GESTIÓN PÚBLICA PARTICIPATIVA Y DEMOCRACIA DIRECTA

Given the poor progress of 1st Belorussian Front, Stalin deliberately encouraged a race between his two major front commanders. In dramatic telephone conversations with Zhukov and Konev late on 17 April, he amended the Stavka operational map by erasing the front boundary line between them in the vicinity of Berlin, leaving the capture of the capital to whomever got there first. As a practical matter, this action was very risky because of the danger of one unit firing at another by mistake, but it certainly encouraged the advance.23 _{(See Map 19.)}

On 20 April, while Zhukov's forces continued their advance, long-range artillery of 3d Shock Army's 79th Rifle Corps opened the first fire on Berlin. The following day, intermixed units of 3d Shock, 2d Guards Tank, 47th, 8th Guards, and 1st Guards Tank Armies penetrated into Berlin's suburbs and began days of difficult urban combat. In the heavily urbanized terrain of this region, the Soviet field armies had to perform many functions simultaneously: changing direction to encircle the city, bringing up supplies and artillery to sustain the attack, reorganizing assault troops

into small, combined-arms teams for city fighting, and moving the bridging necessary to cross the many canals and rivers in the Berlin area. To do all this while continuing the advance against heavy opposition was a masterpiece of staff work and cooperation, an example of the sophistication achieved by Soviet forces during the Third Period of War.24

Meanwhile, Konev's front maneuvered to complete the envelopment of German Ninth Army from the south and, at the same time, reach the southern outskirts of the city. On 19-20 April, Rybalko's 3d Guards and Leliushenko's 4th Guards Tank Armies advanced 95 kilometers. The following day, elements of Rybalko's army seized the OKH headquarters at Zossen, eliminating any remaining effective control over German operations, and penetrated into the southern suburbs of Berlin, while Leliushenko's lead elements reached the southern approaches to Potsdam. The combined-arms armies of the front's shock group rapidly advanced westward, in the process engaging German Twelfth Army of General Walter Wenck, which the OKH had ordered eastward from the Western Front to link up with German Ninth Army and save Berlin.25 _{From 20 through 26 April, 52d and 2d Polish Armies on tiie front s extended left flank repelled counterattacks}

from the Gorlitz region. Army Group Center had launched these attacks to break through and relieve German Ninth Army. In the central sector, at dusk on 22 April, three forward detachments of 8th Guards Army reached the Spree River on the southern side of the German capital and achieved hasty crossings before the defenders realized their presence. On 24 April, Chuikov's 8th Guards and Katukov's 1st Guards Tank Armies linked up with Rybalko's 3d Guards Tank and Lieutenant General A.A. Luchinsky's 28th Armies southeast of Berlin, completing the encirclement of Ninth Army

around Beeskow southeast of Berlin.26 _{The next day, on 25 April, the Soviet 58th Guards Rifle Division of Colonel General}

A. S. Zhadov's 5th Guards Army linked up at Torgau on the Elbe with elements of U.S. First Army's 69th Infantry Division.27 _{Soon, similar festive meetings took place along the entire front as Soviet forces advanced to the}

prearranged demarcation line dividing the two Allied forces.

As Allied forces linked up along the Elbe, Rokossovsky's 2d Belorussian Front forces forced the western channel of the Oder River, penetrated German defenses on its western bank, and pinned down Third Panzer Army, depriving it of the opportunity to deliver a counterblow from the north against Soviet forces encircling Berlin. This was the long- anticipated attack by so-called Group Steiner, which Hitler hoped in vain would save Berlin.

Now, even Hitler realized that the war was lost, although he continued to issue vain orders for Busse's Ninth Army (to the east), Wenck's phantom Twelfth Army (to the west), and Group Steiner (to the north) to break through to the capital (see Map 20).

Any units that still had the combat power to break out of the Soviet encirclements were simply melting away, fleeing westward toward the Allies.

Lacking any effective command and control structure, the remnants of the Wehrmacht fought on like a chicken with its spinal cord severed. Zhukov began the formal assault of Berlin on 26 April, and the battle raged block by block for the next week (see Map 21).

