r a l as
1. Con. Deb. S y d . 18 91, p. 857 . 2. I b i d ., p . 859 .
channel of communication between State Governors and the British Government was to remain a source of friction between 'provincialists' and 'centralists' well into the twentieth century.^
Debate on the provisions in the Draft Constitution concerning the Governor-General revealed some of the divisions in the colonial society of the 'nineties. The discussion on Grey's amendment regarding the appointment of the Queen's Representative showed the remnants of
earlier, albeit diminishing, republicanism ranged against the prevailing tide of Imperial patriotism. The debate on the question of channels of communication indicated a
deep-seated division which was to be a feature of the first ten years' operation of the Commonwealth and in some respects was to persist much longer. A further polarization of
opinion which was to persist long after federation concerned those who wanted to achieve the benefits of remaining within the Empire without expense and those who were prepared to be generous in their dealings with the Empire. The ground on which this conflict was fought was the provision of the Governor-General's salary.
Discussion about the salary to be paid to the Queen's 2
Representative was brief at the 1891 Convention, but sufficient to reveal disagreement over the nature of the
1. See below, pp. 114-119. Also D.I. Wright, Commonwealth and States, 1901-10. A Study of the Executive and
Administrative Relations of the Seven Governments of Australia in the First Decade of the Federal System,
unpublished Ph.D. thesis, Australian National University, Canberra, 1968.
office and the role His Excellency was expected to exercise. Munro felt that the sum specified in the clause framed by the drafting Committee, £10,000 was altogether inadequate. He thought that,
the gentleman to be appointed ought to be equal to the ... governor-general of India ... capable of being a cabinet minister in England.!
But other delegates disagreed. To Kingston they were erring on the side of 'excessive liberality'. Grey moved that the amount be reduced to £6,000. But again Kingston and Grey were in a minority. Most delegates agreed with Griffith
that by including the salary in the Constitution they would forestall 'persons ... constantly endeavouring to earn a
2
little cheap popularity by proposing reductions'. Grey's amendment was defeated without division and the clause remained unaltered, although it did not in fact solve the
3