The Cold War provides the overarching historical context for these four cases. Literature on the origins of the Cold War is extensive but generally falls into one of three schools of thought. Chronologically, these are the orthodox, revisionist, and post- revisionist views. In From Trust to Terror, historian, former government official, and purveyor of the orthodox view, Herbert Feis, presents the post–1945 split between the wartime allies as rooted in conflicting ideological accounts of the war.23 Feis argues that the West celebrated capitalism’s ability to manufacture more than the fascist Germans
21 “The Ambassador in Korea (Muccio) to the Secretary of State,” telegram, May 6, 1951, U.S.
Department of State, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1951, vol. 7, pt. 1, Korea and China (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1983), 419, http://digital.library.wisc.edu/1711.dl/
FRUS.FRUS1951v07p1 (hereafter U.S. Department of State cited as DOS, Foreign Relations of the United
States cited as FRUS, and Government Printing Office cited as GPO).
22 Cao Van Vien et al., The U.S. Adviser, Indochina Monographs (Washington, DC: Center of Military
History, 1980), 58–61.
23 Herbert Feis, From Trust to Terror: The Onset of the Cold War, 1945–1950 (New York: Norton,
and simultaneously supply the Soviets, while free men and women fought valiantly for the rights of others to enjoy the same liberties.24 In contrast, the Soviets, still bitter from bearing the brunt of the fighting against the German Army, saw the bravery of their people as proof of communism’s superiority.25 Feis’s orthodox view generally blames the Soviets for their belligerent actions and rhetoric as they expanded their geographic control to prevent a repeat of what they had just suffered.26 Thus, the orthodox viewpoint saw the aggressive response of the West as justified based on the real and present threat posed by the Soviet Union and its communist allies.
The revisionist perspective emerged in the 1960s and coincided with the expanding war in Vietnam. Revisionists were more critical of U.S. behavior than those of the orthodox school and blamed this behavior for creating an unnecessary conflict. In
Another Such Victory, Arnold Offner, a prominent revisionist, summarizes his central
theme in this comment: “Throughout his presidency, Truman remained a parochial nationalist who lacked the leadership to move the U.S. away from conflict and toward
détente.”27 Offner points to numerous confrontations throughout the Truman
administration during which the United States could have taken steps to reduce tensions with the Soviet Union—yet chose not to—instead establishing an adversarial relationship that lasted for nearly fifty years.28 Offner’s narrative describes Truman as a simple, naïve, unworldly country boy who blustered his way through foreign policy due to his consistent “parochial nationalism” during his two terms.29
Another revisionist, Melvyn Leffler, concurs with the argument that the Truman administration was responsible for much of the antagonism of the Soviet Union, but Leffler is not as critical of Truman’s personality. In Preponderance of Power, Leffler
24 Feis, Trust to Terror, 5. 25 Ibid.
26 Michael F. Hopkins, “Continuing Debate and New Approaches in Cold War History,” Historical Journal 50, no. 4 (December 2007): 914.
27 Arnold A. Offner, Another Such Victory: President Truman and the Cold War, 1945–1953
(Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2002), 470.
28 Ibid., 458. 29 Ibid., xii, 100.
presents Washington’s policy as pragmatic and focused on maintaining predominant power vis-à-vis the Soviet Union.30 Leffler characterized this strategy’s goals as creating “a world environment hospitable to U.S. interests and values . . . [and to establish] a configuration of power and a military posture so that if war erupted, the United States would prevail.”31 The Truman Doctrine and containment reflected this preponderance of power that shaped the U.S. response to communist aggression in Greece, Korea, the Philippines, and Vietnam.
Finally, the post-revisionists swung partly back toward the orthodox school, as they were more willing to recognize that Soviet motives were unclear and that a cautious U.S. response was justified in this environment. In this approach, post-revisionists were more balanced at placing the decisions made in the context of the international environment, state actions, and leadership personalities of the time-period. This school of thought is more sympathetic to the realization that the world had catastrophically underestimated the danger posed by Germany and Japan prior to the Second World War. The natural response was to take steps to prevent a future similar situation. This conclusion meant meeting force with force, presuming aggressive intentions when signals were unclear, and maintaining larger standing armies than was typical for a postwar period. Scholars in this school include John Lewis Gaddis. In his words, “the American interest was not to dominate other power centers, but to see that no one else did either.”32
The truth about Soviet intentions and ideology will never be known without the full release of Soviet records. Clearly, the United States and other democratic countries were deeply concerned about the spread of communism long before Truman, and this apprehension likely colored his judgment. Additionally, Roosevelt’s death shortly after his fourth inauguration thrust Truman into the foreign policy decision-making process after less than three months as Vice President. Truman’s tendency to take the position most advantageous for the United States when the motivations of Joseph Stalin were
30 Melvyn P. Leffler, A Preponderance of Power: National Security, the Truman Administration and the Cold War (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1992), 18–19.
31 Ibid., 19.
unclear seemed to create conditions that escalated tensions. Offner presents Truman as intimating frequently “that the Soviets had broken every agreement made at Yalta and Potsdam.”33 Yet, as Offner points out, Soviet misbehavior often centered on Truman’s
push to reestablish West Germany as an independent state.34 Additionally, Truman
ignored his own provocative actions that further intensified Moscow’s distrust of Washington’s intentions.
In hindsight, Stalin’s behavior was understandable considering the disagreement between the East and West on the partition of Germany and the wholesale destruction of much of Russia. Likewise, it was reasonable that the Western powers were vigilant toward anyone displaying expansionist and bellicose behavior, having so recently concluded the war against Hitler. Additionally, since one of the hallmarks of U.S. foreign policy is its continuing emphasis on free global markets, Leffler’s hypothesis on the Cold War’s origins seems more appropriate than blaming it entirely on either side. Regardless of fault, however, the result was a simmering belligerent relationship that would be tested on proxy battlefields for the next forty years.