By 30 April, Soviet forces had cut the defending German force into four isolated pieces, and they set about smashing each in piecemeal fashion. The same day, Hitler committed suicide, but the carnage continued for several days. During this period, Soviet assault teams cleared the German defenders from over 300 city blocks.28 _{Every house was taken by storm}

using task-organized assault detachments and groups made up of infantry, tanks, and artillery firing over open sights and sappers armed with explosives. Especially heavy fighting raged in the subway and in underground communications and headquarters facilities.

On 29 April, against fanatic resistance, 79th Rifle Corps troops of 1st Belorussian Front's 3d Shock Army began the symbolic struggle for the Reichstag. The following day, scouts from the 150th Rifle Division hoisted the Red Banner over the building. However, the battle for the Reichstag continued until the morning of 1 May, as Russians rooted bedraggled but stubborn groups out of the basement cellars. On 1 May 1945, forces of Kuznetsov's 3d Shock Army attacking from the north linked up just south of the Reichstag with Chuikov's 8th Guards Army troopers advancing from the south. By the evening of 2 May, German resistance had finally ceased, and remnants of the Berlin garrison, under the command of Lieutenant General Helmuth Weidling, surrendered.29

into Czechoslovakia along the Prague axis, while 1st Belorussian Front's combined-arms armies continued their westward advance, and on 7 May, they linked up with Allied forces on a broad front along the Elbe. The 2d Belorussian Front's forces reached the shores of the Baltic Sea and the line of the Elbe River, where they linked up with elements of British Second Army. Meanwhile, Soviet forces eliminated resisting pockets of German forces in Courland and on the Samland Peninsula, west of Königsberg.

During the course of the Berlin operation, Soviet forces crushed the remnants of the once-vaunted Wehrmacht and captured 480,000 German troops (see Table 16-1).

Table 16-1. Count of Enemy Losses and Trophies by Soviet Fronts Front Killed POWs Tanks and Assault

Guns Guns and Mortars Aircraft

1st Belorussian 218,691 250,534 1,806 11,680 3,426

2d Belorussian 49,770 84,234 280 2,709 1,462

1st Ukrainian 189,619 144,530 2,097 6,086 1,107

Total 458,080 479,298 4,183 20,475 4,995

Source; Berlimkaia operatsiia

1945 goda (Moscow: Voenizdat, 1950), 616-618.

The cost, however, had been great; 361,367 Soviet and Polish soldiers fell in the effort.30 _{The Berlin operation was prepared}

in a relatively short period, and its main aims—the encirclement and destruction of the German Berlin grouping and the capture of Berlin—were achieved in 17 days. The Soviets have since considered the operation to be a classic example of an offensive by a group of fronts conducted with decisive aims in an almost ceremonial fashion. The nearly

simultaneous offensive by three fronts in a 300-kilometer sector with the delivery of six blows tied down German reserves, disorganized German command and control, and, in some instances, achieved operational and tactical surprise. The Berlin operation—in particular the poor performance of Zhukov's front—was instructive in other ways as well. As determined after the war by high level conferences held to study the operation, its nature and course were

markedly different from the heavy combat the Soviets had experienced on the more open terrain further east.31 _{Combat in}

the more heavily urban and wooded terrain near Berlin exacted a far more costly toll on the attackers than Soviet planners had anticipated. These experiences and lessons would form the basis for the postwar restructuring of the Soviet Union's armed forces.

As a reward for their performance during combat on the main axes to Berlin, six Soviet armies (3d Shock, 8th Guards, and 1st, 2d, 3d, and 4th Guards Tank Armies) would be assigned to Soviet occupation forces in Germany. Over 40 years later, the first of these armies to enter Berlin would be the last to depart German soil.

PRAGUE

The fall of Berlin did not end the fighting. With victory in sight, Stalin and his senior commanders became more concerned than ever about the possibility that the Western Allies would play them false. At the time and long afterward, the Soviet participants took seriously the German offer to surrender to the West while continuing to fight in the East. Of course, Eisenhower insisted on total surrender on all fronts, but the Soviet leaders could not overcome their fear of treachery file:///C|/Downloads/1109/WTC.htm (170 of 191) [3/10/2007 4:38:43 PM]

or, at the very least, of being cheated out of their hard-won victory.

