Historically, there is no express right to privacy in English law81 but following the enactment of the Human Rights Act 1998 (HRA), the equitable common law remedy of breach of confidence was extended by the courts, effectively creating a new right to protect the misuse of private information. This was to secure the rights guaranteed by claimants’ Article 8 Convention right, which guarantees the right to respect for private and family life,82 while at
the same time balancing this with defendants’ Article 10 right to freedom of speech. Following a series of high-profile cases decided over the next decade,83 the new right to privacy in English law can be described as a ‘curious amalgamation of tort law, equity and Arts 8 and 10 of the European Convention on Human Rights.’ 84 As a result, the key legal principles of the tort are
81 In the case of Wainwright v Home Office [2003] UKHL 53; [2004] 2 AC 406, the House of Lords held that
there was no cause of action under English law for ‘invasion of privacy.’
82 Article 8 (1) HRA 1998.
83 Three landmark cases can primarily be attributed to the emergence of a tort for invasion of privacy: the House
of Lords’ decision in OBG Ltd v Allan [2007] UKHL 21; [2008] 1 AC 1 (HL); the decision of the European Court of Human Rights in Von Hannover v Germany [2004] EMLR 379 (ECtHR) and the House of Lords’ decision in
Campbell v MGN Ltd [2004] UKHL 22.
to be found in case law, and the courts’ decisions have, unsurprisingly, been influenced by European jurisprudence.85
The House of Lords established a two-stage test for misuse of private information in the leading case of Campbell v Mirror Group Newspapers.86 Stage one stipulates that the court must identify whether the information in question is subject to a reasonable expectation of privacy, so that Article 8 is engaged. At stage two, the defendant’s Article 10 right is considered, along with any other relevant circumstances of the case, for example, whether there might be any public interest in publication, which would outweigh the strength of the privacy claim. In Re
S (A Child),87 the Lords clarified that neither the Article 8 or 10 right has presumptive priority,
and that where the two rights are in conflict, the courts must conduct an intense focus on the comparative importance of the specific rights being claimed in each individual case, carefully considering the justifications for interfering with, or restricting, each right. Finally, the proportionality test, or the ‘ultimate balancing test’ should be applied to each right,88 which involves the courts’ consideration of whether the intrusion, or the degree of the intrusion, into a claimant’s privacy is proportionate to the public interest supposedly being served by it. Following the leading case of Max Mosley v News Group Newspapers,89 most information relating to private sexual activity now gives rise to a reasonable expectation of privacy, under the first part of the Campbell test the courts will find very little public interest justification for publication. The public interest defence has been effectively diluted, and individuals can now reasonably expect information relating to their sexual activities to be a private matter. Despite the fact that the two-part test formulated in Campbell has long provided the basis for privacy cases, however, the tort of misuse of private information was only confirmed recently as a standalone remedy, independent of the equitable remedy of breach of confidence, when this was finally established in the Court of Appeal case of Google v Vidal-Hall,90 in 2015.
85 For examples see the decisions in Von Hannover v Germany [2004] EMLR 379 (ECtHR) and Peck v United
Kingdom [2003] 36 EHRR 41, which essentially found that a public location does not always preclude the
protection of an individual’s Article 8 right, although this position has not been consistently followed by the UK courts.
86 [2004] UKHL 22. 87 [2004] UKHL 47.
