Entrenamiento de la red neuronal

Based on Niedenthal et al.’s (1999) theory of emotional response categorisation, this study’s first hypothesis proposed that the induction of affective feelings (emotive prime), but not the activation of affective knowledge (cognitive prime), would cause participants to re-organise their perceptions of effect similarities and CSA sequelae. However, while emotion formed the means of categorisation for some item groups (guilt, shame, arousal), these categories were also endorsed by all participants of the emotional, cognitive, and no-prime group. Participants seem to have organised CSA descriptors according to a function or common goal as one of the primary criteria for classification, for example, by grouping together different coping efforts (risk-taking/impulsive or avoidant behaviour). Overall, an even split of functional and emotional response categories was reported. Emotional arousal did not cause participants to consistently organise categories by means of emotion , hence, no support for Bower’s (1981) associative network/spreading activation model was found.

In the recovered similarity framework, however, some dimensions in this sexual abuse research corroborate with previous general research using MDS to determine underlying criteria for categorisation, such as arousal difficulties (Russell, 1980) and avoidance/withdrawal (Davidson, 1992). Study Two’s outcome corresponds to Study One’s findings using an additional sample of expert participants. This research’s emotional axis of arousal difficulties and guilt/shame shows thematic resemblance to the hyperarousal/anxiety and blame/low self-esteem poles of the combined lay-expert framework (Study One). Resulting from the two studies, it can be concluded that participants carry a stable and congruent model of which CSA effects are related or “belong-together”. This organisation is independent of their level of “expert” knowledge, attempts of cognitive restructuring through training by a professional, or their emotional state at the time of the task. Such shared internal representations ensure participants similar understanding of the effects and coping descriptors on RESA hence form a preliminary step to interpreting participants’ attitudes in the next task.

Attitude

The second hypothesis of this study, based on the affective priming effects, proposed that all priming and no-prime conditions will yield different attitudes of CSA sequelae. The cognitively primed group was also expected to be different from the no-prime group because only the former group was given the chance in an ‘expert lecture’ to adjust their underlying models about CSA. Although the post-study questionnaires demonstrated that participants processed the content of the short films according to the intended experimental effect, participants’ responses of CSA sequelae did not vary between the groups. Contrary to the study’s second hypothesis, common trends were again found across the emotional, cognitive, and no-prime samples. One can argue that these results portray the common cognitive schema or perception about CSA outcome carried by a high number of non- abused individuals. This was the case although evidence has shown that negatively aroused participants are those trying to over-compensate for bias in the study (reversed priming

effect) and are less likely to rely on their pre-formed knowledge (Glaser & Banaji, 1999). Reversed priming increases the likelihood that participant will over-correct their judgment and become more cautious in their evaluation. Gender differences in judgments were only found for our non-primed sample with female attributing significantly more maladjustment to CSA than men. Previous research on abuse detection has indicated gender differences, with females showing greater tendency to suspect child abuse (Kendall-Tackett & Watson, 1991). However, as there were only small numbers of participants in each profile, female and male perceptions were again investigated in the following Study Three.

Several alternative explanations for the study’s outcome can be considered before conceptual ideas on the origin of stable CSA perceptions are discussed. Firstly, ineffectiveness of the primes could account for the similar results, as Fazio (2001) reported that the associated strength of the prime moderates automatic attitude activation. Short responses to a questionnaire completed after the study, however, displayed differences in participants’ emotional states, thus validating the effectiveness of the primes.

Secondly, it could be argued that all participants were in a state of (emotional) equilibrium regardless of the manipulation. For example, the exposure to written stimuli describing CSA effects could evoke a similar emotional response across all individuals, also known as semantic priming, which could account for the matched perceptions. However, Innes-Ker and Niedenthal (2002, p. 807) showed that “processing of emotional verbal material does not necessitate the induction of an emotional state” by finding that participants’ emotional state was not affected by completing an unscrambling task of emotional sentences. Another reason for the emotional equilibrium could be that the exposure to the task and its instructions may have elicited emotions. As the attitude task specifically asked participants to imagine what will follow sexual abuse, it is probable that thinking about CSA can lead to subjective feelings of distress in the participants. Yet again, previous research has demonstrated that concentrating on cold cognitive aspects during an emotional procedure can prevent participants from actually experiencing the emotion. Niedenthal and Halberstadt (2001) used an emotion-evoking film in which one half of the participants

were instructed to focus only on cold, cognitive aspects of the prime (number of camera perspectives) to prevent them from experiencing an emotional reaction. It was shown that while the emotional group was more likely to use emotional response categorisation, the cognitively stimulated group was not systematically affected by the film. Participants who concentrated on cold aspects of the prime still reported awareness and could recall the emotional content. They did not, however, actually experience the emotion and therefore produced non-emotional categories (Niedenthal & Halberstadt, 2001). This result is similar to the cognitive group in the present research, who, as shown in the questionnaires, recalled cognitive aspects of the film without reporting emotional responses despite engaging in a potentially emotion-inducing task.