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The moderating theory of factional-led institutional change offered here is

straightforward, and builds on existing models of party and group organization. I posit that group-led change develops in Congress when groups develop the internal infrastructure necessary to empower their members to overcome institutional hurdles to challenge the status quo. If Congress is designed to prevent junior members or representatives of marginalized groups from accessing and exercising formal power, then the development of a strong group organization provides members with an alternative source of power. Organization moderates the capacity of party factions to drive procedural, policy, and leadership change. The better organized the group, the greater their capacity to subsidize the pursuit of their members’ individual and group goals regardless of party and/or leadership support. Organizationally-weak factions will struggle to unite their members behind a coherent agenda or leadership, or mobilize them when their interests are at stake. Organizationally-strong factions will develop specific agendas

representative of their interests, and will succeed in mobilizing their members to support their mutual goals. Figure 2.1 illustrates the model of group-driven institutional change offered here. In the pages that follow, I introduce the components of group organization necessary for members to overcome the common coordination problems and succeed in a challenging legislative

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Figure 2.1: Moderating Theory of Group-Driven Institutional Change in Congress

Legislative scholars have long recognized the inherent transactional nature of party membership in Congress. Coordination between members with inevitably competing interests and goals is inherently difficult; parties incentivize individual participation and contribution to compensate for, and marshal, these competing interests (Aldrich 1995). Members will participate and contribute to upholding the party brand, and in exchange, parties help members fulfill their (re)electoral, good public policy, and prestige goals (Cox and McCubbins 1993, 2005).

Incentives include not only material and purposive selective benefits, but also a range of services to subsidize their responsibilities to represent their district. In more specific terms, if members participate and contribute to the party, the party will give them plum committee assignments and leadership positions, the party will support them in tough re-election races, the party will ensure they receive floor votes on legislation and amendments they sponsored, and so forth (Pearson 2015). This arrangement between party members and leaders is not inherent to the U.S. Congress or political parties – it was strategically developed by the parties themselves (Stewart and Jenkins 2009).

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Party factions confront the same organizational problems as the broader party. If they want to encourage members to contribute and participate in the group, and to reconcile members’ often competing goals and interests, they need to develop a similar set of internal mechanisms, tools, and resources to encourage individual participation in the group (Olson 1965; Schwartz 2006; Weinstein 1967; DiSalvo 2012). Coordination within parties does not just happen – the seeds of cooperation between leaders, members, and constituents were gradually developed by all involved over time. Party factions and groups are no different. Organized factions incentivize individual contribution, regularly mobilize members to participate, resolve conflict consistently and transparently, and elevate leaders reflective of the broader membership.

Prior research on the pitfalls of group coordination (Olson 1965; Weinstein 1967; Matson 1958) and the realities of the legislative environment (Hall 1998; Aldrich 1995; Cox and

McCubbins 2005) reveal five critical aspects of organization, each of which I examine extensively:

• Mechanisms to promote the participation of members; • Resources to support group activities;

• Strong leadership to advocate on behalf of group interests; • Established group decision-making processes; and

• Tools to share information between group members.

Each of these indicators of organization are strategically developed by members. They are not inherent or naturally developed by groups – no matter their size or internal cohesiveness – nor are they the consequence of a static, one-time decision with infinite returns. Just as party elites must make a continual decision to invest in the development of internal resources and tools, so too must party groups and factions.

When new groups initially emerge in the political environment, they often have some organizational structure – for example, a specific leader(ship) and a membership, a set of

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principles that guides decision-making, even a physical office or building that ostensibly

represents the group itself. But structure does not inherently imbue the group with the capacity to promote member cooperation in support of their collective goals, or that the group follows some well-developed, coherent internal order. Many groups form around the ambitions of a single charismatic leader with no long-term collective goals or strategy to achieve them, or the group emerges only sporadically to protest the status quo or challenge legislation on the agenda without long-term coordination of their efforts or the resources to develop a legitimate alternative

(DiSalvo 2011; Hammond 2001). Other groups form as more of a social outlet for members with similar policy preferences, but lack the motivation to coordinate strategic collective action around those preferences.

