Lister in 2004 reports that even in those districts which remained under the administration of Region 4 after 1994, when the Borana were squeezed out, the Gabra Miigoo were generally well-treated by the EPRDF. This occurred in order to create a counter-force to the Borana, and they benefited with an increased number of political positions. In 2004, the Gabra Miigoo were still representing the Borana in the House of People‟s Representatives (the Federal Parliament) from Yabelo constituency, and members of other urban minorities of mixed ethnic background were empowered at the zonal level.
From 1992 to 2002, the Somali and Garri politicians managed to penetrate into the Oromo territory by exploiting a better relation with the federal government, gaining external support for the new settlements and managing trans-boundary migration306.
In 1992, the regions were re-organized to fit the ethnic federalism of the Transitional Chart. Oromia (Region 4) and Somali (Region 5) regional States where created, subdivided into zones and administrative districts (woreda). Borana Province, with the exclusion of Dolo district inhabited by the Digodia and other Somali speaking minorities, was changed into Borana Zone, with the addition of Jamjam Province, a highland in the north inhabited by the
305 Quoted by Pallottino, 2007.
306 Bassi M., Enhancing equity in the relationship between protected areas and local communities in the context of global change - Horn of Africa and Kenya, Synthesis of lessons learned, Consultancy paper, 2003.
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agro-pastoral Guji-Oromo. The administrative centre was set in Nagele Borana town, which had previously served as the centre of Borana province. The Borana and Guji inhabited districts of Areero Province were also incorporated under the Borana Zone, that was thus subdivided into 12 administrative districts: Adola, Oddo Shakkisoo, Uraga, Bore, Hagaramaram, Galana Abaya, mainly inhabited by the Guji-Oromo, and Arero, Liban, Dire, Taltalle, Yaballoo, Moyale, mainly inhabited by the Borana.
The Somali National Regional State (Region 5) was divided into nine administrative zones, but the formalisation of the internal demarcation was slow, especially along the border with Oromia. The south-western corner was called Liban zone, bordering Kenya to the south, Afder zone to the east and Oromia region to the north and west, but it was not clearly demarcated. In 1994, a territorial dispute arose between Region 4 and Region 5. A declaration was emanated by which eight kebele from Liban district of Region 4 were transferred to the Liban zone of Region 5. As a result, they formed Filtu district in addition to Dolo woreda. Despite being just a small rural village, Filtu obtained the de-facto status of a zonal administrative centre. The zonal authorities formed their own militia that, according to local sources, was used to further push their territorial claim in the Liban district of Region 4. The conflict between the Borana and the Digodia was intense from 1997 to 2001, particularly in Qorati and Hadhessa kebele307.
From 1992 to 1994 the OALF leadership shifted to a Somali identity. By formal decision of the Transitional Government of Ethiopia, 11 kebele of Moyale woreda were annexed to Region 5. These include the crucial tulaa wells and surrounding rangelands of El Leh and El Gof. Seventeen kebele, including the entire town of Moyale, were instead entrusted to the administration of Region 4. Region 5 obtained the administration of the key pastoral area of Hudet, removed from Arero woreda of Region 4. By 1994 the administrative configuration of Liban Zone (Region 5) was thus emerging as divided into three woreda of Filtu, Dolo and Moyale. The entire Liban zone of (Region 5) was divided into the three woreda of Filtu, Dolo and Moyale. The entire Liiban Zone of Region 5 was therefore curved out of the customary territory of the Borana-Oromo. Out of the three woreda of the newly established Zone, Dolo was the only one no longer used by the Borana herders.
Moyale town was formally under Region 4, but de facto divided into two, serving as administrative centres for both the Moyale woreda of Borana zone (Region 4) and the Moyale woreda of Liban zone (Region 5). Several kebele legally under Region 4 were either
307
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controlled by the militia of Region 5 or under the facto double administration. The people from both sides living in these kebele were either displaced by conflict or suffered serious abuse and were later forced to leave308.
During the federal and regional elections of 1995, the Borana were excluded from institutional politics and therefore lost important seasonal rangelands in Liban and crucial market-oriented permanent water and pasture resources in Dire. The Digodia and the Garri fully re-aligned themselves with the Somali People Democratic Party (SPDP). It was highly coordinated with the EPRDF, standing in opposition to the secessionist political organisations of Region 5, since 1994. They obtained most political positions both at woreda level in Dolo and Filtu, and at zonal level in Filtu (Region 5). The Garri and their customary leaders obtained full control of Moyale district of Region 5, and representation in the House of People‟s Representatives.
In 1998, the pastoral component of the Maareexan gave up the Somali territorial claim in Liban of Region 4, and recognized the Borana traditional system of resource management. The returned Gabra Miigoo retained their Oromo identity and aligned with the OPDO, the Oromo branch of the EPRDF. The Gabra pastoralists slowly re-built their relations with the Borana pastoralists by revitalizing their customary leadership and yaa’a.