Thus, when General Omar Bradley offered to assist in the occupation of Czechoslovakia, Stalin responded with another order to accelerate the advance. On 1 May, the Stavka ordered 1st Belorussian Front to relieve all elements of 1st

Ukrainian Front engaged in mopping up in Berlin so that Konev could turn southwestward and, in conjunction with Marshal R. la. Malinovsky's 2d Ukrainian and General A. I. Eremenko's 4th Ukrainian Fronts, advance on Prague.

The Soviets' old nemesis, Army Group Center, which for over two years had been poised threateningly on the approaches to Moscow, was to become the new and last Soviet target. In May 1945, the more than 600,000 men of this Army Group, now commanded by Field Marshal Ferdinand Schoerner, awaited inevitable destruction—ironically, not in Germany but in Czechoslovakia, which had been one of Hitler's initial victims.32

While the Reichstag was still under assault, between 1 and 6 May, the forces under the command of Konev, Malinovsky, and Eremenko regrouped to launch an offensive of overwhelming proportions against Schoerner's force. This attack was in conjunction, if not in competition, with General George S. Patton's U.S. Third Army, which was poised to

enter Czechoslovakia from Bavaria. The combined force of over 2 million Soviet and Polish soldiers planned to rely on heavy tank forces, including three tank armies and a cavalry-mechanized group, to spearhead a rapid thrust directly on the Czech capital, Prague.33

Konev's hastily approved plan called for Colonel General N. P. Pukhov's 13th Army and Colonel General V. N. Gordov's 3d Guards Armies to attack west of Dresden, penetrate the Erzgeberg Mountain passes in southeast Germany, and assist the subsequent commitment of Rybalko's 3d and Leliushenko's 4th Guards Tank Armies for a rapid exploitation to

Prague.34 _{Polish and Soviet forces would launch a supporting attack in 1st Ukrainian Front's Gorlitz sector. Simultaneously,}

in a wide arc covering the eastern and southern borders of Czechoslovakia, Eremenko and Malinovsky were to mount similar offensives spearheaded by tank forces.

The advance was to begin on 7 May, but at noon on 5 May, the population of Prague launched an uprising and appealed by radio for Allied help. This brief struggle with the German occupation forces cost the Czechs at least 3,000 killed and 10,000 wounded. Stalin again hurried the attack and ordered that it commence on the afternoon of 6 May.

Spurred on by Stalin's demands for haste and taking advantage of local German withdrawals, Konev struck from the north on 6 May. He launched his main attack from the Riesa area with three combined-arms armies (13th and 3d and 5th Guards) and 3d and 4th Guards Tank Armies. The next day, he launched two secondary attacks with slightly smaller forces (including 2d Polish Army) further to the east. Malinovsky's 2d Ukrainian Front struck northward from Brno toward Olomouc and Prague with four combined-arms armies (53d, 7th Guards, 9th Guards, and 46th), Colonel General A. G. Kravchenko's 6th Guards Tank Army, and Colonel General I. A. Pliev's 1st Guards Cavalry-Mechanized Group. In between Konev's and Malinovsky's forces, Eremenko's front pressured German defenses across its entire front.

Within two days, Konev's forces occupied Dresden, Bautzen, and Gorlitz against dwindling German resistance, and 4th Ukrainian Front seized Olomouc; a day later, it linked up with advancing 2d Ukrainian Front forces for a combined drive on Prague. To accelerate his advance, on the night of 8-9 May, Konev ordered Rybalko's and Leliushenko's tank armies to make a dash for Prague. At first light, the two tank armies, spearheaded by specially tailored forward detachments, began an 80-kilometer race, linking up in the city with forward mobile elements of 2d and 4th Ukrainian Fronts, which included Czech forces of the 1st Separate Czech Tank Brigade. During the following two days, Soviet

forces liquidated or accepted the surrender of more than 600,000 remaining German forces.35 _{On 11 May advanced elements}

of Leliushenko's tank army linked up with the forces of the U. S. Third Army east of Pilsen, ending the major wartime field operations of the Red Army.