88 Ibid at [17] per Lord Steyn. 89 [2008] EWHC 1777 (QB). 90 [2015] EWCA Civ 311.
As the current law stands, in order to establish a claim for the misuse of private information, the courts must apply this two-stage process. First, the court must determine whether there is a reasonable expectation of privacy, such that Article 8 is engaged at all, which is a question that must be considered objectively from the standpoint of a reasonable person in the claimant’s position.91 To assist in applying the threshold test, the Supreme Court later held in Murray v
Big Pictures (UK) Ltd, 92 that the question of whether there is a reasonable expectation of
privacy ‘is a broad one, which takes account of all the circumstances of the case.’93 These
include the attributes of the claimant; the nature of the activity in which the claimant was engaged; the place at which it was happening; the nature and purpose of the intrusion; the absence of consent (and whether it was known or could be inferred); the effect on the claimant; and the circumstances in which, and the purposes for which, the information came into the hands of the publisher.94 If a privacy interest is found, the courts must applying the balancing
test, to ascertain whether there might be a countervailing public interest, such as the right to freedom of expression, which displaces the right to a reasonable expectation of privacy completely, or tips the balance in favour of disclosure.95 Available defences might be that the
information is in the public interest; that it is gossip or mere tittle-tattle; that it is already in the public domain, or accessible to the public, so that it is not deemed private; that the disclosure of the information is in the interests of national security, public safety, the economic wellbeing of the country, the prevention of disorder or crime; or that the disclosure of private information was justified in order to protect the health and moral rights and freedoms of others.96 Actions
based on a claim under the HRA must be brought to court within one year.
The same remedies for the tort of misuse of private information are available as for breach of confidence, namely an injunction, and compensation. Claimants might expect to recover nominal, general or aggravated damages to compensate them for the distress caused by the misuse of their private information, but these awards are relatively modest. Because the cause of action has recently been classified as a tort,97 however, exemplary damages may also be
91 Campbell v MGN ([2004] UKHL 22 at [134] – [139]. 92 [2008] EWCA Civ 446.
93 Ibid at [36] per Sir Anthony Clarke MR. 94 Ibid.
95 Campbell v MGN ([2004] UKHL 22 at [134] – [139]. 96 Article 8 (2) HRA 1998.
available,98 which potentially improves this position. However, the most important remedy,
and the one that claimants are most interested in, is an injunction to restrain the misuse of their private information. Interim injunctions can be granted over several parties, including those unknown.99 Non-disclosure orders can also be granted, in order to protect the identity of
claimants.100 Legal costs are usually recoverable from the losing party.
3.3.2 Analysis of Three Paradigmatic Categories of Potential Revenge Porn Defendants
This section will explore how the current law on misuse of private information responds specifically to three paradigmatic categories of potential revenge porn defendants. This will give analytical clarity as to the effectiveness of the cause of action, when responding to revenge porn, and will provide a foundation for the normative analysis in the next section.
(iv) Primary Disseminators
The original, unauthorised dissemination (or threatened dissemination) of revenge porn, by primary disseminators, will, in most cases, be a misuse of private information. To establish this, the courts must apply the threshold test, to identity whether victims have a reasonable expectation of privacy, in relation to the images, in order to engage Article 8. Following the decision in Mosely, which affirmed that sexual disclosures could warrant protection in privacy, providing that the first part of the Campbell test was satisfied, the claimant would usually have a reasonable expectation of privacy in respect of her images, due to the sexual nature of them. When applying the balancing test, it would be unlikely that the claimant’s Article 8 right would be trumped by the defendant’s Article 10 right to freedom of expression. So, where primary dissemination is facilitated by individuals known to victims, such as ex-partners, ex-friends, casual acquaintances and one-night stands, all these parties would be liable, as the focus is on the unwarranted exposure of information concerning the private lives of claimants, rather than on the breach of trust that led to the disclosure. Where disclosure is threatened, or to prevent
98 Jojo YC Mo, ‘Misuse of Private Information as a Tort: The Implications of Google v Judith Vidal-Hall,’
(2017) 33 Computer, Law & Security Review 87, 95.
99 Contostavlos v Mendahun [2012] EWHC 850 (QB). 100 Under Civil Procedure Rules, r 39.2 (4).
further disclosure, claimants can apply for an interim injunction, to restrain publication of images, and this can be on a ‘without notice’ basis if the threat of dissemination is immediate. Where primary dissemination is facilitated by parties unknown to victims, for example, if images have been obtained and disseminated following the hacking of stolen mobile devices or Cloud storage accounts, a court can grant an interim injunction over any party who has possession or control of the images, including unknown parties,101 so the matter could
potentially resolve swiftly out of court, without having to go to trial. Claims can be brought anonymously, by virtue of a non-disclosure order,102 which is advantageous to victims, as this
can reduce the impact of bringing this sort of action to court.
