Principios archivísticos:

In the previous section, we analyzed the stability of the Concertación cabinets from the perspective of change. In this section, we will do the opposite and analyze stability from the perspective of ministerial continuity.

We will use an analysis of the individual changes in ministers based on the idea that stability is achieved the more time ministers spend with each portfolio. As Huber and Martínez Gallardo (2004, 2008) maintain, less ministerial turnover implies more portfolio experience, which translates into more expertise in policy management and into relations with other cabinet members.

We have developed a Permanence Index (of portfolio experience), which was obtained by dividing the number of months each minister stayed in office by the total number of months each administration lasted. In this chapter, we will present an average for each administration. Afterwards, the measurement per minister for each administration will be presented. The above gives us a number between 0 and 1, which is the proportion of continuance by administration, with 0 being that they stayed less than one month and 1 being that they stayed for the duration of the administration.

If we compare the averages of the Permanence Index with those from pre-1973 administrations, there should be more permanence in the Concertación administrations than in pre- 1973 ones.

Table 13: Ministry Permanence Index (1938-1973)

President Number of Ministers Ministers‟ Permanence Index (Average %) Aguirre Cerda 43 0.16 Ríos 66 0.18 González Videla 87 0.13 Ibáñez 141 0.08 Alessandri R 49 0.25 Frei M 38 0.36 Allende 67 0.19 Aylwin 25 0.76

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Frei RT 49 0.39

Lagos 43 0.38

Bachelet * 45 0.48

Source: own elaboration

*The Bachelet administration is considered up to 12/31/2009: 46 months

The data from Table 14 shows that the average permanence in pre-1973 administrations is less than that in Concertación administrations.

In Table 14, we can see that the Aylwin administration was clearly outstanding, because it had an average ministers‟ continuance of 0.76 or, in other words, 76% of ministers on average stayed in their posts for the duration of the administration. In other words, the ministers stayed in office for an average of 36 (75%) of the 48 months that the Aylwin government lasted.

Some conclusions need to be drawn from our second dependent variable. First, in comparison to previous administrations, the data shows that the Concertación was more stable in terms of cabinet dynamics than previous administrations. Secondly, within the Concertación, the Aylwin administration was outstanding in terms of stability. Thirdly, ministers were more stable than undersecretaries.

d) Conclusions

To conclude, we would like to comment on the Concertación as a government coalition. As a result of the analysis of cabinets, some common characteristics of this coalition can be highlighted. Firstly, in comparison to previous administrations, the Concertación was more stable in terms of cabinet stability. Also, variation was observed within the four coalition administrations. The first Concertación government was outstanding in terms of stability.

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Secondly, the Concertación generally maintained the same party composition from 1989 onwards. Stability was also expressed in cabinet performance. Contrary to what is expected from a transitional administration, the Aylwin administration was outstanding, being the most stable administration. President Aylwin took extreme care when administering the government in a context of fear about the return of authoritarianism. This was a strategic decision, not foretold. Elsewhere, the divisions in the governing party led authoritarian parties to regain influence (e.g. the Domincan Republic from 1978-82).

Thirdly, power-sharing patterns are seen in the four Concertación administrations. Literature‟s expectations about proportionality were confirmed as a general rule, but with certain deviations. We found formateur party under-representation, small party bias and medium-sized party proportionality. The power sharing patterns demonstrated stability in the assignment of power within the Concertación administrations. The Christian Democrats went from being under-represented to being over- represented. This demonstrates the special care taken to preserve the role of the PDC, traditionally the biggest party, within this coalition.

This chapter presented a general quantitative and qualititative picture of the Concertación government administrations. Our data give us the “big picture”. This has allowed us to understand how this coalition, formed by former political enemies, governed together. It is not obvious that these parties and its leaders should have successfully governed during all these years.

This research deals with the question of why the Concertación has become one of the most successful government coalitions in Chilean history. The most common explanations are related mainly to external factors: the transitional context and, fundamentally, a change in the rules of the game, like the constitution and the binominal electoral system. In other words, the explanations are centered on historical and institutional arguments and not on a single actor‟s strategic interaction. Although some have reinforced the government developed by the Concertación administrations, they

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have not carried out a more thorough analysis of coalition dynamics, nor extended it to the four Concertación administrations.

This dissertation examines the complementary arguments related, firstly, to the need to maintain coalition and government governability, as opposed to the UP experience and, secondly, to use technocrats politically with the purpose of combining both technical and political expertise. An unwillingness to repeat Allende‟s UP experience of government instability made political coalition leaders develop several informal rules that favored coalition governability by enhancing power sharing arrangements and inter-party checks, translating into a capacity to administer power efficiently (Siavelis, 2006). To these informal rules oriented towards increasing government coalition cooperation, we add a new balance in the relationship between the Executive, the President and the coalition parties, in which the former won the the autonomy to appoint cabinet members and develop policies in relation to the latter. What is most important is that this new relationship did not lead to a rupture, since parties continued, at least formally, to control government posts, one of the most important rewards in government coalitions. Also, the political use of technocrats by the Concertación allowed for proper economic and financial administration, without breaking with political control of these appointments because these technocrats belonged to these same parties. The Concertación‟s success seems to be based on a balance of political and technocratical expertise and not on technocratical management of state affairs.

Now we will analyze the four administrations individually, starting with the Aylwin administration.

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