EL CRECIMIENTO ECONÓMICO Y ESTABILIDAD MACROECONÓMICA CON

The first shots that led to the complete Soviet occupation of Poland were actually fired in the Ardennes Forest, 800 kilometers to the west of the Vistula River. On 16 December 1944, Hitler launched a major offensive in the Ardennes region, committing most of his available mechanized forces in an effort to knock the Western Allies out of Europe before the next Soviet blow fell in the East. General Hasso von Manteuffel's Fifth Panzer Army and SS General Sepp Dietrich's Sixth SS Panzer Army, supported on the flanks by two infantry armies, attempted to rush through the region and seize the Meuse River bridges, dividing the Allied front. In weeks of desperate fighting, the German offensive fell short of its goal, halted by a combination of skillful armored maneuvers, stubbornly held road junctions, and, when the skies cleared, overwhelming Allied tactical air power.

In the crisis of the Bulge, the Western governments asked Stalin to take the pressure off them by resuming the offensive. Ultimately, as will be described, Stalin responded by launching his next major offensive eight days ahead of schedule. This episode only reinforced the Soviets' belief that they were carrying the brunt of battle in the war. It is worth noting, however, that the growing concentration of German mechanized forces and logistical support in the West made the Soviet task in the East far easier than it would otherwise have been.

Similarly, continued Soviet operations in Hungary had the desired effect of drawing off German forces from Poland. In late December 1944, Marshal R. la. Malinovsky's 2d Ukrainian Front and Marshal F. I. Tol-bukhin's 3d Ukrainian Front had renewed their offensive, penetrated the imposing German Margareithe defenses located between Lake Balaton and the southern outskirts of the capital, and encircled three SS divisions, 13th Panzer Division, and numerous Hungarian units in the city itself. The task of capturing the city was no mean task, and initial Soviet attacks into Budapest itself

vividly demonstrated that seizure of the city would require considerable time and effort.

To do so Malinovsky created an ad hoc group consisting of three rifle corps of 46th Army (23d, 10th Guards, and 37th Guards) to reduce Buda, and 18th Separate Guards Rifle Corps, 7th Rumanian Corps, and 30th Rifle Corps from 7th Guards Army to seize Pest.1 _{This loose organization under dual army command made little progress in the last days}

of December. The veterans of city fighting at Stalingrad were few and far between in the Red Army of 1944, and the Germans did their usual systematic job of organizing a defense. Moreover, the commitment of large forces to reduce German defenses in the city weakened the Soviet outer encirclement line 40 kilometers west of Buda and provided an opportunity for the Germans to mount a relief effort for their beleaguered garrison.

On Christmas Day, Hitler responded to the southern threat and attempted to exploit the relief opportunity by directing the redeployment of IV SS Panzer Corps from the area north of Warsaw to Hungary.2 _{Two full-strength SS panzer}

divisions (Totenkopf and Viking) detrained northwest of Budapest and launched a surprise night attack on New Year's Day, hitting the 4th Guards Army of Tolbukhin's/ronf on its vulnerable western flank just south of the Danube River. The violent attack, which nearly destroyed the Soviet 18th Tank Corps, finally ground to a halt only 20 kilometers west of Budapest, blocked by redeployed reserves from both 46th and 4th Guards Armies. On 6 January, a Stau/ca-

directed counterattack by Colonel General A. G. Kravchenko's 6th Guards Tank Army and Colonel General M. S. file:///C|/Downloads/1109/WTC.htm (142 of 191) [3/10/2007 4:38:43 PM]

Shumilov's 7th Guards Army jumped off north of the Danube in an effort to encircle the attackers but made little headway. A second German attack was launched by III Panzer Corps north of Szekesfehervar on 7 January. Designed to take advantage of IV SS Panzer Corps' success to the north, it was halted by Soviet 4th Guards Army forces with only limited gains. This assault, however, demonstrated that Soviet defenses southwest of Budapest were relatively weak and perhaps could be crumbled by a larger German force.