The tort of misuse of private information was used by YouTube star, Chrissy Chambers, to sue her ex-boyfriend for revenge porn, under the law in the High Court. He had recorded videos of them having sex, while she was asleep, then posted these onto free porn websites after the relationship had ended, where they were viewed hundreds of thousands of times.103 The Crown
Prosecution Service was unable to bring charges against him, however, as the videos were posted before the misconduct was criminalised, in April 2015. In the first civil case of its kind, in England and Wales, and with the aid of crowdfunding, Chambers sued her perpetrator for harassment, breach of confidence and misuse of private information, winning substantial damages. 104 While the terms of the settlement mean the man cannot be named, nor the amount
of damages paid to Chambers disclosed, Chambers’ victory now paves the way for her to sue the sites that hosted the material. The verdict serves as a stark warning, Reid observes, not only for primary disseminators, but also for Internet intermediaries who host this kind of content.105
101 Contostavlos (n 99).
102 Under Civil Procedure Rules, r 39.2 (4).
103 Jenny Kleeman, ‘YouTube Star Wins Damages in Landmark UK ‘Revenge Porn’ Case,’ The Guardian (17
January 2018) < https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2018/jan/17/youtube-star-chrissy-chambers-wins- damages-in-landmark-uk-revenge-porn-case> accessed 15 January 2019.
104 Antoinette Raffaela Huber, ‘Revenge Porn Law is Failing Victims – Here’s Why,’ The Conversation (25
January 2018) <https://theconversation.com/revenge-porn-law-is-failing-victims-heres-why-90497> accessed 15 January 2019.
105 Alan Reid, ‘Landmark Revenge Porn Cases are a Stark Warning for Perpetrators and Social Networks,’ The
Conversation (17 January 2018) < https://theconversation.com/landmark-revenge-porn-cases-are-a-stark- warning-for-perpetrators-and-social-networks-90250> accessed 15 January 2019.
A possible defence for primary disseminators is that information considered to be trivial and of no consequence will not be sufficient to engage Article 8, so, in a scenario where primary disseminators have disclosed images that might be relatively anodyne, such as those showing the victim semi-clothed, or engaged in the act of merely kissing and cuddling, the claimant’s right for reasonable expectation of privacy might be displaced with the defendant’s countervailing right of freedom of expression. While the subject of the images may be mortified at their disclosure, the quality of the material in question may not be objectively sufficient to engage the subject’s Article 8 rights. In these cases, claimants might be better off relying on a claim of breach of confidence. Additionally, where information is already in the public domain, or accessible to the public, it will not always be deemed as private, which could be problematic for individuals seeking an injunction, if their images have been particularly widely disseminated, although the extent of the public nature of the images will be considered by the courts on a case-by-case basis.
An important exception to the expectation of privacy that individuals can have, with regard to the misuse of their private sexual images by primary disseminators, however, is that there is no general right to privacy, for adults, which protects images taken in public places. This means that privacy law does not protect victims of ‘downblousing’ or ‘upskirting,’ where images are obtained in public spaces, and then disseminated onto dedicated fetishists’ websites.106 This is
because in common law jurisdictions there can be no reasonable expectation of privacy in public places.
In summary, the focus of the tort of misuse of private information is on the unwarranted exposure of information concerning the private lives of claimants. It is unquestionably relevant, in the case of revenge porn disclosure by primary disseminators, known or unknown to victims, where victims have a reasonable expectation of privacy in regard to their private, sexual images. It is particularly useful for restraining further dissemination of images, following the application for an interim injunction. Additionally, because the cause of action has recently been classified as a tort, exemplary damages may also be available. Misuse of
106 However, ‘upskirting’ will soon be a criminal offence, in England and Wales, punishable by two years’
imprisonment: the Voyeurism (Offences) (No. 2) Bill 2017-19 currently passing through Parliament amends s 67 of the Sexual Offences Act 2003, creating additional offences under s 67A, to make certain acts of
private information cannot be used, however, by victims of ‘upskirting,’ as images that have been obtained in public spaces are not protected by privacy law.