Organized factions are rendered distinct from these groups through their decision to focus

on their own internal group development as a strategy for external impact.3 _{Group power here is} a product not of group size, the internal cohesion of their ideological convictions, or the salience of their policy agenda. The power of groups of members to overcome the significant barriers to institutional change, including the stark power asymmetries and informational asymmetries between junior and senior members (see chapter one and four for more detail), is a function of their organization. The more organized groups are, the greater their capacity to develop and marshal their members’ competing interests and expertise towards the common pursuit of the group’s shared and individual goals.

In addition to rule and procedural reform, organization enables factions to overcome the two central barriers to long-term representation of their interests – leadership advancement and

3 _{Of course, organization is not a dichotomous concept such that groups are either “organized” or “not}

organized.” Rather, organization is understood here as an ordered concept (with high, moderate, and low levels) with specific observable indicators that can be empirically measured and employed to construct variables of interest (see Cotter at al. 1989).

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policymaking participation. Organized groups provide members with the training and experience necessary to be competitive for leadership positions, including policy experience outside of their own committee assignment; visibility and connections in the House with other members, the leadership, interest groups, and the media; access to tools and resources for building legislative coalitions around important policy priorities in the House; and almost instantaneous prestige and cachet that comes with being a part of a group with a known reputation in the House. If

leadership advancement depends on either recruitment by current party leaders or the self-starting initiative of ambitious rank and file Members (Loomis 1984; Peabody 1967; Canon 1989), organized party factions can bridge the gap – simultaneously helping self-starters while grooming members unlikely to be recruited by party leaders. Further, organization empowers groups with the resources to inform and mobilize their members about policy problems and relevant

proposals, the authority and legitimacy to negotiate between policy allies inside and outside of Congress (including party leaders, the Administration, and interest groups), as well as the tools necessary to coordinate legislative coalitions around specific policy proposals. These are all critical components of agenda-setting with the public, at the committee stage, and on the floor (Kingdon 2010).

Here I depart from the sequence of institutional change outcomes commonly assumed in most theories (see Figure 2.1 above). Procedural, policy, and leadership change are irrevocably linked in the House of Representatives. But whereas most theories assume that procedural change alternatively and simultaneously promotes leadership (Schickler, Sides, and McGhee 2003) and policy change (Rohde 1991), I argue that each of these three dimensions of change shapes the processes and outcomes of the other dimensions. Members themselves are keenly aware of the close interplay between these three dimensions of change; they often pursue

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mediated by party leaders. Success along one dimension can be leveraged to achieve and further success along another. When groups succeed in the passage of formal rule and procedural changes, organization enables factions to capitalize on that success to pursue their policy agenda. And when groups are successful at moving their ambitious allies and representatives into formal leadership positions, these leaders use their institutional power to enforce procedural reforms and place into practice the group’s policy goals. Long-term representation of group interests is dependent on simultaneous pursuit of all three dimensions of institutional change.

The role prescribed here for party organization in promoting leadership emergence and policy agendas is in keeping with a vast literature on organization at all levels of government. Jenkins and Stewart (2007) explain agenda-setting power in the House through organization. The historical development of the majority party’s organizational monopoly empowered the

development of the procedural cartel (Cox and McCubbins 1993) and centralized agenda-setting processes in the contemporary House (Rohde 1991).

In Key’s (1964) conception of party organization, organization serves as a thoroughfare through which relationships are developed and maintained between elected officials and the party members that elect them. The congressional caucus literature, especially work by Susan

Hammond (1989, 1991, 2001) and Stevens, Mulhollan and Rundquist (1980), builds on this theory and applies it to organizations of members in Congress. Caucus organization empowers members involved to place issues on the agenda, and receive the leadership experience necessary to be competitive for leadership races (or to be recruited by existing party leaders). Organization helps foster relationships between future and current leaders, as well as other party members in Congress. The state and local parties’ literature provides further evidence that organization

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enables both “programmatic” agenda-setting activities by parties at the state level (Cotter et al. 1989), and control over candidates for local elections (Masket 2009).

There is also evidence that organizational weakness negatively shapes group longevity. For example, Rae (1989) found that liberal Republicans’ failure to organize inside and outside of Congress explains their inability to regain the agenda-setting success they enjoyed during the Johnson, Nixon and Ford Administrations. The group simply did not have the capacity to leverage the initial agenda momentum they gained in the 1960s and 1970s, and ultimately disappeared from the party altogether.