Estructura Organizacional del Municipio

North Korea has good reason to keep its distance from South Korea in terms of government-to-government as well as people-to-people relations. Since the North Korean government refuses to recognize the legitimacy of the South Korean government, referring to it as a puppet government and to its presi- dent as the “person in authority” (less respectfully as “traitor” or “criminal”), government officials are loath to deal with their South Korean counterparts. As for dialogue between people, the Kim regime must control all aspects of inter-Korean contact to keep the North Korean people isolated and thus igno- rant of the outside world.

Kim Il Sung’s lifetime goal and his promise to the people was to reunite the two Koreas under communism. Having failed to achieve this goal in the Korean War, he turned increasingly to diplomacy to destabilize and delegitimize the Seoul government, while employing terrorist tactics as “a continuation of pol- itics by other means.” On only a few occasions have the two governments engaged in substantive dialogue (at least in public).

Following talks in 1971 between the Red Cross societies of the two Koreas on the subject of reunions of separated families, a series of secret and then public meetings was held between envoys of the two governments meeting in Pan- munjom (along the demilitarized zone), Pyongyang, and Seoul. On July 4, 1972, delegates to the talks signed a joint communiqué in which they agreed to achieve unification through independent Korean efforts without being subject to exter- nal imposition or interference; by peaceful means; and to achieve “great national unity” by transcending differences in ideologies and political systems.44_These

would become known in North Korea as the three principles of independence, peaceful unification, and great national unity. A South-North Coordinating Committee was established to implement the agreement according to the sup- plementary recommendations, which included an agreement not to slander or defame each other, restore severed national ties and carry out social exchanges, but little was accomplished and North Korea cut off further dialogue in August 1973. Both sides continued to make occasional proposals for tension reduction and cooperation, but such proposals were never mutually acceptable.

During the latter half of the 1980s North Korea became more concerned about its own survival and less concerned about defeating South Korea. The two Koreas held a historic series of high-level talks, which led to the signing of two documents in the final days of 1991. The Agreement on Reconciliation, Nonaggression, and Exchanges and Cooperation was a more detailed version of the failed 1972 agreement. The Joint Declaration of a Nuclear-Free Korean Peninsula was designed to eliminate mutual threats of nuclear aggression— from the U.S. nuclear weapons that were presumed to be based in South Korea and from the nuclear weapons program that North Korea was suspected of developing.The negotiations leading up to these agreements opened a dialogue channel between the two governments, but North Korea was unwilling to implement the sweeping provisions of the reconciliation agreement or to open its nuclear program to the joint inspections provided for in the nuclear decla- ration; consequently, the two governments reverted to their traditional hostile relations, although nongovernmental trading relations continued to develop.

North Korea’s long-standing goal of reunifying the two Koreas changed to a demand for the formation of a Korean confederacy consisting of “one nation, one state, two systems and two governments”—a strange political arrange- ment indeed but one that would presumably guarantee the survival of the North Korean government.45_{The challenge of truly unifying the country}

would be left to the efforts of “our posterity,” as Kim Il Sung suggested in his 1991 New Year’s address. The first-ever South-North summit was scheduled for the summer of 1994, but just two weeks before the historic meeting with ROK President Kim Young Sam, Kim Il Sung died of a heart attack. President Kim Young Sam refused to extend South Korea’s condolences, insulting and angering the North Koreans, who refused to deal with President Kim for the remainder of his tenure.

North Korea’s official policy toward South Korea has remained consistent since Kim’s death. In his first major paper on unification and foreign policy, Kim Jong Il in 1997 pledged to continue his father’s policies embodied in the Three Charters for the Reunification of the Fatherland, which are the three principles of independence, peaceful reunification, and great national unity, the Ten-Point Guideline for All-Korean Unity, and Kim Il Sung’s proposal for the formation of a Democratic Confederal Republic of Koryo (DCRK).46_The

three principles were agreed to in the 1972 North-South joint communiqué, although the two Koreas interpret them differently. By the principle of inde- pendence (that is, Juche), North Korea means that American forces should be withdrawn from South Korea and the U.S.-ROK security alliance should be abrogated. The North Koreans consider this step the touchstone principle for        

Korean unification. The principle of peaceful unification means that South Korea should stop its arms buildup and end joint military exercises with the United States. The principle of national unity means that the ROK govern- ment’s National Security Law should be abolished and its National Intelligence Service disbanded, so that all peoples and parties in South Korea, not just gov- ernment officials,could participate in discussions on Korean reunification with the North Korean government and its front organizations.

Kim Il Sung’s ten-point guideline, first presented in 1980 and updated in 1993, is a more specific statement of the three principles, with an emphasis on confederal coexistence between the two Koreas.47_{If South Korea were to abide}

by the spirit of North Korea’s confederation formula, it would be required to cut itself off from the international community and play out the game of domestic politics on an enclosed playing field. This state of affairs would be admirably suited to North Korea’s brand of totalitarian communist politics, which was so successful in the late 1940s that the communists under Kim Il Sung were able to gain control of the northern half of the peninsula without significant bloodshed.48

The crisis of North Korean food shortages beginning in 1995 provided an opportunity for inter-Korean contact. Even before the devastating summer floods, ROK President Kim Young Sam had offered to supply grain and other goods to North Korea, sending the vice minister of finance and economy to Beijing in June to meet with a North Korean “nongovernment” official to dis- cuss food aid. The first shipment of South Korean rice headed for North Korea on the South Korean cargo ship Sea Apex, which was forced to fly the North Korean flag upon arrival in port, thereby insulting the South Korean govern- ment. Following strong South Korean objections, an apology from the North Korean rice negotiator opened the way for a resumption of rice shipments. A crew member on another South Korean rice ship was detained by the North Koreans for taking pictures, further dampening South Korean ardor to assist North Korea.

After the summer floods North Korea’s appeals for food grew more urgent. The United States limited its initial donation to a symbolic $25,000,South Korea donated $50,000, and Japan supplied $500,000 in flood relief. Since 1995, World Food Program appeals have boosted the scale of donations. From June 1995 to the end of 1998, the donations from all international sources had reached $1.08 billion, with South Korea donating $316 million.49

South Korea’s Kim Dae Jung government, inaugurated in early 1998, adopted a “sunshine policy” toward the North, taking the position that indi- viduals and organizations could legally provide aid to North Korea (something

that until then was a violation of the National Security Law), but that tax dol- lars could only be spent on aid if the public was behind it. After being stung by North Korea’s hostile reaction to early food donations, the public wanted reciprocity as a condition for continued humanitarian aid, asking that North Korea take steps toward opening its borders—especially to the members of separated families—and reform its economy in return for continued aid. The North Korean press belittled the quid pro quo concept as characteristic of the thinking of a money-hungry traveling salesman.50