As the analysis above shows, there has been continuity in Danish security and defence policy since the Cold War. Activism has been the sought policy by all governments in this time period.
The degree of activism in the sense of which operations Denmark has been engaged in have of course varied. Whereas Denmark had to find its feet in the beginning of the 1990’s exemplified by the symbolic deployment of OLFERT FISCHER to aid the UN allies in the 1991-1992 Gulf War, the deployment of peace keepers to the Balkans symbolized that Denmark was now willing to participate. This was of course outlined even further in the Danish participation in the NATO-led bombings of Serbia in 1999, where there existed no UN sanctioning. The backing from parliament in this instance also underlines Denmark acting as a unitary actor, as the Social-Liberal Party, which had traditionally been known as an anti-war party, voted in favour of this intervention. As such, viewing Denmark as a unitary actor in the international system is possible.
This is important in relation to classic realism’s focus on states as the primary actors in international politics.
In relation to the question of why there was and is a need for activism in security and defence policy, the above analysis shows that Denmark adapted to the setup of the international system following the end of the Cold War, as per Due-Nielsen and Petersen’s thesis. This did of course not happen overnight, but it is clear that the absence of threat, and thus low stress sensitivity, meant that Denmark could be become gradually more involved in international military operations. In Due-Nielsen and Petersen’s thesis, influence capability rises as stress sensitivity diminishes, which is arguably exactly what happened in Denmark’s case. Initially, the armed forces were only cut minimally from their Cold War standards. However, the capability to influence, and thus to be activist, rose by the development of the Danish International Brigade and various support units geared for international deployments. As the above clearly shows, there has been an on-going transformation of the Danish armed forces’ to become a leaner but meaner fighting force, capable of international deployments. Thus, the Danish military has
Page 66 become a toolbox in which politicians can look for the right tool for a given security related job.
This development took shape in earnest after the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks, as it was highlighted that even though the traditional threat had all but vanished, asymmetric threats persisted. As such, if Denmark wanted to continue on a path of activism, this meant that the armed forces had to be adapted to have capabilities to fight such threats. There was therefore no longer a need for submarines or an air defence system, systems that were both cut from the Danish capabilities list in the 00’s.
Beyond the political developments, it is also worth remembering that the Danish defence budget has not risen or fallen dramatically since the end of the Cold War. This is indicated well in the table above, showing the development in the defence budget since 1988. As has been underlined time and again in the Defence Commissions’ reports, there has been a requirement in the Danish armed forces to reduce costs and make processes more efficient. As stated in the reports and in the Defence Agreements’, the key purpose of these measures has been to free up funds for
international operations, and for procuring military hardware capable and useable in international military operations. If the traditional mobilized defence of the Cold War had been maintained, the defence budget would arguably had to have doubled in size, something that Danish
politicians nor Danes arguably would have been willing to do. As such, the activist security and defence policy undertaken by Denmark since the end of the Cold War has clearly been a choice that politicians have been willing to take. In relation to adaptation and activism, Denmark has sought to increase its influence capability now that stress sensitivity was reduced drastically with the end of the Cold War. And if a state wants to influence international affairs it invariably requires an activist foreign, security, and defence policy.
5.5 Summary
Denmark is still a small power, but the lack of a territorial threat has meant that the military is no longer passively defending, but actively engaged in preventing threats, just as it was noted by the 2008 Defence Commission and in the 2010 – 2014 Defence Agreement. Therefore the adaptation and activism thesis is good at explaining the developments. It is possible to follow such policies because Denmark’s stress sensitivity has become very low, due to the disappearance of
traditional military threats. On the other hand, this has meant that there has been and is an
Page 67 opportunity to influence international developments more, understood by Due-Nielsen and Petersen as influence capability. This capability has led to activism in security and defence policy, meaning that the Danish armed forces’ have been adapted to military deployments far from Danish shores. Furthermore, it can be established that Denmark has acted as a unitary actor in this time period, as parliament time and again, and generally with wide support, has passed decisions that has enabled Danish participation in international military operations. In the next chapter, I will discuss these findings in relation to classic realism in order to show why a small state as Denmark can benefit from pursuing an activist policy internationally in a world where competition is the order of the day.
Page 68