(i) Secondary Disseminators
Where revenge porn dissemination is amplified by secondary disseminators, known or unknown to victims, these individuals would be liable under misuse of private information. Unlike breach of confidence, an action for misuse of private information can be brought irrespective of whether defendants were aware that the images they were re-distributing were revenge porn, as the principal focus of the tort is on the expectation of privacy victims can have in respect of their private images. As with primary dissemination, the courts will apply the threshold test to identity whether victims have a reasonable expectation of privacy, in order to engage Article 8, followed by the balancing test, to ascertain if there is a countervailing public interest, such as the right to freedom of expression, which displaces the right of reasonable expectation of privacy. As the courts are likely to be sympathetic to claimants, it is unlikely that a public interest defence would be upheld. In addition, proceedings can be brought anonymously. However, as with primary dissemination, possible defences for secondary disseminators could be if the images in question are relatively anodyne, so could be considered trivial, or they may already exist extensively in the public domain.
The action can be a particularly useful one to effectively restrain further dissemination of images by secondary disseminators unknown to victims, as courts can grant an interim injunction over several parties, including those unknown, which can include anyone who has possession or control of the images.107 An example of an interim injunction being used to
effectively restrain publication by secondary disseminators can be seen in the revenge porn case, JPH v XYZ and Persons Unknown.108 Here, the court also included amongst the defendants, “persons unknown,” to enable any resulting order to be served on a number of friends holding copies of the images. After an interim order was made to restrain publication, the judge recognised that because of the circumstances, swift action was necessary to prevent
107 Contostavlos v Mendahun [2012] EWHC 850 (QB). 108 [2015] EWHC 2871 (QB) (QBD).
the spread of the material going viral once it was in the public domain.109 Therefore, information about the third parties holding copies of the material was exchanged between the parties’ solicitors within one hour of the order, as well as relevant steps being taken to remove any material already posted, prior to the service of the order. Additionally, in the event that the material was made public, the judge ensured that committal proceedings would be an available sanction for non-compliance.110 The action was so effective, that to date, the identities of the parties have not been revealed, and the harmful images have been kept out of the public domain.
In summary, providing victims have a reasonable expectation of privacy, in respect of images disseminated by secondary disseminators, so that Article 8 is engaged, and this is not displaced by a countervailing public interest, victims can bring an action for misuse of their private information. It is particularly useful where it is crucial for victims to be able to effectively restrain further publication of their images, as an interim injunction can be granted over several parties, including those unknown, thus effectively prohibiting the further publication of images, by anyone who has them in their possession or control.
(v) Internet Intermediaries
Most contemporary revenge porn disclosure is facilitated by Internet intermediaries, via social media platforms, image board forums or discussion websites, or via dedicated revenge porn websites. Victims’ priority will be to attempt to secure the prompt removal of any images in the public domain, and in the first instance they should use any reporting tools provided to report revenge porn dissemination, to request takedown of their images. If pursuing this first action is unsuccessful, victims should notify all relevant Internet intermediaries who are publishing their images of a complaint, as early as possible. Once an intermediary is on notice that the publication is unlawful, there can be no defence to its publication, as it will lose its
109 Jennifer Agate, ‘Case Comment: Civil Injunction in “Revenge Porn” Case: JPH v XYZ and Persons Unknown’
(2016) 27(1) Ent LR 18, 18.
defence under the Electronic Commerce (EC Directive) Regulations 2002 (Regs 17-19)111 to a
claim for damages.112 If co-operation is not forthcoming, however, then victims can seek an
interim injunction to restrain further publication of their images. There can be numerous Internet intermediaries involved, but as is the case with the primary and secondary disseminators, providing victims have a reasonable expectation of privacy, in respect of their private images, so that Article 8 is engaged, and this is not displaced by a countervailing public interest, such as freedom of expression, the courts can grant an interim injunction over several parties, including those unknown, which can include anyone who has possession or control of the images.113 Therefore an interim injunction restraining publication can be served over any
Internet intermediaries who are publishing the images.114 As Wilson points out, it cannot be
taken for granted, though, that Internet intermediaries, particularly those operating outside the