Democrat Republican Independent
overwhelmingly Republican between 1960 and 2008 (see Figure 3.2), Catholics, in 2008, split evenly between the parties. Realignment has clearly occurred in both cases, but while
contemporary white evangelicals dependably vote for Republicans, today’s Catholics have no consistent partisan preference.
Because Catholics and evangelicals, in a sense, started from the same place – social conservatism – but developed as political groups in distinctly different ways, Catholics’ split partisan allegiance may present a plausible alternative scenario to the evangelical partisan
trajectory. However, there are important theological differences between the two groups. Perhaps most notably, Catholicism does not connote the same intensity of views – for example, biblical literalism – that evangelicalism does. Indeed, there are few “moderate” evangelicals based on the theological definition of who is an evangelical. As a result, the comparison is limited. Yet, Catholic party identification data demonstrates that, given a changed set of historical, social, and political circumstances, we might observe a different affiliation pattern – or no consistent
partisan affiliation at all – with regards to white evangelicals.
Given the possibility of a different outcome, I explore the historical, social, and political dynamics of white evangelical partisan affiliation. In doing so, I provide an explanation for why we observe white evangelicals today widely affiliated with the GOP. First, I explain why the group was perhaps best thought of as “up for grabs” in terms of party affiliation as late as the middle part of the 20th century. I then examine the group’s incorporation into the Republican Party, critically evaluating two scholarly explanations of how and why white evangelicals became a constituency of the GOP. The first, from David Karol, focuses almost exclusively on party elites as political entrepreneurs. The other, from Geoffrey Layman, places the movement of conservative evangelicals into the GOP as part of a larger partisan realignment of southern
whites, focusing more on group actors. I will conclude that while Karol’s framework is in many respects instructive, it is limited because it considers evangelicals one-dimensional Christian issue political actors. That is, it does not account for issues or political conflict outside the direct political transaction between Republican elites and white evangelical actors, thereby ignoring the fact that evangelicals have preferences on both Christian issues and other issues.178
Conversely, Layman’s model, by embracing the cultural conflicts that resulted from Democratic cultural and racial liberalism (and Civil Rights policymaking) during the 1960s- 1970s, takes into account at least some simultaneous political turmoil. This allows for a more complete understanding of evangelical political behavior and partisan preference. However, by emphasizing the idea of a culture war, Layman’s explanation is also limited. The culture wars thesis is problematic in that it minimizes the influence of political entrepreneurs and
oversimplifies complex religious, social, and moral cleavages.179 I will therefore conclude that because both explanations are limited in scope and applicability, they should be thought of as simultaneous political processes.
A “Sleeping Giant”? White Evangelicals and Party Affiliation
Despite salient evangelical Republicans such as Jerry Falwell and Pat Robertson, it is problematic to assume that white evangelicals would inevitably become (or always were) Republican Party constituents. In fact, it would be better to consider white evangelicals, who were weakly affiliated with the Democratic Party through the 1960s, relatively unattached voters
178
By “Christian issue” I refer to the issues traditionally important to religious conservatives. For example, sexual politics (abortion, the ERA, the “traditional family”), school prayer, and the Christian school movement. As we will see, evangelicals also have strong opinions on issues not traditionally associated with religious conservatives such as foreign policy and the politics of race.
179
See discussion in Chapter 2. The term culture war comes from the sociologist James Davidson Hunter’s 1991 book of the same name. See Hunter, Culture Wars: The Struggle to Define America.
until the late 1970s. Political scientist Albert Menendez goes as far as to characterize evangelicals as historically the “sleeping giant of American electoral politics” in his 1977 book.180 Menendez draws on both the group’s size – white evangelicals make up approximately 25% of the electorate – and historically nonpartisan inclinations to support his claim.181 Years of relative political isolation, perhaps due to geographic, social, and economic isolation, help to contextualize Menendez’s claim.182 Additionally, evangelicals historically resisted politicization, preferring instead to attempt to “save souls” rather than reform society.183 Reichley sums up this perspective in observing that white evangelicals were historically “quiescent” Democrats, mostly as a result of their concentration in the South where the Democratic Party had “monopolized” political power.184 Based on white evangelicals’ historical status as relatively unattached voters as well as group’s theological distrust of politics, incorporation into the Republican Party does not seem intuitive or expected.
This is further illustrated in Table 3.1, showing the groups that were most closely associated with the Republican and Democratic Parties in 1972 and 1984. During the early 1970s, evangelicals remained, to use Reichley’s terminology, quiescent, at least in the eyes of party constituents – the group was not closely associated with either party in 1972. Yet by 1984, evangelicals were strongly associated with the GOP, demonstrating the group’s partisan
incorporation.185 Therefore there must have been some group-party affiliation process between
180Albert J. Menendez, Religion at the Polls (Philadelphia: Westminster Press, 1977). 104. 181Wilcox, Onward Christian Soldiers? The Religious Right in American Politics: 46. 182
Guth, "The Politics of the Christian Right," 12. 183
Ibid., 23. 184
A. James Reichley, "Pietist Politics," in The Fundamentalist Phenomenon: A View From Within; A Response From Without, ed. Norman J. Cohen (Grand Rapids, Mich: Eerdmans, 1990), 73.
185Arthur H. Miller, Christopher Wlezien, and Anne Hildreth, "A Reference Group Theory of Partisan Coalitions," The Journal of Politics 53, no. 4 (1991). See also Oldfield, The Right and the Righteous: The Christian Right Confronts the Republican Party: 112.
1972 and 1984 that to a large degree drove evangelicals into the Republican Party. In this light, Menendez’s early portrayal of evangelicals as a “sleeping giant” seems fitting.
Table 3.1