Estrategia de posicionamiento en mercados competitivos

Liberals were keenly aware of the significance of their decision to organize – a decision with far reaching implications for the Democratic party brand and the reputation of their party leaders. The initial reluctance by liberal leaders to formalize the association between themselves and their likeminded partisans underscores this fact. Throughout the 1950s, liberals met

frequently to vent and share their frustrations over their lack of power and inability to fulfill policy promises to their constituents. This relatively amorphous group of junior members of Congress met under a variety of names, including the Mustangs, McCarthy’s Mavericks (for Representative, and later Senator, Eugene McCarthy (D-MN), the Select Planning Committee, the Liberal Study Group, and the Liberal Steering Committee. Absent regular meetings of the

Democratic Caucus, liberals lacked any other forum for meeting with their fellow partisans to discuss policy, issues back home in their districts or in their own re-election races, intra-party politics, or complaints with their party leaders. But lacking a majority in the Democratic Caucus and access to formal power in the House, these meetings were more of a social – rather than legislative – forum for members to meet with one and other. They were not a venue for long- term strategic planning or coordination. Their most visible activity to date was the “Liberal Manifesto,” an outline of liberals’ major legislative goals that was introduced on the House floor on January 8, 1957, and widely viewed as a strategic misstep for revealing their hand to the opposition too early (Ferber 1965).

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majority within the Democratic Caucus to accomplish any of their goals, and they believed this election was their chance. Anticipating a watershed election for Democrats, a small group of liberals, including Reps. Frank Thompson (D-NJ), Henry Reuss (D-WI), George Rhodes (D-PA), and Lee Metcalf (D-WY), began contacting Democratic candidates to inform them of their “liberal Democratic program.” They worked with a small volunteer group of staffers to offer candidates “assistance…in supplying certain specific types of research data which might be useful to them in their campaign against the Republican incumbent.”3 _{Their efforts included} warning Democratic incumbents and candidates in advance of interest group attacks (such as the Chamber of Commerce), and preparing candidate responses to them. The goal was to engender support among these Democrats prior to their election to Congress, with the hope that they would join the group after they got elected (a strategy DSG would adopt for much of their tenure in the House). The 1958 election ultimately increased the Democratic majority by 49 seats to 283, and as anticipated, many of these new Democratic members wanted to join the “liberal group.”

To prepare for this larger Democratic majority, Reps. Thompson, Reuss, Rhodes and Metcalf sent a Dear Colleague letter to 80 liberal members in December 1958 stressing the key gatekeeping power provided by the Rules Committee, which “strangled liberal legislation of vital importance to our constituencies and the well-being of the country as a whole.”4 _{The letter asked} members to respond with their opinion about whether or not Democrats “should endeavor to liberalize House rules at the beginning of the 86th _{Congress,” the specific types of changes should} be advanced, and their opinion as to the best strategy to adopt to achieve these rules changes. Enclosed with the letter was a memo outlining proposed changes in House rules, including

3 _{November 12, 1958 letter from Reps. Thompson, Rhodes, Reuss, and Metcalf to Rep. John E. Moss.}

DSG papers, Part II, box 159, folder 1.

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petition, various proposals to strengthen party responsibility, modifying the functions and power of the Rules Committee, and liberalizing procedures for sending bills to Conference.5 _The

majority of the proposed reforms outlined in the memo targeted the committee system, rather than the number of leadership positions available to members, the type of power wielded by party leaders, or the function and power of the Democratic Caucus. Though reforms targeting these areas were discussed, they were pushed off for future congresses.

These early efforts were guided by a strategic plan, entitled the “Proposed Master Plan and Timetable for Efforts to Liberalize House Rules.” The plan underscores how wary party leaders initially were of this emerging group of liberals. The Master Plan stressed personal, member-to-member recruitment tactics to reassure and offset “Leadership attempts to dissuade them from joining us by use of special favors, promises of committee assignments, threats, etc.”6 These concerns provide first-hand evidence that individual members and factions in Congress are hampered by the leadership’s unique access to carrots and sticks to induce their fellow partisans to fall in line (Peabody 1967; Pearson 2015). The Master Plan also advanced a strategy to maintain contact with Democrats on the “Leadership fringe” to gauge the leadership’s counter- activity and potential areas of compromise. Rep. Richard Bolling (D-MO), a Rules committee

5 _{The 21-day rule stipulated that if a bill had been held in the Rules Committee (after referral to the}

committee) for 21 calendar days, the chairman of the relevant committee of jurisdiction for the bill could bring the bill directly to the floor of the House on the second and fourth Mondays of every month. The discharge petition provides a mechanism for a large plurality (at times, 150) or simple majority (no more than 218) of members to bring a bill directly to the floor if the relevant committee of jurisdiction refuses to report the bill.

6 _{These recruitment tactics will be discussed briefly below and in detail in chapter four, but the tangible}

benefits of membership were stressed at every point. DSG members gained access to a wide array of information and research services on legislation before the House and other policy issues, as well as a variety of campaign services (polling services, interest group contacts for donations, etc.).

