4 EL CONFLICTO CON LA IGLESIA.

In this section, the planning and decision-making concerning the start-up of UNMIL are analysed. This planning was under a tight constraint of time-pressure, as the take-over from ECOMIL was set to October 1, 2003.

At the overall strategic level, the planning of UNMIL was designed in accordance with recommendations made by the Brahimi report, which outlines the UN integrated mission peacekeeping concept (Durch et al 2003:47). This entailed the set-up of an integrated mission task force (IMTF) that would enable broad inputs from the competencies of the UN system. The IMTF consist of several UN departments that jointly plan the aspects of the mission. However, there were too many representatives involved, which meant that the IMTF quickly became a briefing format instead of a truly integrated planning body (Durch et al 2003:48). Traditional ways of planning and decision-making where heavily relied upon, with the department of peacekeeping operation (DPKO) taking the lead in planning, as this is the standard channel of planning and decision-making under the authority of the secretary general (Hull 2008:25).

The IMTF was replaced by a Liberia working group to reduce the number of participants, and this group proved more effective at working out differences between police and military functions (Durch et al 2003:48). However, it was still mostly an aide to the DPKO, and the group failed at drafting a joint integrated strategy for Liberia (Hull 2008:26). The strategic planning lacked integration, and DPKO took their perspectives on what was needed for other UN agencies. Also, communication horizontally and vertically (to the UN country team, UNCT, in Liberia) was flawed (Eide et al 2005:22-23). This resulted in a heavy reliance on DPKO and that other departments of the UN had to conform to their “security first” agenda (Campell & Kaspersen 2008:474). UNMIL initiated the operation from the planning without an integrated strategic framework, which meant that common views of objectives and vision for the mission was lacking.

Previous experiences and SOP’s where heavily relied upon in the planning process, hampering integration and resulting in a lack of a shared strategic framework.

The assessment missions carried out before the deployment, compensated for a lack of ground awareness and enabled swift deployment, alleviated these flaws to some extent. The assessment missions were much more integrated in their design and execution. Liaison officers were used in contact with the ECOMIL presence on the ground, and several UN departments along with troop contributing countries participated in the assessment missions. Contacts were also established with the rebel factions to guarantee access (Fiawosime in Fiawosime and Bah 2005:173-174). This also resulted in the establishment of an advance UN headquarters that the UN ran in collaboration with regional staff until the larger UNMIL force was deployed (Aboagye & Bah in Fiawosime and Bah 2005:101- 102). The logistics branch was also deployed.

As a result of the inputs from the liason officers and the establishment of logistics and advance headquarters, this enabled the UNMIL to deploy rapidly. Needs assessment: an evolving transitional strategic framework

As the deployment of UNMIL was underway, the lack of a strategic framework became evident. To remedy this, the UN set up a Joint Needs Assessment in collaboration with the World Bank, to set up a strategic framework for the

transition to durable peace (UNDG Liberia 2006:3). This planning was an integrated effort with technical assessment groups and a coordinating body in Liberia. Many stakeholders were involved, including the Liberian transition government (NTGL). This planning process resulted in a results focused transition framework (RFTF), which outlined priorities in clusters with attached costs (UNDG Liberia 2006:3-4). An attempt were also made to incorporate the Humanitarian appeals framework driven by the Office for Coordination of Humanitarian Activities (OCHA), but was eventually kept as needs outside of the RFTF.

Although the effort was integrated and included a commendable width in stakeholders, UNMIL, due to engagement with deployment, did not participate to a larger extent. There was no linkage to the assessment missions, which would have been useful since access outside the capital Monrovia was heavily constrained. There was also no link to other strategic plans such as the UN development assistance framework or the long-term strategy of the NTGL (UNDG Liberia 2006:5). This made some of the objectives in the clusters overly optimistic. As a strategic framework it was a good attempt, but lacked considerations of root causes of conflict and the weak ability of the state institutions as implementers. As a strategic framework must consider root causes and have a centre of gravity on which the resolution of the conflict relies to make all other efforts possible (Eide et al 2005:19), the RFTF did not manage to provide the strategic overview for the transition period.

But the assessment was an important coordinated appeal for funds based on needs identified on the ground.

Rehabilitating the ex-combatants

A Disarmament, Demobilisation, Rehabilitation and Reintegration (DDRR) programme was identified as a key ingredient in the transition to peace. The planning was hallmarked by a broad engagement of UN, NGO, donors and local actors, and resulted in an action plan. The structure set up by this plan was under the leadership of a national commission for DDRR (NCDDRR), which gave policy to the Joint Implementation Unit (JIU). The JIU was the hub of the DDRR programme structure, supported by a technical committee (UNDP 2004:12). The plan covered the DDRR process, but was biased towards the DD part without much attention given to rehabilitation and reintegration. This was to be able to jump-start the programme in December 2003 (UNDP 2004:46-47). Although the plan lacked sufficient coverage of the RR component, the structure outlined was integrated and contained many implementing agencies, covering areas as administration, medical care, security and demobilisation, enabling the programme to handle the DDRR in a comprehensive way. The DDRR programme is thus an example a heavily integrated field.

In the next section, the implementation of the deployment and startup of the DDRR programme is analysed, along with the results of the needs assessment.