Documento universitario

Another issue in the debate about technocracy in Latin America relates to the type of regime type and to a particular ideology, which, in the case of Latin America, would be neoliberal. It is argued that there is a certain affinity between technocracy and market capitalism, because both put emphasis on productive efficiency (Centeno, 1993). Technocrats have been related to the introduction of neoliberal reforms in the region, especially orthodox versions (Ross Schneider, 1998; Domínguez, 1997; Silva, 1997; Teichman, 2001; Huneeus, 1998; Silva, 2008).37

The term technopol is proposed to define a particular decision-maker who combines both expertise and political capacity and is related to the implementation of economic reforms in Latin America

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The relationship between technocrats and economic reforms was analyzed in the case of the Salinas de Gortari Administration in Mexico (Centeno, 1998). Policy change under his presidency was a technocratic revolution: it was directed by an elite committed to an exclusive policy paradigm based on the application of rational techniques (Centeno, 1998). With Salinas and De la Madrid, a new type of decision-maker arrived. In Mexico, técnicos and politicians are said to be different according to their career patterns (bureaucratic versus electoral experience), qualifications for entry (expertise versus loyal service to party), basis for legitimacy (professional administration versus continuation of revolutionary heritage) and ideology (technical versus political rationales). Geographical, generational and possible racial and class differences may also be reflected. Centeno distinguishes between four groups in the Mexican elite: técnicos, technocrats, political bureaucrats and politicians (each with different backgrounds, professional profiles and political functions). Politicians are the PRI dinosaurs, while political bureaucrats belong to the national office of the party but have no constituency. Técnicos are middle-class engineers and economists, who do not play dirty political games and are especially present in some institutions. A hybrid type is the technocrat, who combines the expertise of the técnico and the political influence of the politician. In the case of Mexico, they dominate large parts of the state.

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(Domínguez, 1997). This author defines technopols as highly technically trained, politically engaged public figures who have made “economics „political‟” and have made their political allies govern more effectively. He argues that these policymakers have made economic policies acceptable to the public at large in democratic or authoritarian settings. Domínguez (1997) argues that technocrats can operate in both democratic and authoritarian regimes, because they offer a methodology for understanding social problems that rests on a belief in the ability to arrive at the optimal answer to any problem. Their key criteria for action are realism and efficiency. These technopols are a variant on technocrats because they are technocrats, but they are also political leaders.38 Technocrats often come from bureaucracy while technopols are outsiders.

There is a match between technocrats and neoliberalism (Centeno, 1998). This author analyzes Hayek´s work as an example of one of the most constant lines of contemporary technocratic thought in the region: faith in markets and consumer distrust of democracy, as well as a distrust of the voters‟ choice. Hayek has three principles: there are superior forms of knowledge and higher truths than political debate will allow; the market is the best means to achieve knowledge and political and social conflict must not interfere with the market. Examples of the application of these principles are observed in Latin America. The technocratic mentality has an ambivalent relationship with democracy: it seeks to protect the population from its worst political instincts and, at the same time, trusts them to make the right economic choices.

A different perspective is maintained by Whitehead (1997), who argues that the delegation of political authority to experts is not only related to neoliberalism, nor is it a new phenomenon in Latin America. What is new is the fact that, with the economic crisis of the eighties, the type of experts present has changed (before they were intellectuals and generalists). Now reforms are inspired by economics and implemented by professional economists.

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(1) at or near the top of their country´s governmental and political life (including the opposition), who (2) go beyond their specialized expertise to draw on various different streams of knowledge and who (3) participate in the nation´s political life (4) for the purpose of affecting policies.

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The relationship between technocrats and authoritarianism is as an aspect also evidenced by Mauceri (1997) in the case of Fujimori‟s Peru and the introduction of neoliberal reforms. Mauceri (1997) argues that President Fujimori governed with two groups: the technocrats and an informal network of loyalists. The author sustains that the technocrats had a role in reforming state structure, especially privatization. They had a key role in bringing together the government, international financial institutions and the local private sector. Technocrats were found at all levels of Fujirmori´s government, from ministers to agency directors.

Technocrats are associated with unpopular reforms because they do not consider representation as a means to an end. Technocrats have few sources of independent support. There are four causal mechanisms for technocratic ascendancy: 1) modernization; 2) pluralism (technocrats as networks); 3) delegation (politicians delegate power to control uncertainty and 4) investor confidence. Economic crises gave power to neoliberal technocrats because Presidents designed technocrats in order to restore and maintain investors´ confidence (Ross Schneider, 1998)

The relation between technocracy and neoliberal reforms is also explained by the level of autonomy from the politics that technocrats have usually had (Silva, 1997; Loureiro, 1997; Montecinos, 1997; Centeno, 1997; Ross Schneider, 1997). This has been facilitated by the weakening of political parties by labor and student organizations, especially left wing ones.39

Dictatorships were a hard lesson to populist politics, because leaders realized that increasing, uncontrolled offerings and social demands could lead to an unmanageable situation that would bring back authoritarianism. As Silva (1997) says, this situation has provoked an increase in the number of leaders not related to politics. For some authors, like Silva (1997), there is a relationship between

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As Corrales (1997) exemplifies with the Carlos Andrés Pérez (1989 – 1993) administration in Venezuela, relations between technocrats and politicians are not always good. According to this author, the técnicos‟ initiative to foster economic market reforms was not well received by politicians. In a pro-reform cabinet, técnicos were worried about efficiency and politicians about how to reduce the political costs of those reforms. In the case of the AD, politicians were opposed to the reforms promoted by the técnicos and the AD became an opposition party.

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democracy and technocracy: less democracy implies more technocracy. Economic decision-making during dictatorships was isolated and democratization did not change technocratic decision-making in general in Latin America (Loureiro, 1997; Teichman, 2001).

A third argument that relates technocrats to neoliberal reforms is the greater visibility given to these decision-makers as a signal to the world that their financial and economic management is satisfactory. Technocrats have been transformed into the counterparts of international financial experts (Ross Schneider, 1998).

In other words, the ascendancy of the technocratic elite (decision makers with PhDs in economics) in policy decision-making is seen as a key ingredient for the successful implementation of market reform (Haggard and Webb, 1994; Haggard and Kauffman, 1995; Pastor and Wise, 1992; Teichman, 1997; Teichman, 2001).

As we will see later, in the case of Chile during the dictatorship, neoliberal reforms were introduced first (Huneeus, 1998; 2002). During the post-authoritarian democracy, technocrats in government coalitions maintained the same model, with extreme fiscal discipline and an increase in social spending.