The insurgent leaders were also active in the field of diplomacy by trying to create an atmosphere of good-will between themselves and the British Government. They,
including a few Hazara elders, wrote to the Queen, 11 If ever at any time you proposed to improve and cherish the distressed people of Afghanistan, pray do not throw away
90 rm •
this opportunity but come to our aid.” This vague approach had been interpreted, in some publications of the Government of India, as though the Ghilzay elders
91
wished to place their country under the British. It is more probable that the insurgent elders simply hoped that the British Government would not side with the Amir and that they might be able to flee to the adjoining British territories in the event of their failure.
87 General Ghulam Haydar Orakzay to Amir, KD, 13 Ma y 1887, PSLI, 50, 630.
88 PD, 7 Dec 1886, BSI,I,- '.49, 113- 89 KD, 22 July 1887, PSLI, 50, 1673. 90 MM, Apr 1887, PSLI, 50, 221.
The Government of India did not answer the letter, but it did take the issue up with the Amir. The Amir had earlier intensified a ,jehad movement, by warning his
subjects that threats to their country and religion was imminent, from the infidels. In one of his recent
publications, the Targhib al-Jehad (The Encouragement of Jehad), he had ^iven out that it was the intention of the infidels to occupy their country a third time - an
obvious reference to the British who had invaded Afghan istan twice in the past. The Viceroy pointed out to the
Amir by stating that ” ...in this you are merely endeavouring to divert to your neighbours the animosity which has
apparently come to exist amongst a portion of your subjects
L
Ghilzays^/ towards your own person.’* ^ But to avoid complications, the Viceroy assured him that the objectof the policy of the British Government was ” ...to maintain a powerful, independent and united Afghanistan under a
ruler capable of enforcing peace and order within his own territories, of conciliating the good-will and confidence of his people, and of showing a formidable front to an
93
invading foe.” Dufferin implied that the formation of such a ’’formidable front” in Afghanistan against ”an invading foe” - a phrase which presumably referred to Russia - was difficult to envisage when the power of the Ghilzays, the bravest of the Pashtuns, was broken up into insignificance. Subsequently the Viceroy again addressed the Amir directly on the subject of the Ghilzays, advising
92 Marquis of Dufferin to Amir, 20 July 1887, PSLI, 5 0, 1420, 93 Ibid.
him f,to come to some amicable understanding wi t h the
94.
insurgent Ghilzals'1. At the same time, he offered the Amir arms and ammunition worth twenty lakhs of rupees
as a gift, nevertheless, the Amir suspected the British of helping the Ghilzays. In his private darbar he was reported to have remarked, f,The English should not think that they would reign over Afghanistan. They should be grateful and thankful to me that I sent them back safe
q*5
from this country.” Only when the rising had almost
been suppressed, did the Amir assure the Viceroy that his treatment towards the Ghilzays in the future would be more lenient.
/
In peace-time, the Ghilzay elders (khan, malik, m u s h r ),
0 7
unlike the Durrani elders, were not all-powerful. They exercised only limited authority over the nearest sections of their tribe. The Ghilzay tribe, as a whole, was broken up into small independent groups. But in a state of
emergency such as a war, this was altered. A mong the Sulaiman K h e l , chelwashtees (fighting forces?), commanded by an able person who was given wide power and the title
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of Mir, were organised. During the campaign, each clan of the Ghilzays elected leaders, presumably in the above manner. We read that even a certain Mohammad A kram Hazara
a 99
also led the ,Andars in the 6'ampaign.
94 Marquis of Dufferin to Amir, 15 Sept 1887, PSLI, 5 1, 547. 95 KD, 5 Apr 1887, PSLI, 5 0, 269.
96 Amir to Marquis of Dufferin, 4 Oct 1887, PSLI, 5 1, 769. 97 Elphinstone, 2, 151.
98 Ibid, 2, 154.
The engagements between the A m i r ’ s army and the
insurgents were too many to describe. Only a description of the major ones, with decisive effects, will be attempted here. In the spring, the insurrection was resumed. The
total number of the insurgents was reported to have risen from 20,000 in M a r c h ^ ^ to about 100,000 in April.
Qalat fell to them. Mull a Karim and other leaders who had arrived from Kakaristan surprised and killed from ten to
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twenty of the A m i r ’s troops every night. Ghulam Haydar Orakzay was ordered to advance on Qalat from
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Muqur, but he was unable to do so. Finding his direct advance checked, the General retreated and joined the shaken force under his father on the border of the Maruf district (about 90 miles to the east of Kandahar in the Hotakay country). There, his father had already opened
a front. But since he was old and feeble and the khassadars under him were untrustworthy, his activities were rather a mixture of treachery, conciliation and indecisive engagements. He had already been defeated by the Hotakays under Mohammad
Shah who had taken position at Ataghar, an inaccessible location surrounded on all sides by hills.
The morale of the combined forces of the Amir improved with the arrival of a Durrani levy and the
despatch of abundant provisions from Kandahar, At Ataghar, these combined forces inflicted the first major defeat
100 MM, M ar 1887, PSLI, 49, 1281. 101 ED, 7 Apr 1887, PSLI, 50, 243- 102 KD, 5 Apr 1887, PSLI, 50, 268.
103 Ghulam Haydar Orakzay to Amir, KD, 15 Apr 1887, PSLI, 50, 281.
105