By early May, the surviving German military leaders were more than ready to comply with Allied demands for general and unconditional surrender. Eisenhower's threat to break off negotiations and seal the front lines against refugees, in essence turning them over to the Soviets, was the final argument. Yet the Soviet representative to Eisenhower's headquarters, General I. A. Susloparov, had no instructions on the matter. When his counterpart in Moscow, Major General John Deane, inquired about coordinating the announcement of the surrender, Antonov and his staff officers again suspected that their allies were seeking to grab all the credit. Meanwhile, in Rheims the surrender ceremony had been arranged for early on 7 May, and Susloparov still had no instructions. Afraid to sign without orders, he was even more afraid to have the Soviet Union left out of the surrender. Finally, Susloparov nerved himself to sign the

surrender document, annotating it with a qualifier that would allow Moscow to renegotiate later if necessary. No sooner had he reported his actions that he received a frantic telegram from the Stavka ordering, "Don't sign any documents!"36

CONCLUSIONS

The 18 months of the Third Period of War accorded a gruesome symmetry to the horrors of war on the Eastern Front. The first 18 months of war witnessed the unprecedented catastrophes that beset the Red Army and the titanic defensive battles at Moscow and Stalingrad, punctuated by periodic Soviet counteroffensive impulses. The Germans had advanced to the gates of Moscow, the banks of the Volga, and the northern slopes of the Caucasus Mountains. At a cost of over 10 million military casualties and uncounted civilian fatalities, the Red Army had halted Blitzkrieg and turned the tide of almost unending German military victories.

During the 12 months of the Second Period of War, beginning with the catastrophic German defeat on the Volga and ending with the victorious Soviet drive to the Dnepr after the equally catastrophic German defeat at Kursk, the Red Army destroyed Blitzkreig as a viable offensive military concept. At a cost of nearly 10 million additional military casualties, the Soviets began the liberation of their territories. Unlike the First Period of War, in this period the Germans and their allies themselves suffered losses numbering in the hundreds of thousands. More devastating for the German cause was the slow realization that this process of attrition would accelerate toward inevitable and total defeat.

This process reached fruition in the Third Period of War. A seemingly unending procession of Soviet strategic victories ensued, which tore the heart out of the Wehrmacht, inexorably propelled Soviet forces into central Europe, and climaxed in the total military and political defeat of Nazi Germany. The cost to the Red Army was a final nine million casualties. The military consequences of operations in spring 1945 were clear. The remaining forces of the once-proud and seemingly indestructible armies of Germany were crushed by the combined efforts of Allied forces assaulting from East and West. Nazi Germany, which had based its power and built its empire on the foundations of warfare of

unprecedented violence and destructiveness, was felled in equally violent and decisive fashion. The colossal scope and scale of the Berlin operation, resulting in appalling Soviet casualties and equally massive destruction of the German capital, was a fitting end to a war that was so unlike previous wars. As more than one German veteran observed, war in the West was proper sport, while war in the East was unmitigated horror. This final horror eliminated the remaining 2 million men of the Wehrmacht and reduced Germany to ashes.

The political consequences of these last operations reflected a process that had been going on for over a year, which the Soviet Union's Allies had largely overlooked in their search for victory. That process now became crystal clear during the peace that followed. In the baggage of the victorious Red Army came political power in the guise of newly formed national armies for Soviet liberated states and governments to go with those armies. Two Polish, three Rumanian, and two Bulgarian armies fought and bled alongside the Red Army, together with a Czech Corps and other smaller national formations. Once returned to their liberated lands, these units cooperated with local partisan formations, many of which had also been sponsored and equipped by the Soviet Union. Under the protection of the Red Army, these armed forces and the governments-in-exile that accompanied them quickly transformed military into political power.

Slowly, in mid-May 1945, the firing died out and the war in Europe gradually came to an end. Having, at great human cost, captured Bucharest, Belgrade, Warsaw, Budapest, Vienna, Berlin, and Prague from the shattered Wehrmacht, the Soviets, by rights, had undisputed claim to the lion's share of the spoils of this victory over Nazi Germany. In

Western perceptions, however, the political consequences of that victory deprived the Soviet Union of that right. Within a few short years, the horrors of war were replaced by the menace of the Cold War, and suspicions soon obscured

the unprecedented suffering and triumph of the Soviet peoples.

CHAPTER 17

Conclusion