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and the leadership, and Rayburn often sent Bolling to speak as his representative to liberals.7 Cognizant of the need for the leadership’s support to pursue any rules changes, liberals dispatched Rep. Chet Holifield of California, a comparatively moderate member, to lobby Speaker Rayburn immediately prior to the beginning of the 86th _Congress.8 _{Holifield advocated} for three specific reforms intended to address liberals’ concerns: (1) add an extra Democrat to the Rules Committee (Holifield advocated for a western liberal), (2) allow as few as 150 members to discharge legislation from committees (rather than 218), and/or (3) reinstate the 21-day rule, which provided that if the Rules Committee did not act within 21 days on a bill duly reported to its jurisdiction, the bill could be automatically brought to the floor for a vote.9 _{At issue for the} liberals was the strong belief that liberal and conservative Democrats “should not be protected from controversial legislation. They should vote on important committee reported bills.” Party and committee leaders who suppressed critical policy issues (in part to “protect” members from controversial legislation) limited the capacity of liberals to cast meaningful votes on issues important to their constituents. To liberals, this was a violation of their institutional and representational responsibilities – and as Holifield remarked from the House floor, “If a Congressman does not have the ‘guts’ to vote on legislation, he needs a ‘wet nurse.’”10

7 _{While this document did not explicitly state which Democrats were considered to be on the “leadership}

fringe,” Bolling is the most likely candidate. In earlier communication between Holifield, Blatnik and Rayburn, Rayburn stated that he would send Bolling as his representative to address liberals.

8 _{Memo from Holifield re his telephone call with Speaker Rayburn. DSG papers, Part I, box 55, folder 3.} 9_{In theory, the Rules Committee serves as a “traffic cop,” responsible for determining the “rules” of debate}

governing legislation voted on the House floor and ensuring the orderly and fair consideration of

legislation. Many members – Democrat and Republican alike – also viewed the Rules Committee as – in the words of Rep. Charles Halleck (R-IN) – a critical check on the “unwise, unsound, ill-timed, spendthrift and socialistic measures” (CQ Almanac 1951). However, during much of this period, the ideological divisions within and between the two parties and the absolute power of the Rules committee chairman, Rep. Smith, enabled the committee to serve as a veto point for liberal legislation. Chairman Smith would – as congressional folklore has popularized – go home to his Virginia farm to “milk his cows,” and the Rules Committee would simply not assign a rule.

10 _{October 20, 1960 DSG Legal Memo “Oppositions in the House of Representatives to a Change in the}

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Committee, had turned down proposals to increase the size of his Committee, and Rayburn was not currently interested in the other proposals. Holifield left the call with the impression that Rayburn was chiefly interested in sowing up the southern vote for Speaker. And indeed, Rayburn had no intention of breaking up the long-fought coalition between the leadership and southern, conservative Democrats for a group of junior members. He was especially unsympathetic to liberals’ demand for a westerner on Rules, replying “You boys can raise this in the next Caucus if you want to, but I think you better not.”11 _{After the meeting – and over the Speaker’s warnings} not to speak to the press – Holifield released a statement that simultaneously proclaimed success and held Rayburn accountable for potential legislative failures: “We have received assurance from Speaker Rayburn that legislation which has been duly considered and reported will be brought before the House for consideration within a reasonable period of time.”12 _Rayburn’s concerns over how the press would interpret their conversion was not unfounded. After Holifield’s pronouncement, a Washington Post editorial declared that “The Speaker has a clear obligation now to redeem that pledge. Indeed, he faces a determination whether he or Rules Committee Chairman Howard Smith is the leader of the House.” Nevertheless, in exchange for Rayburn’s pledge, liberals promised to forgo their efforts to reform House rules and the “Master Plan” was put on hold.

11 _{Undated 1959 meeting minutes between Speaker Sam Rayburn and John Blatnik. DSG papers, Part I,}

box 55, folder 7. As the Democratic Caucus only met immediately prior to the beginning of each Congress during this time period, this conversation likely occurred immediately prior to the January 1959

organizational meeting of the Caucus. The request by DSG for a “westerner” on the Rules Committee may seem surprising at first to congressional scholars well versed in speaking in terms of “Northerners” and “Southerners.” However, the archival record reveals that liberal Democrats rarely identified themselves as or advocated on behalf of “Northern Democrats” (though they did routinely speak of “Southern

Democrats”). DSG usually advocated on behalf of “National Democrats” or “westerners,” who the group believed were systematically under-represented in leadership positions in the party and on committees.

