The Defence Commission of 1988’s final report on recommendations for Danish security policy and the country’s armed forces was published in 1989. It bore clear indications of the historical events that were unfolding as the commission was discussing what should be the structure of Danish security policy and the Danish armed forces of the 1990’s. Central to the report were the East-West relations between the Warsaw Pact and NATO countries, and therefore considerations about disarmament, nuclear weapons, and general Soviet military strength were central to its conclusions. As a result, it was written very much in Cold War terminology, exemplified by importance of the defence of the Jutland-peninsula in case of a Warsaw Pact attack in the report (Final report – Defence Commission of 1988; 67). Its predictions in relation to the security environment for Denmark were based on two scenarios placed at either end of a scale between worst case and best case. In the best case scenario, disarmament and treaties on cutting the number of nuclear warheads between the two blocs would lead to reduces tensions, which was
Page 39 supposed to lead to a predicted 50% cut in conventional capabilities for the NATO countries by 2000 (ibid; 135). The worst case scenario envisaged a Soviet return to the Brezhnev-doctrine of re-armament and increased repression of dissidents, and the subsequent impact this could have on the tensions between the two blocs. However, this was seen as a very unlikely scenario, with a more likely worst case scenario being the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact leading to the rise of nationalist and ideological differences in the nations of the eastern bloc (ibid; 133-136).
The recommendations for tasks and purposes of the Danish armed forces given by the
Commission were that they should be an integral part of the country’s security policy, and that the Danish military as a result must be able to prevent war, maintain sovereignty, securing self-determination, and promote a peaceful development in the world. The underlying feature of the Danish military should be that it must be prepared to fight a war with the Soviet Union and its allies, alongside Denmark’s NATO allies (ibid; 93). This was also highlighted in the
Commission’s recommendations for defence procurement in the 1990’s, where the focus was on equipment designed for large scale, high intensity warfare, such as NBC-protective combat clothing, MLRS rocket artillery, anti-ship missile defences, and updated air-defence systems (ibid; 130-131).
Thus, in the end of the 1980’s, Danish security policy was still tied up to Cold War alliance thinking in which Denmark was a frontline state. This required maintaining a vast amount of both soldiers and materiel, needed to counter the anticipated Warzaw Pact invasion of both the Jutland peninsula and the Danish archipelago. NATO was to be a key part of this, as the report from the commission underlines that:
“The Danish armed forces, based on Denmark’s exposed strategic situation, cannot work in a war-preventing manner to an adequate degree. The prevention of war is therefore to be sought through Danish membership of NATO and the combined, Denmark included, defence effort” (Final report – Defence Commission of 1988; 93, author’s translation).
As acknowledged by the members of the Commission, Denmark could not defend itself because of the exposed geographical position as a frontline state in the Cold War. Therefore, Danish
Page 40 security policy was tied to NATO and to offering an adequate contribution to the combined effort of the alliance, in order to become sufficiently secure. In war time, the Danish armed forces would work alongside NATO allies in defending the southern part of the Jutland peninsula as well as ensuring superiority at sea in the Baltic (ibid; 67, 68-69). In other words, Denmark simply had to hold fast until help could come from the outside, exemplified by NATO’s plans for the defence of Denmark in the mid 1980’s. These plans focused on that Denmark should relatively quickly receive reinforcements from the lightly armed Allied Command Europe Mobile Force, AMF, in case of an immediate emergency. If more time was available to respond, i.e. in the build-up phase of an escalation crisis between East and West, more heavily armed forces from the UK and the US were to arrive in Denmark, along with contingents of fighter jets from the US, UK, and Canada (Friis 2008; 312)1.
The Danish armed forces themselves were focused on presenting a credible obstacle towards a Warsaw Pact air- and seaborne invasion force on Zeeland. In case the enemy landed, Danish soldiers were to make sure than any gains they made would come at a high cost. Before any enemy force could land however, it would first have to face the Royal Danish Navy. The Navy’s primary objective was to present as many obstacles as possible for the Eastern Bloc’s naval forces. This was to be done by laying mines in strategically important waters along the Danish coast, and by employing submarines and the WILLEMOES-class missile boats. As shown here, most operational plans focused on the defence of Denmark proper. As such, the defence of Bornholm was not given much consideration, as it was anticipated that it would fall quickly if the Warsaw Pact decided to attack. Furthermore, in the event of a war, the defence of the Faroe Islands and Greenland would fall to Denmark’s NATO partners in the form of the US and the UK (Friis 2008; 314).
In the light of the 1988 Commission report, the 1990’s would be very much like the 1980’s and 1970’s. The main, if not only, enemy in almost every sense of the word would be the Soviet Union and its allies. It was also acknowledged that Denmark could not defend itself, but that the country still needed to present both a credible threat and ally, in the sense that the military should be “mean” enough to ensure that it could hold fast until NATO reinforcements arrived. This
1 However futile these notions might have been in the light of the recent disclosure of the Warzaw Pact-plans to simply nuclear bomb Denmark into submission in the event of the outbreak of hostilities has, luckily, never been found out in practice (Friis 2008; 304).
Page 41 meant that there had to be a balancing act in defence posture, in the sense that Denmark’s NATO allies, as well as the opposing Warsaw Pact, had to be ensured of Denmark’s will to defend itself while maintaining an overall non-provocative policy towards to Soviet Union and its puppet states. This was underlined by the so-called “Footnote period” in the 1980’s, where the
Conservative government had its hand forced in matters of national security by the opposition, led by the Social Democratic Party (Friis 2008; 326).