For the purpose of this thesis, airpower is defined as all forms of aviation that can be used for COIN. It includes all the aircraft, Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs) and the various kinds of loads that they can carry for different roles in COIN. Airpower can be employed in a COIN in two ways: indirect and direct. The indirect employment supports
41 K.E. here means fire power, whether from ground or air.
42 Corum, Fighting the War on Terror, 27-8.
43 William R. Polk, Violent Politics: A History of Insurgency, Terrorism and Guerrilla War, from the
other elements to fight the insurgents or win over the population. Reconnaissance and surveillance can offer useful information about the location and movement of insurgents. In transport, airpower affords quick reaction to the ground forces against emerging threats from insurgents. Air logistics can support ground forces to sustain operations in isolated areas for extended period; it can also support the population and other agencies in execution of economic development. Psychological operations can be targeted on insurgents to generate divisions in their ranks. In a direct role, airpower is used to apply kinetic energy through close air support or independent air strikes against the insurgents. Enhanced range, endurance and accuracy resulting from technological advancements in the last two decades have substantially increased the lethality of airpower.
Airpower has the unique ability to operate in a third dimension, which allows quick concentration of force at the most important place and appropriate time without confronting most of the adversary’s ground defenses. Early airpower theorists identified this ability of airpower to strike directly at the adversary’s centre of gravity (COG), and therefore advocated massive, decisive and independent employment of airpower. Giulio Douhet, for instance, recommends “neutralizing an enemy’s strategic ‘vital centre.’”44
Hugh Trechard argues that airpower can “shatter the will of an enemy country” without destroying an entire generation.45 Similarly, William Mitchell says that attacking an
enemy’s war-making capability and will to fight “would yield a victory that was quicker and cheaper than one obtained by surface forces.”46 It is interesting to note that these
claims were made before the Second World War, when the inaccurate targeting due to technological constraints allowed only 20 percent of weapons to be within 1000 feet of the target.47
44 Meilinger, “Giulio Douhet,” 1.
45 Meilinger, “Trenchard, Slessor, and Royal Air Force Doctrine,” 41.
46 Mark A. Goldfelter, ed., “Molding Airpower Convictions: Development and Legacy of William
Mitchell’s Strategic Thought,” in The Path of Heaven: The Evolution of Airpower Theory, edited by Phillip S. Meilinger (Alabama: Air University Press, 2001), 78.
47 Craig D. Wills, The Cadre Papers: Airpower, Afghanistan, and the Future of Warfare (Alabama:
Airpower technology has made significant progress during the last six decades. The accuracy has improved exponentially. The GPS guided Joint Direct Attack Munitions (JDAMs) used in recent conflicts such as Afghanistan and Iraq are accurate within 10 to 15 feet even under complete overcast conditions or at night.48 The accuracy
and high reliability of modern weapon systems allow discreet engagement of targets with a high degree of success provided the target can be correctly identified. Many have criticized airpower for lack of persistence. Low fuel consumption due to improved engine technology, air to air refueling and UAVs now allow significantly increased range and endurance. Increased endurance coupled with reliable and highly mobile communications provide a greater sense of security to the ground component of a counterinsurgency effort. Ground troops chasing insurgents into populated areas are increasingly inclined to go an extra mile for a hard-kill because they can rely on airpower if trapped in a dangerous situation. Technologically, airpower has the potential to salvage a variety of situations, but it often comes with a political cost due to associated collateral damage. Thus, some of the effects of technological progress on COIN, such as precision targeting and rapid response, cannot escape the serious limitations inherent in the political nature of COIN. 49
The lethality of airpower has often forced insurgents to hide in populated areas.50
It has drastically reduced the chances of military defeat for counterinsurgents because the insurgents are unable to concentrate and launch a decisive “strategic offensive”—Mao’s third phase. Such revolutionary tactics require the concentration of insurgent forces to win and hold ground, exposing them to direct application of airpower that may cause debilitating casualties. However, political gains may be nullified if airpower is identified as foreign or seen to represent external players. In this case, even a population that has been physically and ideologically separated from the insurgents may retain sympathy for indigenous rebels if victimized by of a foreign air assault. Recent airpower theorists,
48 Wills, The Cadre Papers, 10.
49 Steven Metz, “Small Wars: From Low Intensity Conflict to Irregular Challenges,” in Rethinking the
Principles of War, edited by Anthony D. McIvor (Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 2005), 280.
50 Adam J. Vick et al., Air Power in the New Counterinsurgency Era (Arlington: Rand Corporation,
therefore, consider indirect use of airpower such as transport, reconnaissance and surveillance more important and effective for COIN, especially when the insurgents are not physically separated from the population. In conventional warfare, direct use of airpower becomes more effective and the political consequences of collateral damage less damaging when battle lines and allegiances are clearly delineated.51