Once again an opportunity for coming to an under
standing with the Rational Party was missed. The proposals could have become a basis for a settlement, but L y t t o n ’s obstinate refusal to contemplate the restoration of
Y a ’qub was a stumbling block. Followers of the Rational Party resisted the advance of G-eneral Stewart who had left Kandahar on 1 April for Kabul. Two bloody engage
ments were fought between the forces of the Rational Party and those of the G-eneral - one in Mushaki (about 23 miles
to the south of Ghazni), the other in Char Assia (near Kabul). Wi t h the ultimate victory of the
34 Afghan elders to Griffin, undated, PSLI, 25, 509- 35 KD, ... PSLI, 25, 325*
British forces, two Barakzay leaders of the National Party lent their support to the British, naively hoping this would help towards the restoration of Y a ’qub.
On 24 April, when Ghazni fell to General Stewart, Sardar Mohammad 'Alam accepted the temporary governorship of that city.
D u ring this period, 'Abd al-Rahman tried to consolidate his position in Turkistan and extend his influence in the country, especially in the province of Kabul, In Kabul, the main centre of his attention was Kohistan, where he had many followers. In his letters to the elders and his relations, ’Abd al-Rahman, with remarkable skill, appealed to the hopes of the militant anti-British Afghans as well as to the British, Basically, his liters were not anti-British, but they were equally not meant to disregard the anti-British feelings in the country. In fact ’Abd al-Rahman kept in wi t h both sides, the one expecting a peaceful settlement and the other leadership against the British.
’Abd al-Rahman called on the Kohistanis to be ready to fight for their faith and country and announced that he was moving on Kabul. He advised Mulla Mushk-i-*Alam and others to await his arrival and to attack the line of communications rather than Sherpur , the headquarters of the British forces at Kabul. To his relations in
Kabul, where his letters were most likely to be intercepted,
’Abd al-“Rahman wrote that "...affairs in Afghanistan had fallen into confusion owing to "bad management and
• 2 7
breaking faith with Powerful State....'1 or "I hope when I have talked the matter over with the English
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Government, they w i l l . ... .be pleased to withdraw. .
Among the people, the immediate response was one of expectation and excitement. They looked on ’Abd al-Rahman as the long-awaited leader. The Charikaris expressed
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their willingness to join ’Abd al-Rahman. Mir Bacha started arming soldiers for hi m and Ghulam Haydar C h a r k h i , a leader of the national Party, joined him in Kataghan. Only General Mohammad Jan Wardak came out against him, warning the British officials that ” ...Abdur Rahman and the sons of Azim / Mohammad Ishaq and his brothers^/" are sent by R u s s i a . ^
The Kabul sardars were disturbed. Mohammad Hashim entered into closer communication with the Mustaufi, and with the liberal use of his money tried to win over the Rational Party.
Griffin was alarmed. Since Kabul is, strategically, at the mercy of Kohistan, Griffin believed that a general rising' of the Kohistanis would prove formidable. He
wrote, ’’The principal danger to be feared is that...
37 Griffin to Foreign (T) ... PSLI, 25? 696.
38 ’Abd al-Rahman to Sardar Fakir Mohammad, 23 Mar 1880, PSLI, 25? 253.
39 Lytton to Cranbrook (T), 9 Apr 1880, PSLI, 25, 99. 40 Mohammad Jan Wardak to Bawab Ghulam Husayn (Assistant
the Sardar may prefer to trust a general rising, unite his forces with those of the Ghazni party, who might he induced to join him, and endeavour to become Amir of Afghanistan without the assistance of the English whom he knows to be anxious to leave the country.” ^ - The
picture looked still gloomier to Griffin when an erroneous report reached him that 1Abd al-Rahman had made an
alliance with Ayub. As will be discussed later, Griffin’s alarm was premature.
Lo n g before ’Abd al-Rahman had stirred up the people, Lytton had thought of him as Amir for Kabul, mainly
because bo t h were opposed to the family of the late Amir Sher ’Ali. W i t h the offer of Kabul to the hitherto
fugitive ’Abd al-Rahman, Lytton hoped he would make ’Abd al-Rahman so grateful that he would easily accept his ’’new order” . It did not prove difficult for Lytton to obtain approval of his choice from London, with the one qualification that ’Abd al-Rahman was .acceptable to the country, and he would be contented with northern
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Afghanistan.” However, before that Cranbrook asked Lytton, ”But where is he, and how do you propose to know his wishes?”^ Lytton had already instructed his
officials in Afghanistan to find out the whereabouts and wishes of the Sardar.
While the Sardar was in exile, his mother lived in
41 Griffin to Stewart, 8 Apr 1880, PSLI, 25, 247• 42 PNEA, 151.
Kandahar and his sister in Kabul. They were contacted by the B r i t i s h officials, probably in early February.
In a letter to *Abd al-Rahman, his sister wrote "Twice the E nglish had asked me about you. They enquired whether
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y o u were disposed to be friendly with them." Sayyed Grhous al-Din, a nazir of the family of *Abd al-Rahman,
had a similar letter. "The English are exceedingly anxious 45 for your friendship. They constantly ask me about you."
On March 3, 1880, * Abd a l - R ahmanfs mother, who was interested in public affairs, was able to inform General Stewart in
Kandahar that *Abd al-Rahman had rejected A y u b ’s invitation for a joint march on Kabul because "... he had no intention
AC.
of acting against the English,..." Lytton considered these letters v e r y important and wrote to Griffin about them, before the latter had set out for Kabul, that they may have "... the most important practical bearing on the early solution of the very difficult problem you are about
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