El Mecanismo de Garantía de las Obligaciones

Wishing to avoid dependence on either of his powerful communist neigh- bors, Kim Il Sung applied the principle of Juche to foreign relations by trying to achieve independence from foreign influence and promote the democrati- zation of the international order.The independence theme encompasses several of Kim’s concerns. One, already mentioned in conjunction with Kim Il Sung’s 1955 speech, was to eliminate competing domestic political factions originat- ing in China and the Soviet Union. By the end of the 1950s these factions had been effectively eliminated. A second concern was to avoid domination by the Soviet Union’s communist party, which considered itself the “mother party.” Kim made it clear that the Korean Workers’ Party (KWP) was independent of all other parties, though willing to cooperate with them in the spirit of prole- tarian internationalism—a concept that gradually lost its meaning as it became evident that the Chinese and Soviet communist parties were going their sep- arate ways. A third concern was to promote Korean unification. North Korea consistently took the position that South Korea is an American colony, and that if U.S. forces were expelled from the peninsula the South Korean people would rally to Kim Il Sung and Juche. Since Chinese troops departed from the North in 1958, this theme of North Korean independence versus South Korean dependence has been central to Pyongyang’s claim to sole political legitimacy on the Korean peninsula.

Finally, North Korea’s concern for independence stems from Korea’s his- torical experiences as a small state often at the mercy of larger states. The tactical problem Kim Il Sung faced was how to reconcile the need for aid from the Soviet Union and China with political independence. Until the end of the cold war, North Korea was relatively successful in keeping the aid pipeline from both countries open without leaning strongly toward either side. Because of its strategic location in East Asia, with borders on both China and the Soviet Union, and facing Japan and the American-allied South Korea, North Korea was a significant enough piece of political real estate to be wooed by both com- munist powers. The strategic problem that Kim Il Sung was never able to solve was how to apply Juche socialism principles to make his country economically and politically powerful enough to hold its own in the international arena. Pyongyang’s political “declaration of independence,”published in Nodong Sin-

mun on August 12, 1966, was a response to changes in Soviet policy since

Khrushchev and to the instability of China during the Cultural Revolution.        

Kim elaborated on his 1966 statement at the first session of the Fourth Supreme People’s Assembly on December 16, 1967:

We must not act on orders and instructions of others but, on the basis of the interests of our revolution and construction, settling all problems from the standpoint of Juche. . . . Needless to say, the international unity of the proletariat of all countries and the friendly alliance of the socialist countries in the revolutionary struggle against imperialist aggression . . . are an important guarantee for safeguarding the revolutionary gains already obtained and winning new victories. . . . The decisive factor for victory in the struggle against imperialist reaction, however, is the inter- nal forces of the country concerned.24

Pyongyang’s foreign policy line was further developed by a speech Kim Il Sung gave to KWP’s Sixth Party Congress in 1980, in which he introduced the three guiding principles of independence (chaju), friendly relations, and peace.25_{In his speech to the Supreme People’s Assembly in 1990, the order of}

these principles was changed to independence, peace, and friendship, and this statement is found in article 17 of the 1992 and 1998 revisions of North Korea’s constitution.

North Korea’s declaration of independence from the Soviet Union and China was accompanied by a campaign to become a leader among that loose association of nonaligned states that had inaugurated a semiformal organiza- tion,the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM),in 1961.26_{North Korea was admitted}

to membership at the August 1975 NAM Foreign Ministers’ meeting in Lima, Peru. South Korea, being aligned with the United States, was not considered eligible for membership in the group. Juche would seem well suited as a ral- lying cry for these nonaligned states, and North Korea put great effort into popularizing its political philosophy by establishing Juche study groups and sponsoring Juche seminars throughout the world. After the death in 1980 of Yugoslavia’s Josip Tito, who had been the unofficial leader of NAM, Kim Il Sung aspired to take his place. But North Korea’s close association with the communist states, the growing cult of personality surrounding Kim, and North Korea’s sponsorship of international terrorism were repugnant to many NAM members.The high point of North Korea’s participation in NAM was the multi- national signing of the Pyongyang Declaration in 1987. During the 1990s, economic problems forced the Pyongyang government to close many of its embassies in third world capitals. In any case, the NAM never had the cohe- sive political, economic, or military power that could provide North Korea with a substitute for its reduced relations with the Soviet Union and China.