The German tactical commanders now showed flashes of their old brilliance. After conducting one more lunge towards Budapest from the northwest (from 10-12 January), which again alarmed the Soviets and drew more forces to the region, SS General Herbert Gille suddenly disengaged his IV SS Panzer Corps late on 12 January, redeployed them to the Szekesfehervar area, and launched a renewed attack eastward with III Panzer Corps on 18 January. By good fortune, the Germans struck 135th Rifle Corps on 4th Guards Army's weakened left flank at a time when all its supporting tanks and self-propelled guns had been withdrawn for maintenance and refitting. Within two days, Gille had brushed aside four Soviet corps and reached the Danube River. He then turned northward, striking back toward Budapest from the Soviet rear. By 24 January, the SS panzers were within 25 kilometers of the southern suburbs of Budapest. However, Hitler would not allow the city garrison to break out, insisting that the attackers relieve the siege. This, plus Malinovsky's rapid shifting of large forces (18th and 23d Tank, 1st Guards Mechanized, 5th Guards Cavalry, and 30th and 133d Rifle Corps) into blocking positions south of the city, gradually absorbed the shock of the German attack. After a final German attempt to drive through to the city, German forces began withdrawing to their initial positions on 27 January.3

Meanwhile, Soviet troops continued to inch forward into the city of Pest. On 10 January, the Stavka urged Malinovsky to establish more centralized control over the three corps involved, and the next day Malinovsky formally appointed Major General I. M. Afonin, commander of 18th Guards Rifle Corps, to head the Budapest Operational Group. Afonin launched an attack to split Pest in two, reaching the Danube River by 14 January. In a world of snow and mist, Soviet assault squads and German defenders fought out a deadly battle, block by block. As the defenders ran short of fuel and ammunition, their tanks and other heavy weapons gradually fell silent. On 12 January, the attackers seized the racetrack that had served as the last emergency landing strip for JU-52 resupply aircraft. By 17 January, the remaining German defenders fell back to the river, only to find that the Soviets had used the sewers to reach the bank ahead of them. At least half of IX SS Mountain Corps ceased to exist. More than 36,000 Germans had died and 63,000 had surrendered by 18 January. The misery of the remaining German defenders would continue west of the river, in Buda.4

At this point, the Stavka gave Malinovsky's 2d Ukrainian Front the task of clearing the western (Buda) bank of the river, leaving Tolbukhin's 3d Ukrainian Front to defend the outer encirclement against continuing German relief efforts. When Afonin was wounded in close-in fighting on 22 January, Colonel General I. M. Managarov, commander of 53d Army and an experienced urban fighter, succeeded him in command of the assault forces, which now consisted of 75th Rifle Corps and 37th Guards Rifle Corps.

Both sides continued to suffer heavy casualties, with the fighting in Budapest approaching that of Stalingrad in ferocity. The struggle went on until 12 February, when about half of the remaining German garrison of 26,000 men attempted to break out. In bloody, desperate fighting, the force was destroyed, and on the following day Buda fell. Loss of the city, however, would not end Hitler's fixation on operations in Hungary, to the detriment of operations elsewhere.

The Soviet Union could ill afford the losses suffered in the heavy fighting around Budapest, but the Germans could afford their losses even less, especially the drain on armor resources that were so critically needed elsewhere. Moreover, Soviet-German combat in Hungary throughout December 1944 and January 1945 served a crucial strategic purpose by keeping Hitler's attention riveted to the south rather than focusing on the east. Most damaging to the German cause was Hitler's decision on 16 January to commit Sixth SS Panzer Army (belatedly withdrawn from the Ardennes) in Hungary rather than Poland. This decision was even more incomprehensible since it came after the Red Army renewed its offensive on the Vistula. Bereft of strategic reserves, Germany's remaining eastern armies waited for the inevitable renewal of

Soviet attacks in the East along the critical Warsaw-Berlin axis.