The Office of the Prime Minister dealt with the border issue between Region 4 and Region 5 until June 2000, when it was presented to the House of People‟s Representatives in accordance with article 48 of the Ethiopian Constitution. A total of 770 kebele were still contested, 615 claimed by Region 5 and 155 by Region 4. The House of People‟s Representatives nominated a Committee of nine members to collect documentation and to discuss the contending of regional states with the administrators, but a decision was not reached. The issue was re-addressed to the two regions for a consensual solution. This new attempt was coordinated by the Ministry of Federal Affairs309.
In 2002 Borana Zone and Guji Zone were created, with Yabelo Borana and Nagele respectively as administrative centres. The districts of Arero, Dire, Taltale, Yabelo, Moyale, mainly inhabited by the Borana, and Hagaramaram, Galaana, prevalently inhabited by the Guji, were included under the Borana Zone, while Adoola, Oddo Shakkisoo, Uragaa, Booree formed the Guji Zone.
308
Bassi M., Enhancing equity in the relationship between protected areas and local communities in the context of global change - Horn of Africa and Kenya, Synthesis of lessons learned, Consultancy paper, 2003.
309 Pallottino Massimo, The Interplay of Power and Knowledge in Planned Social Change; From Policy Making to Project Planning: a Case from Southern Ethiopia, Université de Geneve, Institut universitaire d'etudes du developpement, Thesis No. 19, March 2007.
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During those years, in the target areas, more and more land in the wetter areas, especially in town outskirts and bottom valleys, was allocated for farming by the local administrators and by the leaders of the kebele. The main beneficiaries of this process were urban minorities or a few individuals affiliated with the OPDO and SPDP310. Under this double external and internal pressure on water and grazing resources, the pastoral system became more and more enviable, exacerbating the state of permanent dependency on food distribution311.
In 2002, Clapham defined the new politics of space in Ethiopia as the macro-process of demarcation of regions and other administrative boundaries, locally perceived sometimes as exclusive ethnic spaces312.
In August 2004 a political solution was found for 287 kebele. Among the 484 pending kebele, 150 were claimed by Region 4 and 334 by Region 5. The contention between the two regions was again presented to the House of People‟s Representatives; they decided to hold a referendum (September 2004) and formed the electoral board and the regional sub-permanent committees. The aim of the referendum was to attribute the contested kebele. The idea of the referendum was not evaluated fairly by all parties, especially considering the remarkable increase in population due to the massive inflow of returnees313.
After a more thorough screening, the councils of the two regions agreed to reduce the number of disputed kebele to 463. The pre-conditions for the referendum were agreed upon, including the disarmament of militia, the termination of identity card distribution and resettlement, and the construction of new buildings for new settlers. A national committee was established for the implementation, with members from the Ministry of Federal Affairs, regions, zones and districts. The responsibility for the ballot was entrusted to the national electoral board. In October 2004, the House of People‟s Representatives approved the report by the national electoral board. On a national scale, the registration of voters was halted in 39 kebele and the ballot was successfully completed in the remaining 424. In two of them, the ballot was declared illegal due to procedural problems. 323 kebele were assigned to Region 4 and 99 to Region 5 314.
The referendum was interpreted by most Oromo as a legitimating and consolidating instrument of the demographic situation achieved in the precedent years. Two factors may
310 Getachew Kassa, An Overview of Government Policy Interventions in Pastoral Areas: Achievements, Constraints and Prospects, in National Conference on Pastoral Development in Ethiopia, Proceedings of the conference, Wabi Shebelle Hotel, Organised by the Pastoralist Forum Ethiopia, Addis Ababa, February 2000
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Gufu Oba describes the negative impact on the pastoral system of the Borana (1998).
312 Quoted by Pallottino, 2007.
313 Lister Sarah, The processes and dynamics of pastoralist representation in Ethiopia, IDS Working Paper 220,
March 2004.
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have contributed to the promulgation of unfair regulations for the referendum and the inherent decision-making having no provision for the return of the Oromo displaced persons and showing a stronger influence of the Somali in the bilateral regional negotiations. The first is the political under-representation of the Oromo-Borana at all administrative levels. The Borana systematically complained that they were represented by people having no true knowledge of the local reality, and scarcely motivated. The second is the leading role of the Ministry of Federal Affairs in all the negotiations and committees. This institution during the program of support to good governance in the peripheral pastoral regional states lacked the necessary experience, including the Somali regional state but excluding Oromia315. Extremely violent and protracted episodes of ethnic cleansing took place after the ballot in several localities on the remaining portions of the border, reported both in national and international media.