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on his promise, or whether they believed they simply had no other options after their

conversation. But within a few months, liberals learned that not only was Rayburn unable to fulfill his promise to rein in the Rules Committee, but if they wanted to accomplish their

procedural reform agenda, they needed strong allies of their own in the leadership – and their own site of institutional power in the House.13 _{Despite his assurances, Rayburn could not fulfill his} promises to them that the Rules Committee would not block liberal legislation. A powerful and beloved Speaker, Rayburn simply did not have the institutional power to bypass the Rules Committee on his own, and he was unwilling to spend his precious political capital and risk his own leadership position to press the issue (Polsby 2005). Absent leadership support, liberals needed a majority in either the Democratic Caucus and/or on the House floor. Despite large increases in their Democratic majority in 1958, liberals did not have the votes for any formal rules changes. Thus, they needed to not only increase their ranks electorally, but to win the support of Democrats already in Congress who may not have foreseen the need for change. This task was not insignificant; the hurdles confronting them seemingly insurmountable. But on September 9th _{– a mere 8 months after Holifield’s unsuccessful phone call with Rayburn and his} promise to place the “Master Plan” on hold – the Select Planning Committee met in the Judiciary Committee room and the Democratic Study Group emerged.

Despite strenuous efforts by liberals to avoid DSG being seen as a threat or challenge to party leaders, the Washington Press Corps immediately seized on the story of this group of “Mustangs” who came into the open [in December 1958]…when it sent a mimeographed fact

13 _{Liberals were keenly aware that their reform proposals would go nowhere without strong support in the}

leadership. In a December 30, 1960 DSG meeting at the George Washington Inn, a subcommittee devoted to the “Rules Committee problem” reported that “there is little chance of correcting the Rules situation unless the Group has the approval of the Speaker” (part II, box 159, folder 2). Rayburn would eventually push (a temporary) proposal to expand the Rules Committee, but not until the start of the 87th _Congress.

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sheet on the Rules Committee to prospective supporters.” These press accounts highlight the complex position the formalization of this group placed upon Democratic leaders in Congress. When Rep. Holifield proclaimed that Speaker Rayburn had promised liberals that legislation “duly considered and reported” from committee would receive votes on the House floor,

Rayburn’s ability to deliver on that promise was viewed as a reflection of his power in the House. While the emergence of this new faction of liberals in the Democratic Caucus may not have necessarily weakened Rayburn directly, it certainly exposed weaknesses in his own institutional power and leadership – weaknesses he likely did not want brought to light (Peabody 1967; Cox and McCubbins 1993, 2005).

But Rayburn was a shrewd political strategist. He recognized the critical negotiating leverage this group of liberals would provide him, especially on the types of social policy issues prioritized by DSG. In an interview, former DSG executive director and longtime congressional staffer Scott Lilly, described how the group’s emergence shaped Rayburn’s strategic position within the party:

“Rayburn was smart and knew that if he was going to help Johnson or Kennedy deliver on any kind of program as president, he knew they needed to get control over the Rules Committee. He thought it was going to be a really good thing for younger progressive members to start giving [Rules Committee Chairman] Judge Smith a hard time, and then he could come in as a mediator when the time came. He could come in here as a

mediator.”15

The assumption was that if liberals pushed legislation (and rules changes) to the left of what Democrats in the House – and southern, conservative committee chairs – would normally pursue,

14 _{Don Irwin. “House Rules Group Curb is Sought: Liberals Act to Cut Its Power.” New York Herald}

Tribune. December 7, 1958.

15 _{Lilly’s account of the relationship between DSG and party leaders was reinforced through interviews}

with other staffers. For example, a long-time DSG staffer recalled a similar symbiotic relationship between DSG and Speaker Wright during the Iran-Contras affair in the 1980s. In an interview (August 6, 2015), one staffer said that “Wright was opposed to the whole Nicaragua thing and so he found DSG useful to kind of gin up opposition to Reagan, and DSG was able to finally get opposition to cut off funding [to the Contras]. And DSG was willing to do this because it was the kind of thing they would do regularly.”

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ultimately more liberal than would ordinarily emerge. The most important facet of the group was not necessarily their size and ideological coherence, so much as their legitimacy, which only became apparent through organization. Absent DSG, it was harder for Rayburn to make the argument before staunch conservatives like Chairman Smith (D-VA) that there was a coherent group of members supporting institutional change – a force within the party that needed to be reckoned with.

It is important not to overstate the potentially hostile relationship between liberals and their party leaders in the late 1950s and early 1960s (Zelizer 2015). Nevertheless, liberals’ perception that the leadership and the Democratic Caucus did not represent their interests provides the foundation of their decision to organize themselves. Liberal Democrats had no incentive to suppress differences with their colleagues and protect the “party brand” because the benefits of majority party status went to their more conservative, senior colleagues (Cox and McCubbins 1993, 2005). The party did not further their policy, electoral, or perhaps most critically, power goals in the House (Fenno 1974). And party leaders, for their part, failed to mobilize and coordinate liberals, to elevate their policy priorities, or to support the leadership ambitions of liberal Democrats in Congress. Their first-hand experiences in the 1950s made it abundantly clear to liberals that their procedural, policy, and leadership change agenda was mediated by formal sites of power in Congress. The only way to combat the rampant power and informational asymmetries in the House was to strategically organize their own site of leadership power in DSG. While this task would ultimately take years – a fact liberals were keenly aware of – it is a critical factor in explaining the transformation of the House and the Democratic Caucus throughout the mid- to late-twentieth century.

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